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Malware classification, specifically the task of grouping malware samples into families accord-
ing to their behaviour, is vital in order to understand the threat they pose and how to protect
against them. Recognizing whether one program shares behaviors with another is a task that
requires semantic reasoning, meaning that it needs to consider what a program actually does.
This is a famously uncomputable problem, due to Rice’s theorem. As there is no one-size-fits-all
solution, determining program similarity in the context of malware classification requires
different tools and methods depending on what is available to the malware defender.
When the malware source code is readily available (or at least, easy to retrieve), most
approaches employ semantic “abstractions”, which are computable approximations of the
semantics of the program. We consider this the first scenario for this thesis: malware classifica-
tion using semantic abstractions extracted from the source code in an open system. Structural
features, such as the control flow graphs of programs, can be used to classify malware reason-
ably well. To demonstrate this, we build a tool for malware analysis, R.E.H.A.which targets the
Android system and leverages its openness to extract a structural feature from the source code
of malware samples. This tool is first successfully evaluated against a state of the art malware
dataset and then on a newly collected dataset. We show that R.E.H.A. is able to classify the
new samples into their respective families, often outperforming commercial antivirus software.
However, abstractions have limitations by virtue of being approximations. We show that by
increasing the granularity of the abstractions used to produce more fine-grained features, we
can improve the accuracy of the results as in our second tool, StranDroid, which generates
fewer false positives on the same datasets.
The source code of malware samples is not often available or easily retrievable. For this
reason, we introduce a second scenario in which the classification must be carried out with
only the compiled binaries of malware samples on hand. Program similarity in this context
cannot be done using semantic abstractions as before, since it is difficult to create meaningful
abstractions from zeros and ones. Instead, by treating the compiled programs as raw data, we
transform them into images and build upon common image classification algorithms using
machine learning. This led us to develop novel deep learning models, a convolutional neural
network and a long short-termmemory, to classify the samples into their respective families. To
overcome the usual obstacle of deep learning of lacking sufficiently large and balanced datasets,
iii
we utilize obfuscations as a data augmentation tool to generate semantically equivalent variants
of existing samples and expand the dataset as needed. Finally, to lower the computational cost
of the training process, we use transfer learning and show that a model trained on one dataset
can be used to successfully classify samples in different malware datasets.
The third scenario explored in this thesis assumes that even the binary itself cannot be
accessed for analysis, but it can be executed, and the execution traces can then be used to
extract semantic properties. However, dynamic analysis lacks the formal tools and frameworks
that exist in static analysis to allow proving the effectiveness of obfuscations. For this reason,
the focus shifts to building a novel formal framework that is able to assess the potency of
obfuscations against dynamic analysis. We validate the new framework by using it to encode
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1 Introduction
Malware, ormalicious software, is a term that encompasses all programs that intentionally
exhibit a malicious behaviour. Two things are worth investigating: 1) what makes a program
behaviour “malicious” and 2) what it means for a program to “intentionally” exhibit a malicious
behaviour.
In general, a malicious behaviour in a program can be anything that the end user did not
approve of. Any program action that causes breach of privacy, denial of service, loss of data,
etc., without the user’s explicit approval, is an example of malicious behavior. It is an acceptable
behaviour when a program sends the private data of the user to an end system if the user is
fully aware and is okay with what is happening. Conversely, if the program sends private data
without the user’s express permission, or worse, without their knowledge, that is considered
to be a malicious behavior.
Due to the various types of malicious behaviours and their wildly diverse effects, there are
many categories in which to classify malware. Some of the most common types are:
• adware→malware that infects systems so that advertisements are injected into programs
that would not otherwise have them
• scareware→ these programs make users think something bad happened through the
use of scare tactics, in order to compel them to act against their best interest
• ransomware → areas of the filesystem are encrypted by the malware and will be de-
crypted only after the user pays a hefty amount of money
• spyware→ the private information of the user is mined without permission to be later
sold or used directly by the malware vendors
This is by no means a complete list, and most malware would not fit neatly into just one
of the types outlined above. Most malicious programs, in fact, tend to have more than one
malicious behaviour, and thus can be grouped in multiple categories.
It is more interesting, then, to consider malware as belonging to different “families”, which
are more specific groups than the categories above. A malware family is a class of malware
that have the same behaviours and usually descend from one common initial sample. For





initial malware sample that first locks the device of the user (denial of service), then steals
their information (spyware), and finally encrypts the device and asks for a ransom to decrypt
it (ransomware).
The fight against malware is a continuous one: when security experts find a way to fight a
particular malware family, malware developers will inevitably generate variants of the existing
samples or come up with an entirely different type of malware that is impervious to the new
anti-malware techniques. From the security angle of this work, malware developers will be
often called “attackers” while “defenders” will refer to the agents identifying and analyzing
the malware.
Malware Classification
Malware classification is the task of categorizing malware samples into specific groups. The
simplest type of malware classification has two classes, malware and goodware (benign
programs), and it consists of simply determining whether a program is malware or not. Familiar
classification is a more complex malware classification problem, where we classify malware
samples according to their “family”, i.e. a group of malware that behaves similarly or, in other
words, that exhibits the same malicious behaviours.
If malware can be successfully grouped according to their behaviors, the reverse engineering
process can be expedited to find a “cure”. A successful familiar classification of a malware
sample can also allow the systems to apply whatever correction is needed to fight the malware,
provided that the malware family is a known threat for which a solution has been already
found.
For this reason (and possibly many others that will not be considered in this thesis), un-
derstanding when two programs have the same behaviour is an important task in software
security. In order to classify malware according to their behaviours, we first need to consider
what they actually do. In other words, we need to be able to group them according to their
semantic similarity. This, as will be proven later in the chapter, is an undecidable problem.
The problem being undecidable does not mean that it cannot be solved ever, just that there
is no algorithm that will work correctly for every instance of the problem. The key word here
is “correctly”, as one way to approach an undecidable problem is to voluntarily lose accuracy
and thus allow for errors in the results, as long as the errors can be accounted for.
Scenario 1
One way to approximate the task of determining program similarity is to use abstractions of





these approximations. Clearly, this will result in a loss of accuracy in the results. These
semantic abstractions have to be built from program code, which means that the defenders
either have to possess the original source code or they need to be able to retrieve a suitable
representation of it (i.e. through reverse engineering efforts or disassembly). In the scope of
this work we call this “scenario 1”, and it represents all situations where the source code is
readily available for analysis or can be easily retrieved.
Building a semantic approximation of the program and then defining a similarity function
between the approximations has the clear advantage of making the results readily interpretable.
The control given to the analyzers (the defenders) in generating the program representations
translates into their ability to know what these representations mean, and what their flaws are.
This is a double edged sword, as the loss of accuracy allows the problem to be approximately
solved but also opens it up to be exploited by the attackers. In fact, one of the drawbacks of this
approach is that there are clear and defined limits to the expressivity of the approximations
(and/or their similarity functions).
On another note, scenario 1 is not necessarily the most common one in the wild, especially
in malware analysis.
Scenario 2
It is very common for malware (especially on desktop systems) to be distributed as compiled
binaries, and as a result, it is not always easy to obtain the original source code through reverse
engineering or disassembly of these binaries. For this reason we consider “scenario 2”, where
the malware is in a binary form and it is neither feasible nor convenient to rebuild its source
code.
Working with the binary representation of a program is wildly different from the previous
approach, since compiled programs do not easily lend themselves to the extraction of semantic
abstractions. We could attempt to create an approximation of the binary, but that does not
address the issue of the disassembly process not completing or failing altogether. Furthermore,
this strategy leads to the same drawbacks as in the previous scenario.
Since it is harder to apply domain expertise and build easily interpretable program ap-
proximations and similarity functions, it might be a good idea to let them be discovered by
learning algorithms instead. The malware binaries can be treated as raw data, as there are
many learning algorithms that work well with raw, unstructured data. These algorithms often
fall under the umbrella term of “deep learning” and are doubly apt for the task since many of







So far we have assumed that malware classification has to rely on statically obtained infor-
mation, namely, information retrieved either from the source code or the compiled binary.
This has some advantages, as static analysis is a very well understood field that has been
explored for decades and has produced many theoretical and practical results. These allow us
the expertise needed to focus our efforts in the right direction. But one of the downsides is
that static analysis is inherently imprecise, and there is always a way for the attacker to fool a
system that relies solely on static analysis, be it hard coded or learned from raw binaries.
One way to skirt the imprecision issues of static analysis is to adopt dynamic analysis, which
consists of running the programs under analysis and then analyzing the individual execution
traces. We call this “scenario 3”, which can be associated with any real situation where even
the binary cannot be analyzed but it can be executed. The main difference here is that whatever
is observed during a dynamic analysis is “true”, meaning that the system cannot be “fooled”
into imprecision by the attackers.
Dynamic analysis comes with its own problems. For example, since the execution traces
being analyzed must be of finite length, the program under execution has to be stopped early
in the case of long execution times, thus possibly losing information. There can also only be a
finite number of these execution traces, which gives rise to a further loss of information.
In Section 1.3 we expand on the three scenarios in the context of malware classification.
Goal
The goal of this thesis is to explore the intricacies and the pitfalls of program similarity analysis
in the context of malware classification. In order to place our work into the right context,
we identify three real life scenarios and analyze how to minimize the impact of their unique
pitfalls. The scenarios can be clearly divided by the amount of “openness” of the system in
question and by the amount of domain expertise specific to program analysis that can be
utilized to solve the problem in each of the scenarios.
This first chapter serves as a general introduction to the concept of program similarity
and its use mostly in malware detection and malware classification. We will start with an
intuitive distinction between syntactic similarity and semantic similarity between programs,
subsequently delving into why this is a hard problem to tackle. The last section of this chapter
outlines the contributions of this thesis and serves as general introduction to the next three
chapters that will detail the development of three case scenarios.
4
What is Program Similarity and Why it is Useful
Section
1.1
Figure 1.1: Semantically similar methods in two Android malware samples
1.1 What is Program Similarity and Why it is Useful
The first important distinction that has to bemade is between program “similarity” and program
“equivalence”. When two malware samples are equivalent, they will invariantly exhibit the
same malicious behaviours, so this condition is sufficient to classify them in the same family. It
is not a necessary condition however, since two programs do not need to be equivalent in order
to exhibit the same behaviours. The behaviours themselves need not be exactly equivalent
between malware samples belonging to the same family, rather, they just need to be means to
the same goal.
For example, if two malware samples are designed to steal the personal information of a
user and then upload it to some remote server, they do not necessarily need to go through the
same steps. This makes them not equal, but still similar in their semantics. Figure 1.1 shows
an example of this exact scenario found in two Android malware samples.
In other words, equivalence is a stronger concept that always implies similarity. Similarity
is weaker, but, as we argue at the end of this section, it is more appropriate when dealing with
malware.
A second important distinction is between "semantic" and "syntactic" program similarity.
Syntactic Similarity
Take two programs 𝑃1 and 𝑃2. They are syntactically similar if they are written similarly, for
example 𝑃1:
1 x = int(input())
2 for i in range(x):







1 x = int(input())
2 for i in range(x):
3 x = x + x
4 print(x)
These two programs are almost identical, the only difference being the operator used in the for
loop, making them syntactically similar. While sharing most of their code, the two programs





In broad terms, when we are interested in how a program is written we refer to its syntax.
When the focus is on what the program computes we refer to its semantics. In this light, 𝑃1
and 𝑃2 are syntactically similar but semantically different.
Syntactic similarity between programs is far from useless. Often enough, syntactic similarity
implies semantic similarity. It is also useful to look for syntactically similar code when hunting
for bugs in big codebases, since bugs are often the result of implementation mistakes which
are inherently syntactic.
Semantic Similarity
Semantic similarity deals with what the programs actually compute and forgoes how they
are written altogether. Even within the scope of semantic similarity, there are many different
types of semantics that can be considered.
For example, when two programs compute the same function they have the same denota-
tional semantics. This is referred to as functional equivalence or input-output equivalence and
it is what we generally mean when we say that two programs are semantically equivalent. A
stricter type of semantics, for example, is operational semantics which deals with more fine-
grained information (especially small-step semantics). Two programs are equivalent according
to their operational semantics if they compute the same function and they go through the
same states while doing so. Operational semantic equivalence implies denotational semantic
equivalence but the opposite does not hold.
Malware Similarity
It is unclear which type of similarity is more correct in the context of malware classification. If
two samples are semantically equivalent, then they definitely belong to the same family. If they
are syntactically equivalent, then that implies semantic equivalence and they again belong
to the same family. If they are semantically similar, they belong to the same family when the
shared behaviours are the defining behaviours of the family. If they are syntactically (sometimes
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stylistically) similar, then they might have been written by the same developer/group or share
the same code, thus possibly belonging to the same family.
This last type of classification is very valuable, as it makes it easier to trace the malware
samples back to the same author [119]. Generally, knowing which features characterize a
malware developer makes it easier to identify their source and stop their spread. After all,
defeating the malware once it has already spread is only half the battle.
In this work, we will never consider stylistic similarity, as our goal is to group malware
according to their behaviours. In order to do so, we will not use semantic equivalence but rather
semantic similarity, as many malware variants tend to be equivalent only in the malicious part
and semantically divergent in the rest of the program. Chapter 2 deals with this aspect more
in detail.
Notation
For the remainder of this work we will alternate between intuitive notions and more formal
language. In the latter, every program is usually represented by the letter 𝑃 , while two
or more programs will be distinguished by their subscripts as 𝑃1 and 𝑃2. Every program
𝑃 belongs to the set of all programs ℙ, for which we can also write 𝑃 ∈ ℙ. When two
programs are syntactically different we can write 𝑃1 ≠ 𝑃2, but this is technically redundant as
∀𝑃𝑛, 𝑃𝑚 ∈ ℙ.𝑛 =𝑚 ↔ 𝑃𝑛 = 𝑃𝑚 . If 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are functionally equivalent we write [[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]],
where [[𝑃]] represents the semantic function [[]] applied to the program 𝑃 . In order to express
subprograms, or parts of a program, we will indicate them as a subset of the original program
with lowercase letters as in 𝑝1 ⊂ 𝑃1. The set of all programs semantically equivalent to a given
program 𝑃 is the equivalence class 𝑃 [[]] defined as 𝑃 [[]] := {𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ | [[𝑃]] = [[𝑃𝑖]]}.
Programs can be transformed syntactically and this transformation generates a new program,
such that a code transformation T ∈ 𝕋, can be defined as T : ℙ→ ℙ, where 𝕋 is the set of all
code transformations.
A program similarity algorithm represents a function that ideally takes two programs as
input and generates a measure of similarity between them: S : ℙ × ℙ → {0, 1}. Instead of
considering the whole program, many program similarity algorithms generate an abstract
representation 𝑃A that approximates the semantics of the program. Ideally the abstract
representations and the similarity measure would work against program transformations so





1.2 Why Program Similarity is Hard
There are various degrees in which a problem can be "hard". For a human, calculating the result
of 3 459 123 ∗ 123 234 is a hard task. For a computer, this is a simple mathematical operation
that can be solved in O(1), which does not mean that it can be solved instantly, but only that its
difficulty does not change with a change in input size (in fact, there is no input to this problem
at all).
A computer might instead struggle with an instance of sub-graph isomorphism, since it
belongs to the class of NP-complete problems, that is, the class of problems for which it is
not clear whether a polynomial solution exists at all. But even for how hard NP-complete
problems can be, a solution to them always exists (possibly by using brute force) that will halt
in finite time. This is not always the best reassurance since the heat death of the universe will
also occur in finite time.
Even so, there is an entire class of problems for which we do not have even this small
guarantee, which are computationally unsolvable (or uncomputable) problems. The most
famous uncomputable problem is the Halting Problem: find an algorithm that will decide
whether a computer program halts or not. It is unsolvable because it can be proved that no
such algorithm exists.
The problem that we are set to tackle in this thesis is also an unsolvable problem, and its
reason for being unsolvable is deeply connected to the halting problem itself. In this section
we make a case for why program semantic similarity is such a hard problem, starting from an
intuitive view of the matter and later exploring its formal foundations.
1.2.1 Intuition: Infinite Syntactic Variants Exist for the Same Program
As the challenge in determining semantic similarity between programs is finding an algorithm
for it, all discussion of this problem in this work will be from the point of view of automated
processes. We will not discuss how hard it is for a human to understand when two programs
compute the same function.
In general, it is hard to check whether two programs compute the same function because
there are infinite semantics-preserving syntactic variants for any program. This means that
given any program 𝑃1, there is an infinite class of program transformations T1,T2, . . . ∈ 𝕋 for
which it is true that ∀𝑖 ∈ ℕ.[[T𝑖 (𝑃1)]] = [[T𝑖+1(𝑃1)]].
This is relatively easy to prove, even in an intuitive way, by using the padding technique. In
most programming languages there is a statement that corresponds to no-op, or an instruction
that does nothing at all. In assembly this is famously the NOP command, but even in languages
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that do not have an explicit way to write an empty command we can build it by generating
idempotent statements like:
1 x := x + 1;
2 x := x - 1;
By defining a function T : ℙ→ ℙ that adds a no-op statement anywhere in the code we
create an algorithm that generates syntactic variants of programs while maintaining their
semantics. Applying this function 𝑖 times to a program 𝑃 ∈ ℙ can be written as T 𝑖 (𝑃),
i.e. T 3(𝑃) := T (T (T (𝑃))). Every application of the function adds a no-op statement to
the code, so is clearly true that ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ.𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 → T 𝑖 (𝑃) ≠ T 𝑗 (𝑃). At the same time,
since adding a no-op does not influence the semantics of the program, we have that ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈
ℕ.[[T 𝑖 (𝑃)]] = [[T 𝑗 (𝑃)]]. Since programs are finite strings, adding one statement produces
another finite string, thus the function T can be applied a countable infinite number of times.
This generates 𝑃 T , an infinite set of semantically equivalent programs that are syntactic
variants of 𝑃 . Considering 𝑃 [[]] , the set of all programs semantically equivalent to 𝑃 , it can
be shown easily that 𝑃 T ⊂ 𝑃 [[]] (for example, by applying the idempotent operations shown
above generates variants that are not in 𝑃 T ). It is then proven that there exist infinite syntactic
variants of any program.
The fact that infinite syntactic variants of the same program exist tells us that checking
syntactic similarity alone will not cut it. Comparing the syntax of two programs is generally
not enough when trying to gauge their semantic similarity. At the root of the problem is the
simple fact that the semantics of a program is an inherently infinite object, while the syntax is
finite. Take the following program 𝑃 :
1 x = int(input())
2 return x + 1
𝑃 is a very short program at only 2 lines long. Its semantics is the semantics of the successor
function, which is a map of every integer to its successor. The size of the semantics of this
program is |ℕ × ℕ|. From this we gather two insights:
1. The syntax of a program is easy to work with but it is often not enough for determining
program similarity
2. The semantics is impossible to work with
The intuitive notions explored above do not ultimately prove that we are dealing with an
uncomputable problem, but hopefully they have laid an intuitive groundwork that can be






In order to prove formally that semantic program equivalence is an uncomputable problem,
we will now introduce Rice’s theorem and explain intuitively why it is connected to program
similarity analysis. We start by giving an overview of recursively enumerable, recursive and
non-recursively enumerable sets. Note that we will only consider subsets of ℙ for this section,
but the definitions are the same for subsets of ℕ. In fact, there is an easy bijection from ℙ to ℕ
(ℙ is a set of finite strings that can be easily ordered), which means we could consider either
set, but ℙ was chosen for clarity.
We start by defining the concept of extensionality, which is a key part of Rice’s theorem.
Extensionality
A property of programs is any subset of the set of all programs ℙ. For example, the property
of all programs that halt when given an even number as input clearly defines a subset of ℙ.
The sets ∅ (empty set) and ℙ are, of course, properties of ℙ and they are referred to as “trivial”.
Intuitively, it is very easy to check whether a program belongs to either of these trivial sets (it
either is a program or it is not).
In order for a property 𝛱 , a subset of ℙ, to not be trivial there needs to be at least a program
𝑃1 ∈ 𝛱 and a program 𝑃2 ∈ ℙ/𝛱 . Some of these non-trivial sets are recursively enumerable
sets, and they belong to the superset 𝑅𝐸. If a set 𝐴 ⊂ ℙ is in 𝑅𝐸, then there exists an algorithm
which can decide whether an element 𝑃 ∈ ℙ belongs in ℙ in finite time. If it is also possible to
check in finite time whether an element 𝑃 ∈ ℙ does not belong in 𝐴 ⊂ ℙ, then 𝐴 is a recursive
set. These belong to the superset 𝑅. Within 𝑅 lay all decidable problems about programs.
For example, there is an algorithm that checks whether a program 𝑃 ∈ ℙ belongs to the
property of “all programs that are more than 5 lines long” and one to check whether 𝑃 does
not belong to such a set. This makes the set recursive and the problem decidable.
There is also an algorithm that can tell in finite time whether a program 𝑃 ∈ ℙ halts when
given itself as an input ([[𝑃]] (𝑃) ↓). Intuitively, the algorithm could just run 𝑃 until it eventually
halts and then answer TRUE. However, an algorithm that can tell whether 𝑃 will not halt on
itself ([[𝑃]] (𝑃) ↑) does not exist. This is an example of undecidable problem (also referred to as
uncomputable). It describes a recursively enumerable set that is not recursive, the property 𝐾 ,
which is famously the set of programs that halt when given themselves as inputs. It is proven
that 𝐾 ∈ 𝑅𝐸 \ 𝑅.
We can now define extensionality. A property 𝛱 ⊂ ℙ is extensional if:
𝑃1 ∈ 𝛱 ∧ [[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]] → 𝑃2 ∈ 𝛱 (1.1)
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Recall that [[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]] means that 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 compute the same function (denotational
equivalence). In other words, a property 𝛱 is extensional if every program therein included
shares the property with all its semantically equivalent counterparts. It is easy to see that both
trivial properties defined earlier (ℙ and ∅) are extensional properties.
It can also be shown that the empty set is the only finite extensional property. As we
have proven in the previous section, there are always infinite syntactic variants to a program.
Now assume that a program 𝑃1 is in the property 𝛱 . In order for 𝛱 to be extensional, then
∀𝑃2 ∈ ℙ.[[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]] → 𝑃2 ∈ 𝛱 . This implies that all the syntactic variants of 𝑃1 will also
belong to 𝛱 , making it an infinite set.
Rice’s Theorem
The theorem can now be stated:
Theorem 1. Given an extensional property 𝛱 , then 𝛱 ∈ 𝑅 ↔ (𝛱 = ∅ ∨ 𝛱 = ℙ)
In other words, the only decidable extensional properties are whether a program is a program
(𝑃 ∈ ℙ) or whether it is not (∅). Any other extensional property then represents an undecidable
problem. Not all undecidable problems are extensional. For example, the set 𝐾 mentioned
above is not recursive but it is also not an extensional property. We will not prove Rice’s
Theorem in this thesis as it needs some more background notions and it is generally out of
scope.
It is interesting to note how this theorem ties in with program similarity analysis. Checking
whether two programs 𝑃1, 𝑃2 ∈ ℙ are semantically equivalentmeans proving that [[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]].
Given a program 𝑃 we can define its semantic equivalence class 𝑃 [[]] (the set of programs
semantically equivalent to 𝑃 ) as 𝑃 [[]] := {𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ | [[𝑃]] = [[𝑃𝑖]]}. We can now use Rice’s
theorem to prove that this is not a recursive set and thus it describes an undecidable problem.
The first step is to prove that 𝑃 [[]] is not “trivial”, which means proving 𝑃 [[]] ≠ ∅ ∧ 𝑃 [[]] ≠ ℙ.
We start with the most basic assumption that 𝑃 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] , since a program has to belong to the
set of programs semantically equivalent to itself. The second simple assumption is ∃𝑃2 ∈
ℙ.[[𝑃2]] ≠ [[𝑃2]], since there exists at least one program that is not semantically equivalent to
𝑃 .
Proof. 𝑃 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] → ∃𝑃1.𝑃1 ∈ 𝑃 [[]]
∃𝑃2 ∈ ℙ.[[𝑃2]] ≠ [[𝑃]] → ∃𝑃2.𝑃2 ∈ ℙ \ 𝑃 [[]]





Now we have to show that 𝑃 [[]] is an extensional property. For this proof the simplest
assumption is that, if a program 𝑃1 belongs to 𝑃 [[]] , then all programs semantically equivalent
to 𝑃1 must also belong to the same set. After all, 𝑃 [[]] is a semantic equivalence class.
Proof. ∀𝑃1 ∈ ℙ.𝑃1 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] → ∀𝑃2 ∈ ℙ.[[[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]] → 𝑃2 ∈ 𝑃 [[]]]
∀𝑃1, 𝑃2 ∈ ℙ.{𝑃1 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] → [[[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]] → 𝑃2 ∈ 𝑃 [[]]]}
𝑃1 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] → [[[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]] → 𝑃2 ∈ 𝑃 [[]]]
𝑃1 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] → [[[𝑃1]] ≠ [[𝑃2]] ∨ 𝑃2 ∈ 𝑃 [[]]]
𝑃1 ∉ 𝑃
[[]] ∨ [[𝑃1]] ≠ [[𝑃2]] ∨ 𝑃2 ∈ 𝑃 [[]]
𝑃1 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] ∧ [[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]] → 𝑃2 ∈ 𝑃 [[]] □
Since 𝑃 [[]] is an extensional property and it is not “trivial”, then according to Rice’s theorem,
it is not a recursive property and thus it represents an undecidable problem.
Now we can tie it neatly to our problem setting. Assume we have an algorithm S that in
finite time can tell when two generic programs 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are semantically equivalent (and
when they are not). Then this algorithm can be applied to 𝑃 and any other program 𝑃𝑖 , meaning
it would be possible to decide in finite time whether 𝑃𝑖 belongs in 𝑃 [[]] or not. This is absurd, as
it would imply that 𝑃 [[]] is a recursive set, thus such an algorithm does not exist. A key aspect
of this result is that it does not matter how small or simple the initial 𝑃 is, there is no algorithm
that will always halt and correctly decide whether it is equivalent to any other program.
Now that the reader is hopefully convinced of the uncomputable nature of program semantic
equivalence, we argue that all is not lost. In fact, the general problem is unsolvable, but it still
needs to be tackled for all the reasons we outlined in Section 1.1.
As mentioned earlier, in order to tackle uncomputable problems we need to sacrifice some-
thing. We need to sacrifice generality, as in: our solution will not be applicable to all problems
in this set. This means that what we end up losing in the end is precision, as any methodology
we come up with in order to solve an uncomputable problem will not be accurate. It is a small
price to pay, especially if we can somehow pinpoint exactly where our solution falls short and
why.
This aspect will be expanded upon in the following subsections.
1.2.3 Obfuscations
As shown in previous sections, programs can be modified in (countably) infinite ways and still
maintain their input-output semantics. More formally, we can define a semantics-preserving
syntactic program transformation T : ℙ→ ℙ as:
∀𝑃 ∈ ℙ.𝑃 ≠ T (𝑃) ∧ [[𝑃]] = [[T (𝑃)]] (1.2)
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The set of all possible semantics-preserving code transformation is 𝕋. Many of these possible
modifications entail adding blank statements or no-op statements to the code, as it is the
simplest form of syntactic transformation that does not interfere with the semantics by design.
Equivalently, we have shown how idempotent statements can be inserted anywhere in the
program, for example x := x + 1 followed immediately by x := x - 1. These types of
transformations tend to be avoided especially in compiled languages, since most compilers
are equipped with enough heuristics for optimizations that will remove such meaningless
statements.
A more interesting class of program transformations considers only those that transform the
original program into another “which is much more difficult [...] to understand” [32]. These
are called “obfuscations”.
It should be clear that this definition of obfuscation is rather vague. What does it mean
for a program to be “much more difficult to understand”? By whom is it understood? This
is generally dependent on the problem setting, but for this thesis, obfuscations will try to
fool automated analyzers, meaning algorithms. The problem of fooling human analysts is an
interesting one, but it can be argued that humans and computers have such a different skill set
that many of the obfuscations used to fool humans would probably not work on automated
approaches, and vice versa.
Take program 𝑃1 as an example:
1 x = input()
2 if x > 0:





It is a very simple program that, with any input greater than 0, will return either 0 or 1
(depending on whether the input is even or odd), while with negative integers as input, it
will return the input unchanged. The program can be modified to a semantically equivalent
version that is slightly harder to understand, T (𝑃1):
1 x = input()
2 while x > 1:
3 x = x - 2
4 return x
The obfuscation applied above has a structural effect on the control flow of the program, as





Figure 1.2: The CFG for 𝑃1 (left) and T (𝑃1) (right)
In order to further confuse the syntax, from the modified program T (𝑃1) we can easily
apply another obfuscation and obtain T1(T (𝑃1)):
1 x = input()
2 z = -x
3 while z < -1:
4 z = (z * 6)/3 - 4
5 z = z / 2
6 return -z
The obfuscation shown above uses simple idempotent arithmetic operations in order to
complicate the syntax of the programs. The CFG of the program is structurally identical to
what it was before the transformation. All the code above is in Python so any skeptics can
easily check that the three programs do indeed compute the same function. Of course, there are
many more types of obfuscations other than the ones that affect the control flow or arithmetic
operations, some of which are explored in Chapter 3.
It is interesting now to enquire whether it is always possible to modify a program such that
the resulting version is muchmore difficult to understand. To this end, there is a very interesting
impossibility result reached by Barak et al. [10] that seems to have put a definite pin on the
possibility of general obfuscation. The truth is that the aforementioned study simply finds
a class of functions that cannot be obfuscated with the "black-box" obfuscation requirement.
Thus this result, while groundbreaking, does not apply to other models for obfuscations.
Among these there is the “indistinguishability obfuscation” model [12], for which there are no
impossibility results. Moreover, a candidate construction of an indistinguishability obfuscator
for general circuits has been proposed recently by Garg et al. [59].
For the purpose of this study, we assume that obfuscation is possible for any program, since
the “black-box” requirement is unnecessarily strict and there are no impossibility proofs for
other models.
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Figure 1.3: The 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 abstract domain (left) and the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 domain (right)
1.2.4 Static Analysis
Static analysis encompasses all types of analysis that operate on the source code, or on any
static representation of the program, be it a disassembled version or the compiled binary.
We mentioned in the previous section how, with static analysis, it is possible to “sacrifice”
precision in order to regain computability. The key advantage of static analysis is that, unlike
dynamic analysis, it allows one to reason about infinite computations. Another advantage of
static analysis is that it can be built to be sound, meaning that it will either return results that
are correct for the program under analysis or return “I do not know”. Throughout this thesis
we will not worry about the soundness of our analyses but it is an important aspect that is
worth mentioning.
Abstract Interpretation
Abstract interpretation is a well known mathematical framework for static analysis developed
in the 70’s by Radhia and Patrick Cousot [37]. Intuitively, abstract interpretation allows to
formalize most (if not all) static analyses by substituting the concrete domain on which the
program is evaluated with an abstract domain. Then, the concrete semantics is replaced by an
abstract semantics that correctly approximates the semantics of the program on the abstract
domain. One of the advantages of abstract interpretation is that it allows to build static analyses
that are sound by design.
In this thesis we use abstract interpretation only for examples in this chapter and in chapter
4, so we will not delve too deep into the formalisms.






1 x = 10
2 while x > 1:
3 x = x - 2
4 return x
𝑃2 :
1 x = 15
2 while x > 2:
3 x = x - 3
4 return x
𝑃3 :
1 x = -9
2 while x < 0:
3 x = x + 2
4 return x
𝑃4 :
1 x = -9
2 while x < 1:
3 x = x + 2
4 return x
Figure 1.4: A motivating example
defined as [[]] : ℙ → (𝔻 → 𝔻). The semantics specifies how a program evolves from the
starting state to the end state and is needed in order to know what the program computes.
For simplicity, in our examples the domain of the programs is ℕ. In abstract interpretation,
an abstraction A is a quadruple ⟨𝐴, ≤, 𝛼,𝛾⟩ where 𝐴 is a set of abstract elements 𝑎 that are in
direct correspondence with elements 𝑐 in a concrete set 𝐶 via the monotone functions 𝛼 and 𝛾 :
𝛼 : 𝐶 → 𝐴
𝛾 : 𝐴→ 𝐶
(1.3)
Since the elements in the concrete domain and the abstract domain are a partially ordered set,
this quadruple describes a Galois connection. The abstract elements of 𝐴 are less or equally as
precise as the elements in 𝐷 . For example, since our computational domain is ℕ, some possible
abstract domains are 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 and 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 , pictured in Figure 1.3.
Given an abstraction A = ⟨𝐴, ≤, 𝛾, 𝛼⟩, the corresponding abstract semantics can be defined
as:
[[]]A : ℙ→ (𝐴→ 𝐴) (1.4)
The abstract semantics of a program 𝑃 represent a function between abstractions 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴.
Assuming a simple concrete semantics in which 𝔻 = ℕ, if A is an abstraction of the stores,
then the resulting abstract semantics is a function between elements of 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 or 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠:
[[𝑃]]A : 𝐴→ 𝐴 (1.5)
The abstract semantics is the best approximation of the concrete semantics for a program 𝑃
when we have that [[𝑃]]A = 𝛼 ( [[𝑃]]). This is the best case scenario and it corresponds to
the concept of completeness in abstract interpretation [66]. Nonetheless, it is not a common
scenario for most program analysis tasks.
We can use abstract interpretation to generate semantic abstractions of programs and show
how imprecise these abstractions are compared to the concrete semantics.
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Taking the program 𝑃1 in Figure 1.4 as an example, the value of the variable 𝑥 at the return
point is 0 so the concrete semantics of the program is ∀𝑛 ∈ ℕ.[[𝑃1]] (𝑛) = 0. Since the result
does not depend on an input value we can write [[𝑃1]] = 0. When the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 abstraction is
considered, then the abstract semantics of the program actually return [0, 1]. Let us unravel the
abstract computations step by step in order to gauge how the process works, at least intuitively.
We monitor the value of the variable 𝑥 (which is the return variable) in the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 domain,
starting from its initial value of 10, which corresponds to [10, 10] in the abstract domain of
choice. The program points are characterized by the letter 𝑙 and the number of the line in
which the corresponding instruction appears.
𝑙1 : [10, 10] → 𝑙2 : [10, 10] → 𝑙3 : [8, 10] → 𝑙2 : [8, 10] → 𝑙3 : [6, 10] → 𝑙2 : [6, 10] →
(1.6)
→ 𝑙3 : [4, 10] → 𝑙2 : [4, 10] → 𝑙3 : [2, 10] → 𝑙2 : [2, 10] → 𝑙3 : [0, 10] → 𝑙2 : [0, 10] → 𝑙4 : [0, 1]
(1.7)
What happens in the first 3 lines of the program is relatively simple to explain, the abstraction
keeps track of all possible values of 𝑥 and thus only the lower bound is decreased. In order to
exit the while loop, the exit condition has to be met (𝑥 < 1), thus the value at 𝑙4 is obtained by
solving 𝑥 ∈ [0, 10] ∧ 𝑥 < 1, which yields 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly this abstraction is not ideal for 𝑃1,
since approximating the result of the concrete semantics yields a more precise result than the
one just obtained. In other words, 𝛼 ( [[𝑃1]]) = [0, 0] thus 𝛼 ( [[𝑃1]]) ⊂ [[𝑃1]]A .
Moving to the program 𝑃2 in Figure 1.4, its semantics is simply [[𝑃2]] = 0, exactly like 𝑃1
thus we have that the two programs are semantically equivalent ([[𝑃1]] = [[𝑃2]]). Following
the same steps as above, the abstract semantics of 𝑃2 computed on the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 domain is
[[𝑃2]]A = [0, 2]. Not only is this result not precise, meaning that 𝛼 ( [[𝑃2]]) ⊂ [[𝑃2]]A , the
abstraction for this program is even less precise than for 𝑃1 ([[𝑃1]]A ⊂ [[𝑃2]]A). The programs
𝑃1 and 𝑃2 represent two semantically equivalent programs that would have evaded detection if
the similarity function simply equated their abstract semantic representations. In other words,
they represent a false negative in the program similarity problem.
On the other hand, program 𝑃3 represents a program that is semantically divergent from 𝑃1
and 𝑃2, since [[𝑃3]] = 1. To illustrate the imprecision of static analysis, 𝑃3 has been crafted so
that its semantics on the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 domain is equivalent to the one for 𝑃1: [[𝑃3]]A = [0, 1] =
[[𝑃1]]A . Their equivalence in the abstract representation can be seen as a false positive for a
program similarity analysis that considers these abstractions as program representations.
Finally, 𝑃4 is a program that is semantically equivalent to 𝑃3, thus semantically divergent





The abstract semantics for this program is precise as [[𝑃3]]A = 𝛼 ( [[𝑃3]]). More importantly,
comparing the abstractions finally leads to a true negative result for 𝑃1 and 𝑃4: [[𝑃1]] ≠
[[𝑃4]] ∧ [[𝑃1]]A ≠ [[𝑃4]]A .
Interestingly enough, it is possible to generate infinite functions semantically equivalent
to 𝑃1 that are never equivalent to each other in their abstract representations. The following
program, 𝑃𝑛 , is a generic template for these functions, which also preserves the number of
executed while loops as an invariant.
1 x := 5 + (5 * n)
2 while (x > n):
3 x := x - (n + 1)
Assuming 𝑛 is an input variable, it is relatively easy to see that ∀𝑖 ∈ ℕ.[[𝑃𝑛]] (𝑖) = 0. At the
same time it is also true that ∀𝑖 ∈ ℕ.[[𝑃𝑛]]A (𝛼 (𝑖)) ⊂ [[𝑃𝑛]]A (𝛼 (𝑖 + 1)).
The goal of these examples is to show what kind of imprecision can be added by semantic
abstractions, and consequently, static analysis as a whole. This is not done to discourage the
use of static analysis or semantic approximations of programs but merely to give an intuitive
vision on what the pitfalls of these approaches can be. It should be clear by now that comparing
the syntax of programs to understand whether they are semantically similar is not the right
way to go, and thus the most sensible choice is still to approximate the program semantics.
1.3 Malware Analysis
Hopefully the previous sections will have convincingly outlined why program similarity is
an interesting, albeit hard, problem to tackle. This section inserts program similarity in the
context of malware classification and better introduces the three scenarios mentioned earlier.
Malware Families
Knowing when to classify a malware sample into a specific family can be a hard problem. If it
is syntactically equivalent to other samples already successfully classified in the same family,
then the process is simplified. Recall that syntactic equivalence implies semantic equivalence
and if two malware samples 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 are semantically equivalent ([[𝑀1]] = [[𝑀2]]), then
they naturally belong to the same family. But two malware samples do not necessarily need to
be semantically equivalent in order to belong to the same family. This is true especially with
mobile malware.
In general, a malware sample is not simply a program that only affect a systems negatively.





as benevolent programs and conceal their malicious nature as much as possible. This means
that, given two malware samples 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 belonging to the same family, it is generally
unwise to expect [[𝑀1]] = [[𝑀2]]. Of course, if that happens, then the two samples do indeed
belong to the same family and they are either the exact same program, or a simple syntactic
variant of one another.
A more complex situation is where two malware samples share only their malicious behav-
iors, while differing in their benevolent facades. In this case, we would need to isolate the
malevolent parts and check their semantic similarity, as in𝑚1 ⊂ 𝑀1,𝑚2 ⊂ 𝑀1.[[𝑚1]] = [[𝑚2]] .
Then 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 would belong to the same malware family, provided that𝑚1 and𝑚2 are in
fact their malicious behaviours.
Knowing for certain that two programs 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 are semantically equivalent is hard
enough (generally impossible, in fact), and having to account for the situation in which only a
subset of their semantics to be equivalent is evidently harder. A possibly even harder problem
is detecting clearly what constitutes a “malicious” behaviour.
Presenting solutions to these problems is out of scope for this section, but they need to be
introduced in order to define the scenarios in which we position ourselves.
Three Scenarios
We mentioned that, not unlike other uncomputable problems, the problem of malware classifi-
cation can be (partially) solved in many different ways.
In order to apply static analysis approaches we first need to possess a static representation
of the programs, be it source code, assembly or compiled binary. If the source code of the
malware samples is available, then the best choice might be to develop a program similarity
tool that explicitly makes use of known program representations and their respective similarity
measures. This of course is only possible with the presence of source code or disassembled
code.
Earlier in this chapter, we mentioned how obtaining the source code of malware or correctly
disassembling them is not always feasible, thus leading us to identify the three scenarios.
These scenarios can be thought of as being defined by the inherent “openness” of the system
under analysis. For example, we will see how Android is an open system that allows the easy
recovery of the source code or a very close representation of it. Windows on the other hand, is
much more closed, and recovering the source code from compiled programs is much harder.
The openness of the systems describes the amount of information about the program that can
be gathered for the analysis. The information can then be used in order to make informed





• Scenario 1: open system and ideal scenario where all the information about the program
is available. We can work directly with the source code.
• Scenario 2: semi-closed system where the source code is not available and the decompi-
lation process can be problematic. We can only work with the compiled program.
• Scenario 3: closed system. The program is not available even in its compiled form but it
can be executed. Dynamic analysis becomes the only choice.
The next three chapters will explore the main contributions of this thesis, all of them in the
context of a different scenario.
1.3.1 First Scenario (Open System) - Static Analysis of the Source Code
For scenario 1 we focus on Android malware, since Android is a very open system that allows
us to obtain a pretty faithful representation of the source code from almost any application.
The openness of Android indeed simplifies the analysis process, but it also makes it much easier
for malware developers to insert malicious behaviours into existing apps and then releasing
them into the stores.
The goal of this work is to build a program similarity tool for Android programs (R.E.H.A.)
that correctly groups malware samples with other samples that share the same malicious
behaviours. In order to focus on the malicious behaviours we identify a relatively short list
of Android APIs that can be used to negatively affect the users. Then, as a first step of the
analysis, we filter out every method in the code that does not contain at least one call to these
“risky” APIs.
After this initial screening, we generate the smali representation of Android programs and
from this extract the control flow graph of every method as a program representation to be
used in our program similarity algorithm. From the CFG, a new vectorial feature is generated
in order to further approximate the program representation and allow some structural leeway
in the similarity function.
Losing precision twice during this process, once by focusing on the CFG and then by
approximating it, means that the precision of the tool suffers as it generates many false
positives. On the same note, attackers can easily exploit the flaws in the abstractions by using
targeted obfuscations. Thankfully, since we are in scenario 1 and we are generating our own
representation and similarity measure, we have full domain knowledge and know exactly what
program transformations can negatively affect our approach.
With this knowledge, we introduce a second feature with its own similarity measure which





sequences that are confined in single basic blocks, in a feature called “strand”. With this we
build a second tool, called StranDroid. Again, from every method in the dataset that has
passed the initial risky APIs screening, we generate a set of strands. The similarity algorithm
then matches each method of every program in the dataset against the others using the Jaccard
Index as the similarity measure.
We test both tools against newly-collected ransomware and malware datasets and verify
that the advantages of StranDroid are confined to its precision, while R.E.H.A. has the best
performance and can analyze bigger datasets in less time.
Some of the main advantages of this approach are:
1. interpretability → the abstractions and the similarity functions can be built with full
domain expertise, thus yielding results that are readily interpretable.
2. precision-cost tradeoff → it is possible to fine-tune the amount of precision needed for a
specific analysis, thus tweaking the computational complexity of the algorithms.
There are also many flaws with this approach, among which:
1. uncommon scenario→ abstractions are built from code, which means we assume com-
plete access to the source code of malware. This is not a common scenario.
2. static analysis weaknesses → as we leverage abstractions, we open up holes in our
approach for attackers to potentially exploit.
1.3.2 Second Scenario (Semi-closed System) - Learning on Binaries
Scenario 2 assumes a more closed system, where the source code of the malware is not available
and their disassembly is not feasible. In this scenario, the focus is on classifying malware by
their compiled binaries, mainly on the Windows platform.
The lack of source code makes it harder to use domain expertise in order to build our
own program representations and similarity measure. One of the methods to overcome this
limitation is to hand over these tasks to a learning algorithm, treating the binaries as sources of
raw data to be fed to a model. At this point the information that is not obtained from domain
expertise has to be supplemented by well structured datasets with a robust ground truth.
The first flaw that we can see in this approach is indeed the dataset generation process.
Collectingmalware in thewild often generates unbalanced datasets, meaning that some families
tend to be more represented than others, sometimes to the detriment of the learning process.
Another problem is often the lack of a properly sized dataset, especially with approaches that





over-fitting, a process in which the network learns the training dataset perfectly and does not
generalize well to unseen data.
These problems are easily fixed in other learning contexts. For example, in image recognition
and image classification, both unbalanced datasets and undersized datasets can be fixed with
data augmentation techniques. These techniques usually entail processing the images with
some transformation that changes the general look of the image but preserve their content
(their semantics). Some examples of these transformations are rotation, zoom in and out, tilt,
flip, etc.
It is clear that none of these transformations can be applied to binaries while maintaining
their semantics. In fact, most of these would not return a working program to begin with.
We solve this problem by showing that it is possible to use semantics-preserving obfuscations
on the programs of a dataset as a data augmentation technique. After generating a dataset of
programs in 47 semantic equivalence classes, we train two deep networks on it, a convolutional
network and a long short-term memory.
Another way to solve the problems generated by the lack of a proper dataset is to adopt
transfer learning. This process entails training a deep network on a big dataset and then using
the features learnt in order to classify a new smaller dataset. Lacking a big enough malware
dataset we show that it is possible to generate a custom dataset with the data augmentation
technique explored above and then train a deep network. The features learnt from this custom
dataset can then be used to classify a new smaller malware dataset with transfer learning.
These approaches have a few advantages:
1. hard to attack→ since the representations and the similarity function are learnt auto-
matically, it is harder to find an attack vector.
2. scalable→ after the initial training process, the classification of new malware is compu-
tationally inexpensive.
Possible flaws are:
1. no interpretability→ letting the networks learn the features means that they often do
not have an easily interpretable meaning.
2. unknown cost-precision tradeoff → with previous approaches we could tweak the preci-
sion of the analysis to gain computational advantages. With deep neural networks there
is less control on this matter.
3. imprecision→ this is still a static analysis approach, so a precise algorithm for malware
classification cannot be found.
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1.3.3 Third Scenario (Closed System) - Dynamic Analysis
Scenario 3 represents a worst case scenario of sorts. It is characterized by the complete lack of
static information on the programs.
The only choice is then to execute the programs and gather what is possible from the
execution traces. This process is called dynamic analysis and is often used to circumvent the
lack of precision of static analysis. Using this type of analysis, the execution traces contain
information that is not spurious and is not added by the approximations of static analysis.
Even so, dynamic analysis presents many flaws, not least of them the fact that it can only
consider a finite number of finite traces. This means that it can only see a small subset of the
actual behaviours. Dynamic analysis lacks the formal treatment that static analysis has in
literature. While it is always possible to understand what effects obfuscations have on static
analysis, it is not clear how to prove formally when an obfuscation works on dynamic analysis.
For these reasons in this scenario we do not work on malware per se, but rather we explore
the theoretical hole that seems apparent in this field. In a departure from the other two main
chapters of this thesis, we perform a purely theoretical investigation on dynamic analysis.
In order to prove the effect of some obfuscations on dynamic analysis, we build a mathemat-
ical framework with which we can formalize both the analysis and the obfuscations. We then
show how to use the framework to prove the strength of certain obfuscations against dynamic
analysis found in literature.
1.4 Contributions and Structure of the Thesis
Within this section we provide the structure of the thesis and detail which works have been
published for each chapter.
1.4.1 Program Similarity for Android Malware
Chapter 2 explores the first scenario, where the system is open and we can apply static analysis
solutions with full domain expertise to solve the problem of malware classification. Most of
the content in this chapter has been published in two papers:
1. GroupDroid: Automatically grouping mobile malware by extracting code sim-
ilarities[94]
Niccolò Marastoni, Roberto Giacobazzi, Mila Dalla Preda
Published in the Proceedings of the 7th Software Security, Protection, and Reverse





Abstract: As shown in previous work, malware authors often reuse portions of code
in the development of their samples. Especially in the mobile scenario, there exists a
phenomena, called piggybacking, that describes the act of embedding malicious code
inside benign apps. In this paper, we leverage such observations to analyze mobile
malware by looking at its similarities. In practice, we propose a novel approach that
identifies and extracts code similarities in mobile apps. Our approach is based on
static analysis and works by computing the Control Flow Graph of each method and
encoding it in a feature vector used to measure similarities. We implemented our
approach in a tool, GroupDroid, able to group mobile apps together according to their
code similarities. Armed with GroupDroid, we then analyzed modern mobile malware
samples. Our experiments show that GroupDroid is able to correctly and accurately
distinguish different malware variants, and to provide useful and detailed information
about the similar portions of malicious code.
2. Revealing Similarities in Android Malware by Dissecting their Methods[109]
Michele Pasetto, Niccolò Marastoni, Mila Dalla Preda
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) [2020]
Abstract: One of the most challenging problems in the fight against Android malware
is finding a way to classify them according to their behavior, in order to be able to utilize
previously gathered knowledge in analysis and prevention.In this paper we introduce
a novel technique that discovers similarities between Android malware samples by
comparing fragments of executed traces (strands) generated from their most suspect
methods. This way we can accurately pinpoint which (possibly) malicious behaviors are
shared between these different samples, allowing for easier analysis and classification.We
implement this approach in a tool, StrAndroid, that we evaluate on a few dataset of
malware and ransomware samples, comparing its results to an existing similarity tool.
1.4.2 Deep Learning on Compiled Programs
Chapter 3 assumes that the malware samples in our possession are compiled binaries. Most of
the content in this chapter has been published in two papers:
1. A deep learning approach to program similarity[95]
Niccolò Marastoni, Roberto Giacobazzi, Mila Dalla Preda Proceedings of the 1st Interna-
tional Workshop on Machine Learning and Software Engineering in Symbiosis [2018]
Abstract: In this work we tackle the problem of binary code similarity by using deep
learning applied to binary code visualization techniques. Our idea is to represent binaries
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as images and then to investigate whether it is possible to recognize similar binaries
by applying deep learning algorithms for image classification. In particular, we apply
the proposed deep learning framework to a dataset of binary code variants obtained
through code obfuscation. These binary variants exhibit similar behaviours while being
syntactically different. Our results show that the problem of binary code recognition
is strictly separated from simple image recognition problems. Moreover, the analysis
of the results of the experiments conducted in this work lead us to the identification
of interesting research challenges. For example, in order to use image recognition
approaches to recognize similar binary code samples it is important to further investigate
how to build a suitable mapping from executables to images.
2. Data augmentation and transfer learning to classify malware images in a deep
learning context[96]
Niccolò Marastoni, Roberto Giacobazzi, Mila Dalla Preda Journal of Computer Virology
and Hacking Techniques, 1-19 [2021]
Abstract: In the past few years, malware classification techniques have shifted from
shallow traditional machine learning models to deeper neural network architectures. The
main benefit of some of these is the ability to work with raw data, guaranteed by their
automatic feature extraction capabilities. This results in less technical expertise needed
while building the models, thus less initial pre-processing resources. Nevertheless,
such advantage comes with its drawbacks, since deep learning models require huge
quantities of data in order to generate a model that generalizes well. The amount of data
required to train a deep network without overfitting is often unobtainable for malware
analysts. We take inspiration from image-based data augmentation techniques and apply
a sequence of semantics-preserving syntactic code transformations (obfuscations) to a
small dataset of programs to generate a larger dataset. We then design two learning
models, a convolutional neural network and a bi-directional long short-termmemory, and
we train them on images extracted from compiled binaries of the newly generated dataset.
Through transfer learning we then take the features learned from the obfuscated binaries
and train the models against two state of the art malware datasets, each containing
around 10 000 samples. Our models easily achieve up to 98.5% accuracy on the test set,






1.4.3 A Formal Approach for Dynamic Analysis
Chapter 4 explores the dynamic analysis angle, proposing a new formal framework in order to
evaluate obfuscations in this scenario. Most of the content in this chapter has been published
in the following paper:
1. Formal framework for reasoning about the precision of dynamic analysis[45]
Mila Dalla Preda, Roberto Giacobazzi, Niccolò Marastoni International Static Analysis
Symposium [2020]
Abstract: Dynamic program analysis is extremely successful both in code debugging and
inmalicious code attacks. Fuzzing, concolic, andmonkey testing are instances of themore
general problem of analysing programs by dynamically executing their codewith selected
inputs. While static program analysis has a beautiful and well established theoretical
foundation in abstract interpretation, dynamic analysis still lacks such a foundation. In
this paper, we introduce a formal model for understanding the notion of precision in
dynamic program analysis. It is known that in sound-by-construction static program
analysis the precision amounts to completeness. In dynamic analysis, which is inherently
unsound, precision boils down to a notion of coverage of execution traces with respect to
what the observer (attacker or debugger) can effectively observe about the computation.
We introduce a topological characterisation of the notion of coverage relatively to a
given (fixed) observation for dynamic program analysis and we show how this coverage
can be changed by semantic preserving code transformations. Once again, as well as
in the case of static program analysis and abstract interpretation, also for dynamic
analysis we can morph the precision of the analysis by transforming the code. In this
context, we validate our model on well established code obfuscation and watermarking
techniques. We confirm the efficiency of existing methods for preventing control-flow-
graph extraction and data exploit by dynamic analysis, including a validation of the
potency of fully homomorphic data encodings in code obfuscation.
1.4.4 Conclusions
Chapter 5 contains summaries for all the preceding chapters, combined with the conclusions
and possible future works that might stem from each of them.
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2 Program Similarity for Android Malware
The goal of this chapter is to explore behavioral classification of malware samples in the
context of scenario 1, that is, an almost completely open system.
Android is the perfect environment for such a study, as Android applications are pack-
aged using the Android Package file format (.apk) and can be easily de-constructed back
to their original source code. Of course, this is not perfect since exact decompilation is a
generally impossible task as a lot of information is lost in the compilation process, either due
to optimizations or simple heuristics such as variable renaming.
Nonetheless, the open nature of the system allows us to gauge domain expertise and thus
craft custom code representations and similarity measures to group malware samples according
to their behaviour. On the same note, thanks to the openness of the system, we can challenge
the ground truth and design our tools with clustering (grouping) in mind.
The rest of the section outlines the problem posed by malware on Android devices, starting
with the usual arguments on why it is a worthwhile endeavour to study this platform and its
attack vectors. We then outline the ideas behind our approaches and specify the contributions
of this chapter.
2.0.1 Why it is Important to Study Malware on Android
At the time of writing, Android is the most widespread mobile operating system in the world
with an estimated 85% market share as of 2020 [73]. Combined with the fact that around
3.5 billion people nowadays own a smartphone [120], that results in close to 3 billion active
Android users and many more Android devices. These numbers are helpful in showing why
Android is a highly coveted attack vector for malware developers.
Even though the security model of Android is complex [54] and new versions of the system
tend to keep up with new threats, it is rare for users to consistently have the new version
installed on their devices [90]. Securing the app distribution system is also not always a sound
solution for the security of the ecosystem, as users from all over the world regularly access
third-party stores that are not known for their thorough app vetting process [146]. All of
these factors combined result in an ecosystem that presents many potentially lucrative attack
vectors.
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methods for malware detection and classification [138, 153], generally by adopting machine
learning models. Within these works, the models are presented with a specific view of the
malware samples, usually features extracted by experts, and they learn a way to put each
sample in the correct class. In other ways, what they learn is a measure of similarity between
malware samples. These academic endeavors seldomly reflect in the actual usage by anti-
malware vendors, where the main techniques used for the classification of malware is still
signature-based [77] and thus easily circumvented by simple code modifications [46]. It is
indeed necessary to find better ways to discover the similarities between malware samples.
A recent report published by MalwareBytes [93] shows that Android malware is getting
“stealthier and more aggressive”, which should result in research focused on more precision and
accuracy. The approaches that we present in this paper is meant as a step towards applying
more sophisticated methods to the analysis of Android malware, possibly leading to more
precision in the analysis results.
In this chapter, we illustrate two novel techniques to identify code similarities amongAndroid
apps, with the intent of recognizing and extracting code that produces similar behaviors. Our
approaches are based on static analysis and work at the method level.
Reverse Engineering Helper for Android [R.E.H.A. ]
As an initial step, we extract the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of every method and encode each
CFG in a vector of features that we then use to measure the similarity. Chen et al. introduced
the concept of 3D-CFG and its relative centroid to build a scalable method for app clone
detection in [27], focusing on applications that share most of the code, or at least the core
functionality. One of their main motivations for working on clone detection is the fact that
malware prefers to use app clones as “carriers” for propagation, while our focus is almost the
opposite. We look for similarities in potentially small portions of malicious code, those that
are deemed interesting for our particular analysis.
We implemented our approach in a tool called Reverse Engineering Helper for Android, or
R.E.H.A. for short. The system is able to classify Android malware on the basis of its code
similarities and to extract the portions of similar code, providing useful and detailed feedback
of the classification and helping in the reverse engineering process. We evaluated R.E.H.A.
against 4,211 malicious Android apps, showing that it is able to successfully classify different
families. Our experiments showed that R.E.H.A. is not only able to group together malware
samples of the same family, but it can also distinguish slightly different variants by identifying
differences in the similarities.
In our paper “GroupDroid: Automatically grouping mobile malware by extracting code
similarities” [94] we referred to the tool as GroupDroid, following the common trend of using
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the post-fix (sometimes pre-fix) “droid” in the tool name [29, 157, 2, 150, 8, 53, 5]. GroupDroid
has since become a subsystem of the bigger R.E.H.A., namely comprising only the clustering
part.
StranDroid
At the end of the chapter we will discuss some of the limitations to this approach and describe
a second system, StranDroid, which sacrifices some computational power in order to gain
precision. To develop this system we take direct inspiration from a brilliant work by Yaniv
David, Nimrod Patush and Eran Yahav [48]. In that work, the authors apply similarity by
composition to binaries in order to discover their similarity even when compiled with different
toolchains and optimizations. The idea behind similarity by composition comes from a work
in the field of image recognition [20] and leverages the fact that two images are similar if they
are made of similar components. Thus finding the similarities between the components is a
key part of establishing whether the two original images are also similar. The goal of [48] was
to find pieces of code that were semantically similar to a query fragment mainly to allow the
search of bugs or known exploits in a benign scenario where binary samples are generated
with different compilers or different versions of the same compiler. This use case is, of course,
different from malware analysis where we need to take into consideration the use of malicious
code modifications explicitly designed to prevent analysis. For this reason, the methodology
differs in some key areas that we will expand upon in Section 2.6.
We believe the similarity by composition approach works for Android malware because
malicious behaviors are often just different combinations of the same few base components.
For example, there are approaches that aim at finding Android clones that are similar wrt
their behaviors [100] . For this purpose, Object Based Actions (OBAs) are defined as all
the API calls that can be grouped into a common semantic group: i.e. HTTP-based actions,
TelephonyManager-based actions, SMSManager-based actions, etc. A malicious behavior
can then be summarized by the combinations of these OBAs into common patterns. For
example, if the goal of the malware is to steal the user data and send it to a remote server then
the corresponding behavior can be described with TelephonyManager-based + HTTP-based
actions, while if the data was sent through SMS texts then we would have TelephonyManager-
based + SMSManager-based actions. These are malicious behaviors that can help classify the
malware into different classes and they are all combinations of smaller components.
With the similarity by composition approach of [48], we can give a more precise characteri-
zation of the behaviors hidden in Android methods.
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• Implementation of R.E.H.A., a static analysis tool for behavioral similarity of Android
apps based on structural similarity
• Implementation of StranDroid, another tool for Android app similarity based on
similarity by composition
• Evaluation of both tools against the GENOME dataset and two custom datasets with
malware and ransomware
The rest of the chapter is thus structured:
• Section 2.1 will give a thorough background on some aspects of static analysis, plus a
primer on the Android system
• Some related works are presented in Section 2.8 while the main motivation for the study
can be found in Section 2.2
• Our static analysis-based approach to identify code that produce similar behaviors is
discussed in section 2.3
• R.E.H.A., our tool that finds similarities in malicious Android apps and classify them
accordingly, is described in section 2.4
• Section 2.5 contains the evaluation of R.E.H.A. on a dataset of 4,211 Android malware
samples.
• In Section 2.6 we introduce StranDroid and explain its significance in the scope of this
work
• StranDroid is evaluated in Section 2.7 in order to gauge its effectiveness, especially
when compared to R.E.H.A.
2.1 Background
In this section we will give a brief rundown of the main concepts needed to understand our
methodology and the problem it sets out to solve. For readers familiar with the static analysis






Android is an open source operating system meant for mobile devices that adopts a very strict
security model [54]. Every app installed in an Android device is packaged in an Android
Package (APK) file, Android’s standard packaging file format, and must conform to the model
in order to interact with the most vulnerable parts of the system, and this is enforced through
the use of permissions [57] and specific system APIs. Throughout the thesis we will use the
terms app and APK interchangeably.
A rough structure of the Android Environment can be seen in Figure 2.1.
APIs and Permissions
Android offers a comprehensive list of APIs to its developers in order to better control the
behavior of apps wrt the system itself. We analyzed a number of Android malware samples
and created a list of APIs that can be used to execute malicious attacks on the device, which
we call risky APIs. These are functions that range from network APIs, necessary to send
packets through network protocols, to device-specific APIs, which are used to access private





Other works share our view that some APIs have more weight than others, for example, [150]
calls them “sensitive” APIs and uses them as meaningful features to automatically characterize
Android malware.
The usage of system APIs in Android is regulated by requiring the use of each API to be
accompanied by a request for permission to the user. These permissions are stored in an XML
document (the manifest) at the root of the application and are often used in malware analysis
to spot which APKs could contain malicious behaviors [86, 2, 134]. Naturally, applications that
do not request permission to use any risky API will not be able to affect the behavior of the
device nor infringe on the privacy of the user in any way. It is hard to draw conclusions from
the sole inclusion of permissions in the manifest, since app developers tend to be overzealous
and request more permissions than necessary [57].
For this reason we focus on the API calls encountered in the code without checking the
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Before being run by Dalvik, the JVM implementation of Android, every app is compiled into
𝑑𝑒𝑥 bytecode.
1 01000000 90000000 00000000 00000000 02000000 9C000000
2 01000000 AC000000 14010000 CC000000 E4000000 EC000000
3 07010000 2C010000 2F010000 01000000 02000000 03000000
4 03000000 02000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 01000000
5 00000000 01000000 01000000 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFF
6 00000000 57010000 00000000 01000100 01000000 00000000
7 04000000 70100000 00000E00 063C696E 69743E00 194C616E
8 64726F69 642F6170 702F4170 706C6963 6174696F 6E3B0023
9 4C636F6D 2F627567 736E6167 2F646578 6578616D 706C652F
10 42756773 6E616741 70703B00 01560026 7E7E4438 7B226D69
11 6E2D6170 69223A32 362C2276 65727369 6F6E223A 2276302E
12 312E3134 227D0000 00010001 818004CC 01000000 0A000000
13 00000000 01000000 00000000 01000000 05000000 70000000
14 00200000 01000000 57010000 00100000 01000000 64010000
This format is not very user-friendly, and for this reason most static analysis on Android
code is done on the smali format. As an example we show a simplified onReceive() method
found in a ransomware sample, generating the following smali method𝑚1:
1 const-string v7, "PrintStream"
2 const-string v9, "\n"
3 invoke-interface {v8}, Landroid/text/Editable;->toString()Ljava/lang/String;
4 move-result-object v8
5 invoke-virtual {v8, v9}, Ljava/lang/String;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
6 move-result v8
7 if-eqz v8, :cond_0
8 iget-object v8, v8, Lcom/sssp/s$100000001;->this$0:Lcom/sssp/s;
9 invoke-virtual {v8}, Lcom/sssp/s;->stopSelf()V
10 :cond_0
11 invoke-virtual {v7}, Lcom/sssp/s;->toPrint()V
12 return-void
Listing 2.1: sample method in smali
R.E.H.A. uses APKTool [143] in order to translate the native bytecode into smali files, which
will then be parsed and analyzed by our tool.
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Figure 2.2: Two malware samples
2.1.2 Android Malware
There are many types of Android malware found in the various markets, and they can be
grouped by behavior [80] as:
• Spyware, which is malware that allows an external entity to acquire private information
about the unsuspecting user
• Ransomware, encrypting the private data of the user and requiring a payment (ransom)
to decrypt it
• Adware, showing unwanted ads to the user
Of course many other types of malware exist, but in this chapter we target a small dataset
of ransomware samples in order to gauge the effectiveness of R.E.H.A..
In Figure 2.2 we show the screenshots of two popular malware samples.
2.1.3 Static Analysis
Program analysis is mainly divided into static and dynamic analysis, where the former studies





and analyzes the execution traces. The approach described in this chapter is static, as we
analyze the smali code obtained from the APKs. We now give a brief description of the basic
components of static analysis that are required to understand the inner workings of R.E.H.A..
Basic Blocks
Basic blocks are fragments of code uninterrupted by control flow instructions. They usually
are represented as nodes in the control flow graph.
As an example, we take the previous smali code example in Listing 2.1. From this method
we can extract 3 basic blocks:
1) lines 1 to 6 belong to the first basic block, 𝑏1, then the instruction on line 6 generates a
split in the control flow of the method:
1 const-string v7, "PrintStream"
2 const-string v9, "\n"
3 invoke-interface {v8}, Landroid/text/Editable;->toString()Ljava/lang/String;
4 move-result-object v8
5 invoke-virtual {v8, v9}, Ljava/lang/String;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
6 move-result v8
7 if-eqz v8, :cond_0
Listing 2.2: first basic block
2) the second basic block, 𝑏2 is formed by lines 7 and 8, representing the "else" branch of the
conditional:
1 iget-object v8, v8, Lcom/sssp/s$100000001;->this$0:Lcom/sssp/s;
2 invoke-virtual {v8}, Lcom/sssp/s;->stopSelf()V
Listing 2.3: second basic block
3) finally lines 9 and 10 form the third and last basic block in this simple method, 𝑏3:
1 :cond_0
2 invoke-virtual {v7}, Lcom/sssp/s;->toPrint()V
3 return-void
Listing 2.4: third basic block
Control Flow Graph
The control flow graph is generated by connecting the basic blocks to each other according to
their jump instructions. Following the previous example with method𝑚1, we can connect the




Program Similarity for Android Malware
Figure 2.3: Example CFG from code sample in Listing 2.1
Clearly, the graph will start with 𝑏1 as it is the beginning of the method, then 𝑏1 will have
two outgoing edges connecting it to 𝑏2 and 𝑏3. If the variable 𝑣8 is equal to zero, control will
flow into 𝑏3 as it is the target of the jump, while it will flow into 𝑏2 if the condition is not met.
One final edge has to be added between 𝑏2 and 𝑏3.
The CFG we just described can be seen in Figure 2.3. For the rest of the chapter, the
CFGs pictured will not contain the smali code in the basic blocks as that can easily lead to
unnecessarily big graphs.
Program Slicing
Program slicing is a static analysis procedure that allows the isolation of code fragments (slices)
containing only instructions that are directly related to the slicing criterion through data flow
and control flow [141]. The slicing criterion can be a variable in a specific location, a list of
variables or an instruction that contains at least one variable.
There are two types of program slicing: forward slicing and backward slicing. As suggested
by their names, they differ only in the direction that the slicing takes. In this chapter, we
will focus on backward slicing as our preferred technique to extract strands from the APKs,
meaning that we identify a program location of interest (slicing criterion) and perform a
backward scan of the code, saving a list of instructions that are correlated to at least one of the
variables in the slicing criterion.





the variable 𝑣8 on its last appearance on line 8 is simply all the code from line 2 to 8. The
reason why the code on line 1 is ignored is that the variable 𝑣7 does not interact with any
computation that reads or writes on 𝑣8, which is our slicing criterion.
Strands
The concept of strand was first introduced in [48] (section 3.2) and simply defines a basic
block-level program slice. Isolating slices in a basic block means that all the variables therein
contained are connected with only data flow (as basic blocks do not contain any control
flow by definition). This allows for a less precise representation of the code itself but a more
fine-grained kind of analysis, where it is easier to discard unimportant elements. Section 2.3
goes more in depth about our specific strands implementation, while two examples of strands
can be seen in Figure 2.16.
For completion we show the strands of the code in Listing 2.1. As before, the slicing criterion
is the variable 𝑣8 on line 8. The first strand is:
1 const-string v9, "\n"
2 invoke-interface {v8}, Landroid/text/Editable;->toString()Ljava/lang/String;
3 move-result-object v8
4 invoke-virtual {v8, v9}, Ljava/lang/String;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
5 move-result v8
6 if-eqz v8, :cond_0
Listing 2.5: first slice
While this is the second strand:
1 iget-object v8, v8, Lcom/sssp/s$100000001;->this$0:Lcom/sssp/s;
2 invoke-virtual {v8}, Lcom/sssp/s;->stopSelf()V
Listing 2.6: second slice
From this example it is clear how the strands represent a refinement of both slicing and the
basic blocks subdivision, allowing for finer control on what is shown to the analysis.
2.2 Motivation
Malware lives in a complex ecosystem that, similarly to an industrial environment, includes
malware developers, managers, maintenance, and business strategies. This ecosystem is,
of course, stimulated by the financial incentives that revolve around it. Common trends in
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premium-rate calls, SMS spam, ransoms, advertising click frauds, and in-app billing frauds.
Armin [6] studied the mobile underground market finding an alive and thriving ecosystem
that benefits from the existence of an established modus operandi for desktop malware, which
is well-structured and successful. Such a market is based on a crime-as-a-service model, in
which resources, such as customizable malware, are sold and rented online. For instance,
a Trojan called “Exo Android Bot” was heavily advertised in forums in 2016. For $400 per
week or $3,000 per year, the author promised Android malware that could intercept SMS,
use screen overlays, and had 24/7 support [144]. Unfortunately, sometimes malicious apps
manage to evade detection and appear on official stores. For example, in February 2017, an
Android.Fakebank.B variant masked as a weather app called “GoodWeather” was published
on the official Google Play Store and was downloaded by approximately 5,000 users [144].
One of the distinctive aspects of malware, especially on mobile, is its evident need to fit in
among legitimate apps, to entice users and enable faster spread. Since its appearance needs to
resemble goodware, a large part of the app is dedicated to behaviors that are not malicious at
all, and often the benevolent part of the app varies among samples of the same malware family.
A malware family is thus defined by the only component that is maintained constant among
every sample: the malicious payload (Figure 2.4). This phenomena, known as piggybacking, in
which cybercriminals embed malicious code into benign apps, has been observed and studied
by researchers in previous works [155, 154, 87]. Moreover, as we previously described, malware
authors re-use (part of) their malicious code across different malware versions and variants,
which are constantly released on the underground market.
On the basis of such observations, if we find a good and efficient way to analyze code
similarities between many apps, we can potentially isolate the malicious behaviors shared
among the different malware samples, and classify apps according to these similarities.
Previous works proposed approaches to classifying apps by looking at their similarities [50,
152, 70]. However all these approaches mainly provide black-box tools, which do not generate
detailed information about the behaviors the apps share. Instead, we aim at proposing a novel
approach that allows to obtain practical and detailed feedback of the classification.
2.3 Methodology
R.E.H.A. at its core takes as input smali files from Android apps and filters the individual
methods according to some fixed thresholds that allow us to be selective in regards to the
behaviours we want to observe. Then the code is parsed to extract some static features, 3D-CFG
centroids and API vectors, which will then be used to compare apps at the method level, to





Figure 2.4: Isolating Malicious Behaviors.
Figure 2.5:Workflow of R.E.H.A..
together according to how much code they share. In the next sections, we describe the phases
of the approach of R.E.H.A., following the workflow depicted in Figure 2.5.
2.3.1 Filter
As a first step, apps are unpacked using apktool and the smali files are parsed to extract methods.
The filtering phase considers some thresholds that are variable and can be tinkered with in the
“settings” section. The first one is the𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 , which counts the minimum number
of instructions in a method for it to be extracted. This tells the parser to ignore those methods
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usually set at 6 to weed out some methods that are prevalent in every Android app, mainly “init”
methods. As these methods usually just initiate a couple of variables and invoke one additional
method, they do not contain any pertinent control flow information. If not filtered out, they
become the main source for false positives and usually make the results of our analysis less
interesting.
The second filter checks if a method invokes any of the “Risky APIs”. If it does not, we do
not consider it since it cannot possibly have any interesting behavior. “Risky APIs” is just a
collection of all the APIs offered to Android developers to interact with the phone, and they
range wildly between APIs that allow apps to write SMS and others that grant access to the
phone’s filesystem. With the way the Android OS is structured, apps just do not have any way
to do anything harmful without using these APIs. We collected the APIs from various sources
on the internet.
2.3.2 Feature Extraction
We consider similarity at the method level, so we can encode every method and then compare
it to others. Since our similarity computation needs to be both fast and resilient to code
transformations (to a certain degree), we decided to first consider the structure of the code.
We extract the CFG of every method and encode each CFG in a vector of features that we use
for the final similarity measure.
The first 4 features are the 3D-CFG’s weighted centroid of the method, as first defined in [27].
The idea behind 3D-CFG centroids is borrowed directly from physics, to be more specific it is
a reinterpretation of the “center of mass” of an ensemble of rigid bodies.
3D-CFG. Each method in a sample app gets transformed into its CFG, which represents the
rigid structure, and every node (basic block) in the CFG is treated like an object with mass,
connected to the other objects via weightless sticks (the edges of the CFG). At this point an
“end” node will be added, and every basic block with a return statement will naturally flow
into it, providing a single exit node.
Before assigning any mass to the nodes of the CFG, this needs to be transformed even further
to make it fit into a 3D space. First, each node needs to have < 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧, > coordinates, where:
• 𝑥 = sequence number
The choice of the sequence number depends on the order in which every basic block in
the CFG will be executed. This is not particularly easy to judge using static analysis, but



















Figure 2.6: a CFG and its corresponding 3D-CFG
3D-CFG, thus it can rely on simple heuristics that will assure the same conversion every
time copies of the same method will be fed to the algorithm.
• 𝑦 = number of outgoing edges
• 𝑧 = loop depth
The nesting level of the basic block.
In Figure 2.6 we show an example of a CFG (on the left) and its corresponding 3D-CFG (on
the right).
3D-CFG centroids. Once the method is successfully converted into its 3D-CFG represen-
tation, we can calculate its centroids. The weight 𝑤𝑖 of each node is given by the number of
statements in it.
A centroid is a vector < 𝑐𝑥 , 𝑐𝑦, 𝑐𝑧, 𝑤 > where:
𝑐𝑥 =
∑︁
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𝑐𝑦 =
∑︁












Modified Centroid. Because of the nature of methods in Android apps and their reliance on
invocations of the framework APIs, a second type of centroid is introduced, where the weights
of each node are the sum of the number of statements and the number of invocations. This
allows for better distinction between possibly cloned methods, as it enhances the underlying
differences, and does not increase the complexity of the calculation (both centroids can be
calculated at the same time with no added overhead).
Given the number of invocations as 𝑛𝑖 , the new weighted centroid can be defined as a vector
< 𝑐𝑥 , 𝑐𝑦, 𝑐𝑧, 𝑤
′ > where 𝑤 ′ = 𝑤 + 𝑛𝑖 .
Centroid Difference Degree. Once the methods have been reduced to simple 3D vectors
(technically 4D, as we have the weight in addition to the 3 dimensions), we can define a simple
distance measure between the centroids.
𝐶𝐷𝐷 (−→𝑐1,−→𝑐2) =𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
|𝑐1𝑥 − 𝑐2𝑥 |
𝑐1𝑥 + 𝑐2𝑥
,
|𝑐1𝑦 − 𝑐2𝑦 |
𝑐1𝑦 + 𝑐2𝑦
,






So the first 4 features are the modified centroid, as we experimented a bit with it and found
that it has a way better performance than the normal one or a combination of the two.
The 3D-CFG centroid is a structural feature, and not a very precise one, so it does lose
much of the information contained in the method. This, coupled with the tendency of Android
method to be rather simple, gives rise to a lot of false positives. In the original paper, the
authors added a statement type vector, but after extensive testing with our datasets it became
clear that it did not solve most of the false positives, if any.
Our solution is to look at the APIs that are called during the method execution: if two pieces
of code are similar, they need to exhibit some of the same behaviors. To check this, we extract






API Vectors. This 5th feature in our vector is a binary encoding of the APIs with a value
between 0 and (223 − 1). We isolated 23 “risky” APIs mostly from literature and our own
experience and saved them in a file, then every time a method invokes an API in the list, the
5th feature (which is initialized to 0) will be added to 2𝑎 (where a is the index of the API). So
an invocation to the first API will add 1 (20), to the 4th will add 8 (23) and so on. This is done
mostly to provide a new feature that does not slow down the extraction process any further
and that still allows us to check in O(1) the new property.
During the extraction of the 5th feature we also save a vector of 𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦_𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑠) where we
store at each index how many times the given API is invoked in the method’s body. This is
our last group of features, at this time it’s a vector of 23 elements with each element being an
integer in the range 0+. This will be used in the last step of our similarity function.
2.3.3 Code Similarity
This is the algorithm for our code similarity measure, given 2 methods𝑚1 and𝑚2:
𝑠 (𝑚1,𝑚2) = 𝐶𝐷𝐷 (𝑚1.𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑑,𝑚2.𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑑) < 𝑐𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
∧ 𝐵𝑉𝐸 (𝑚1.𝑎𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙,𝑚2.𝑎𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙)
∧𝑉𝐷𝐷 (𝑚1.𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟,𝑚2.𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ) < 𝑣𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
Where CDD is the Centroid Difference Degree:
𝐶𝐷𝐷 (−→𝑐1,−→𝑐2) =𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
|𝑐1𝑥 − 𝑐2𝑥 |
𝑐1𝑥 + 𝑐2𝑥
,
|𝑐1𝑦 − 𝑐2𝑦 |
𝑐1𝑦 + 𝑐2𝑦
,






This is a very fast operation that lets us filter methods that share at least some common structure.
It returns a weighted distance value between 0 and 1.0, where 0 means complete similarity
and 1.0 no similarity at all. The threshold for the final similarity measure can be changed at
will, but the recommended setting is 0.4 to allow for structural dissimilarities introduced by
code transformations. The next steps of the algorithm will catch any discrepancies produced
by this lax approach.
BVE is the Boolean Vector Evaluation:
𝐵𝑉𝐸 (𝑏𝑣1, 𝑏𝑣2) = 𝑏𝑣1&𝑏𝑣2 (2.7)
This is an 𝑂 (1) function, incredibly simple and designed to act as a rough filter to avoid
analyzing methods that do not share any API invocations. As previously explained, our 5th
feature is a number between 0 and 223 − 1 that is mined without any additional overhead
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Consider this practical example: methods𝑚1 and𝑚2 passed the CDD test, which means that
either their structure is fairly similar or that the threshold was set too high. Method𝑚1 calls 2
APIs, which are located at positions 2 and 7 in the risky APIs vector, so its binary feature is the
number 10000100 (1 ∗ 27 + 1 ∗ 22 = 132), while method𝑚2 calls three APIs that can be found at
positions 3, 5 and 6, producing the binary feature 1101000 (1 ∗ 26 + 1 ∗ 25 + 1 ∗ 23 = 104). At
this point the BVE function simply applies a bitwise AND operation to the binary features
and discovers that they do not share any API calls (132&104 = 0), meaning that the structural
similarity resulted in a false positive. Hence, we can declare the methods to be not similar
immediately without further computations.
If the BVE function returns a TRUE value, then the following function is applied to the
remaining features. The VDD is the API Vector Distance Degree:
𝑎𝑣1 = [𝑣1,1...𝑣1,23]
𝑎𝑣2 = [𝑣2,1...𝑣2,23]
𝑉𝑉𝐷 (𝑎𝑣1, 𝑎𝑣2) =𝑚𝑎𝑥
{︃
|𝑣1,𝑖 − 𝑣2,𝑖 |
|𝑣1,𝑖 + 𝑣2,𝑖 |
|𝑖 ∈ [0, 22]
}︃
(2.8)
This is very similar to the CDD function and again outputs a value between 0 and 1.0, where 0
is an exact match between the API vectors, while 1.0 this time means that at least one of the
elements in one vector did not have a match in the other. We use this function to allow for
future relaxing of the API vector threshold, but for now it’s set at a firm 0 (indicating we want
an exact match all the time).
If all 3 functions return True then the two methods are deemed similar. Figure 2.7 depicts the
workflow of the process, with every extracted feature associated with its similarity measure.
2.3.4 App Similarity
The app similarity score is calculated as the ratio between the number of shared methods and
the number of methods in the first app. The similarity score is asymmetrical to account for the
difference in size between different apps, if an app shares 20% of its code with a second app,
the second app does not necessarily share 20% of its code with the first app.
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑎𝑝𝑝1, 𝑎𝑝𝑝2) =
| {(𝑚1,𝑚2) |𝑚1 ==𝑚2 ∧𝑚1 ∈ 𝑎𝑝𝑝1 ∧𝑚2 ∈ 𝑎𝑝𝑝2} |
| {𝑚1 |𝑚1 ∈ 𝑎𝑝𝑝1} |
(2.9)
Two apps are considered not similar at all when their score is exactly 0, which means that
they share no methods. Two apps are considered equal when their score is 1, which only














Figure 2.7: Workflow of the feature extraction phase, with each feature associated with its similarity
function
2.3.5 Grouping
The grouping phase of R.E.H.A. consists of a general clustering algorithm that uses the app
similarity score as a distance measure. It starts by creating a cluster for the first analyzed
app, then iterating over all other analyzed apps and adding to the cluster all apps with a good
similarity score. To account for the asymmetry of the score, we always check for the best one
of the pair. The similarity score threshold is one of the parameters that we can play with and
can be set to 1.0 if we only want to consider groups of apps that share 100% of the code we care
about. This particular value has proved to be very valuable in our analysis, as it gives more
concise results when few methods are filtered, but it can also severely impair the grouping
accuracy when we are analyzing for more APIs.
Figure 2.8 shows the pseudocode of our grouping algorithm.
2.3.6 MethodQuery
One of the key features of R.E.H.A. is its ability to instantly highlight the methods that are
shared among different apps. However, the grouping algorithm requires the threshold at which
apps are deemed similar to be set manually. This has an unfortunate side-effect; certain apps
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1 for sample ∈ analyzed_apps do
2 for group ∈ groupset do
3 score ← similarity_score(group, sample)
4 if score > threshold then
5 group ← group∪sample
6 else
7 new group
8 group ← sample




Figure 2.8: Grouping algorithm.
still share some critical methods. The method query subsystem was created by leveraging our
optimizations when it comes to search space reduction (described in Section 2.4). In short,
a method can be inserted as query, which then gets transformed into its centroids and API
vectors, and ultimately it is searched in the database.
2.4 System and Implementation
In this section we describe the implementation details for our system, starting with the search
space reduction algorithm that allows us to reduce the analysis time by an order of magnitude.
2.4.1 Search Space Reduction
To analyze an entire dataset, R.E.H.A. needs to encode every method of every sample and
compare it to the others. Numerically, this means that if the dataset contains 𝑛 methods, there
will be 𝑂 (𝑛2) comparisons, which becomes a problem very fast when analyzing big datasets.
For example, the GENOME dataset (which isn’t particularly big) has more than 1,000 apps,
and each one of them has up to 3,000 methods in it (mostly some members of the DroidKungFu
family), which totals at about 3 ∗ 106 methods with 9 ∗ 1012 comparisons. Our algorithm can
compute 105 comparisons per second on average, so that would take close to 9 ∗ 107 seconds
(slightly less than 3 years). Of course this is not an acceptable running time for any kind of
analysis, thus it became necessary to restrict the search space.
Since the first step of the algorithm considers structural similarity between methods by







Figure 2.9: Search space reduction: on the left the whole search space, on the right the green centroids
in the spheroid are considered while the red ones are discarded
restricting the search space literally means that we may consider only the regions of the
4-dimensional space that contain centroids closer to the input centroid.
The first step of the dimensionality reduction occurs during the preliminary phase. When
every method is coded in its centroid, R.E.H.A. updates a nested dictionary-like data structure
that will act as a hash-table to allow for fast searching.
The dictionary is thus updated:




This way, a centroid 𝑐1 with the coordinates [1.342,3.45,8.01,12] will be added to a list
of other centroids in dict[1][3][8][12].
The algorithm to search for a matching centroid is now fairly straightforward, we just need
to calculate a valid range of coordinates to check, and then look into their respective lists. The
range of coordinates is calculated using the CDD function. For example, given the previous
centroid 𝑐1 and the standard thresholds for R.E.H.A., its matching centroids will be searched
in the following ranges: 𝑥 = (1, 1), 𝑦 = (2, 4), 𝑧 = (6, 10), 𝑤 = (9, 15). This gives us 48 possible
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For a more practical example, we’ll run our algorithm on the first method of the first sample
in the GENOME dataset: 86 actual MDD checks and only 9 API checks, in a dataset with about
70k methods. Checking every single method in the dataset against every other method would
take more than 13 hours, but by reducing the search space it will take just 18 seconds, assuming
that the search space was equally distributed (a pretty bold and unrealistic assumption).
Since there is not any theoretical reason why methods should stack up in a particular spot,
we ran some tests and the worst performance by far was in a method that had to be checked
against 290 other methods. With this experimental worst case in mind (assuming that every
single one of the methods had to find 290 suitable doubles), the execution time of our algorithm
would still take just over 3 minutes. Compared to 13 hours, it is still a pretty big improvement.
A simplified illustration of the results of our space search reduction algorithm can be seen
in Figure 2.9.
2.4.2 Implementation
We implemented R.E.H.A. in about 3K lines of Python as a web application, to make it easier
to deploy on remote servers. This section contains a simple overview of the implementation
details concerning its core elements.
For the server side aspects of R.E.H.A., we used the web framework Flask, which allows
for faster initial development and launch on a local machine. Different technologies will be
considered for an eventual future production deployment.
The system works by leveraging apktool to extract the apps and translate the dex files
into the more readable smali format. Then, a simple parser scans through the smali files and
generates the features needed for the similarity measure. Each method is transformed into its
respective CFG (as better explained in Section 2.3.2) and saved in a dictionary that will remain
in RAM for the duration of the analysis. A previous version of R.E.H.A. had everything stored
on disk but that created unnecessary bottlenecks. Currently, the only disk I/O operations
occur on server startup and after the analysis is completed. This means that the dictionary
containing the features and all the reports are saved on disk in plain text using the Python
library Pickle, so that R.E.H.A. can reload them in memory at each startup.
The analysis times have dropped significantly thanks to this implementation detail, but
the program start-up time has increased significantly and so has the RAM usage. In order to







In the following sections, we describe our datasets and the experiments we performed to
evaluate R.E.H.A.. More precisely, we first provide the results of the classification we performed
using R.E.H.A.. To evaluate the classification accuracy, we leveraged AVClass [125], a malware
labeling tool that determines the most likely family of a given sample by clustering the AV
labels obtained through VirusTotal. Then, we present some interesting case studies that show
how malware samples reuse malicious code. Finally, we assess the runtime performance of
our tool.
2.5.1 Datasets
We used four different datasets for our evaluation. First, we got access to 675 ransomware
samples from the Heldroid [5] dataset (Dataset_1). Then, between July and August 2017, we
used the VirusTotal Intelligence API to obtain two datasets: (1) the 500 most recent Android
ransomware labeled as ransomware by at least 5 AVs (Dataset_2); (2) the 1,000 most recent
generic malware labeled as malicious by at least 5 AVs (Dataset_3).
Finally, we gained access to 2,036 apps labeled as malicious by at least 25% of the AVs in
AndroTotal [89] (Dataset_4).
In summary, our datasets total 4,211 malicious apps.
2.5.2 Classificiation Results
Dataset_1 + Dataset_2. For this study, we analyzed a dataset of 1,175 ransomware. The
goal of the analysis was to group these samples by highlighting their shared code.
The biggest group in the dataset turned out to comprise 242 samples, with all of them sharing
the same methods to encrypt and decrypt files. This group goes well beyond code reuse, as all
of them have the same structure and contain only one package with always exactly 22 smali
files. The only differences are in the package name and in the file names, as all of the samples
seem to contain different permutations of random strings.
The methods found to be most relevant, using the API filter function, are the encrypt(),
decrypt() and init() methods, which contain all the code necessary to perform the main
action of the ransomware.
The second group has 94 members and is another case of extreme code reuse, where most
samples contain exactly the same files, this time even with the same names and with only
a couple different packages for most of it. R.E.H.A. was able to identify code reuse even
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C koler locker simplocker slocker crosate svpeng
G1 242 0 0 0 0 0
G2 69 0 0 0 0 0
G3 0 0 0 0 22 39
G4 40 0 0 0 0 0
G5 0 34 0 2 0 0
G6 27 0 0 0 0 0
G7 0 25 0 0 0 0
G8 0 23 0 0 0 0
G9 0 22 0 0 0 0
G10 0 0 18 2 0 0
G11 0 0 7 13 0 0
G12 0 18 0 2 0 0
Table 2.1: Classification of Dataset_1 + Dataset_2. On the x axis we have the classification by
AVClass, while R.E.H.A.’s classification is on the y axis.
transformation applied were different names for the packages and smali files. However, in
these cases, the entire structure of the application was changed.
All in all, R.E.H.A. helped isolate at least 18 groups of apps in the dataset that share their
core code. In Table 2.1, we show 12 interesting groups and their relationship with AVClass
classes. From top to bottom, it is easy to see that what AVClass labels as koler or locker are
actually 9 different groups of applications, which probably exhibit the same behaviour (they
are all ransomware, after all) but do not really share enough code to be considered similar by
R.E.H.A.. Another interesting observation can be made by looking at the table from left to
right on G11, the families simplocker and slocker could be easily merged, which may also
explain the similarity of their class names. The same observation can be made on the samples
in the families svpeng and crosate, which were both classified by R.E.H.A. into G3. Manual
analysis has confirmed that all these samples indeed belong together.
This means that R.E.H.A. gave a more accurate representation of the dataset as a whole by
providing more detailed granularity to the generic labels locker and kolerwhile also grouping
together samples unnecessarily classified into different families. This is evident when looking
at the graphs in Figure 2.10 and 2.11.
One of the best results was given by the second biggest group isolated by R.E.H.A., all
of which was comprised of samples of ransomware downloaded between July and August
2017. The 94 samples were nearly identical clones, and were correctly grouped together into





Figure 2.10: AVClass labels (darker shade) are more generic, R.E.H.A. helps refine the results by
subdividing them.
C SmsThief SmsReg SmsSpy smsforw smsPay
G1 25 0 1 0 0
G2 0 22 0 0 1
G3 0 18 0 0 1
G4 0 4 0 0 2
G5 0 8 0 0 0
G6 0 0 0 9 0
G7 7 0 0 0 0
G8 0 0 0 0 0
G9 0 0 0 6 0
Table 2.2: Classification of Dataset_3 (AVClass on the x axis, R.E.H.A. on the y axis).
lockscreen), with samples evenly distributed among them. It is very likely that the labeling of
new malware is less consistent among different antivirus software, as we can see the opposite
trend during our evaluation of the tool with the GENOME dataset.
Dataset_3. Another dataset we worked on was downloaded from VirusTotal and comprises
539 samples. R.E.H.A. identified about 20 unique groups when analyzing for TELEPHONY
related behaviours. In Table 2.2, we highlight only some of the most interesting groups.
Looking at this table, it is clear that the family SmsReg is actually divided into 4 groups and
the families SmsThief and smsforw contain 2 distinct groups each, again making a case for a
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Figure 2.11: R.E.H.A. helps grouping together samples that were divided by AVClass.
C SmsThief SmsReg SmsSpy lockscreen singleton
G1 32 0 11 0 0
G2 0 0 0 8 20
G3 0 22 0 0 0
Table 2.3: Dataset_3 with Crypto APIs (AVClass on the x axis, R.E.H.A. on the y axis).
be merged, which becomes clearer when changing the filter to consider cryptographic APIs, as
shown in Table 2.3. The most interesting result from this analysis comes from group G2, where
8 samples were classified by AVClass as lockscreen and 20 as singleton. This means that
AVClass did not have a label for them, so they are 20 unseen samples that have been correctly
classified by R.E.H.A. as members of the family lockscreen. The fact that all members of the
family SmsReg were classified into G2 in Table 2.2 and then into G3 in Table 2.3 is a good
indication that the grouping was indeed correct.
Dataset_4. Our last analysis is a dataset consisting of 1,790 samples, all downloaded from
AndroTotal.
Table 2.4 depicts some interesting groups of malware with telephony-related behaviours. The
classification in this case seems to be much more consistent between R.E.H.A. and AVClass.
One reason for this could be that these families have been around for a while, as they appear
in the original GENOME dataset (apart from Sandr), so they have been thoroughly studied
and analyzed. It is also interesting to note that R.E.H.A. divided the samples in what AVClass





C BaseBridge BeanBot SMSpy DroidDream Sandr
G1 65 0 0 0 0
G2 0 49 0 0 0
G3 0 0 37 0 0
G4 0 0 0 36 0
G5 0 0 0 33 0
G6 0 0 0 0 31
Table 2.4: Classification of Dataset_4 (AVClass on the x axis, R.E.H.A. on the y axis).
handy method filtering tool, we looked into these samples. We noticed that, while all of the
samples in the 2 groups mined the IMEI, IMSI and device ID from the unsuspecting user, they
went about it in a completely different way: the samples in G4 divided each action in 3 different
methods, while those in G5 did it in one single method. But this is not the only difference, as
the samples in G4 can send SMS messages to steal the user’s IDs, while those in G5 do not
have this capability and just send everything through the internet. So, in a way, all 69 samples
have some consistent behaviours, but they implement them in very different ways.
2.5.3 Classification Accuracy
R.E.H.A. was first tested using the very well known GENOME dataset [156]. It contains 1200
malware samples of Android malware, categorized into 49 families, all of which were collected
between 2010 and 2011.
This dataset has already been the subject of many studies, all of which have expanded the
information gathered on the families and addressed the various problems that can be solved
by classifying malware correctly ([2], [152], [18]). The fact that the dataset is already divided
into malware families and the huge corpora of existing studies on it means that R.E.H.A.’s
accuracy can be assessed easily.
As the samples in this dataset have been gathered in 2010 and 2011, that implies that they
do not perfectly reflect modern malware, however the dataset overall seems like a suitable
candidate for initial testing.
Of the 49 families in the dataset, 16 of these contain only one sample each. Since R.E.H.A.
can classify samples by grouping them with regard to their similarity, these 16 families cannot
possibly be analyzed and so were taken out of the dataset. The rest of the dataset was grouped
and we checked manually to see if the labels were consistent and the results for the remaining
33 families can be seen in Table 2.5. In the end, our tool achieved an accuracy of 92%.
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Precision Recall Accuracy
CCD 0.7812 0.9578 0.8605
BVE 0.8741 0.9487 0.9099
VDD 0.9057 0.9442 0.9246
Table 2.5: Classification accuracy for the GENOME dataset.
dataset containing 5 variants of DroidKungFu that are often grouped together, thus inflating
the number of false positives. On the other hand, recall does not fluctuate much because the
false negatives remain fairly consistent. It is easy to see that accuracy of the classification is
improved by the addition of the BVE and VDD formulas to check for API vector similarity.
2.5.4 Case Studies
Most of the code reuse we found only involve simple app cloning, sometimes with package and
filename renaming, probably to avoid detection by simpler tools. In this section, we describe
one of our most interesting findings: inter-group code reuse.
Code Removal. The group G2 of Dataset_1 + Dataset_2 is one of the biggest groups, con-
taining 94 samples. All of its members share the methods encrypt(), decrypt(), getKey(),
getMD5string(), and init() that are deemed as interesting by R.E.H.A. when filtering for
cryptographic methods. However, when the classification is extended to other functions (such
as display functions), there is another group that shares a lot of code with samples from group
2. In fact, they share not only the code, but most of the application’s structure as well (as
shown in Figure 2.12). The reason they do not belong in the same group according to R.E.H.A.
is that they are missing all the classes that deal with encryption, making each sample in the
group more like a “scareware” as they lack the ability to actually do any harm to the filesystem.
This highlights one of the challenges when trying to classify entire applications with regards to
their code similarity, as we need to manually set how much shared code constitutes similarity
to begin with.
Code Transformations. Many samples encountered in our analysis are clones. For instance,
all members of group G2 inDataset_1 +Dataset_2 share the same exact code and file structure,
apart from 7 samples that are just a Chinese variant of the malware (they still share the core
code, but with a changed file structure of the app and additional classes). Other families change
some basic properties to avoid detection. For example, group G1 in Dataset_1 + Dataset_2



















































Figure 2.12: Case study, Code Removal (Section 2.5.4). The main instructions that have been removed
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Figure 2.13: Performance of R.E.H.A.’s optimized comparison algorithm.
The most interesting samples try to avoid detection by obfuscating everything, from the
file structure to their code, as is the case of group G3 in Dataset_4, where every smali file is
littered with dozens of methods (with encrypted names) that do not do anything but call each
other, thus obfuscating the CFG of the whole app. Control flow obfuscation is also applied to
the individual methods, making it a challenge for most similarity detection techniques. Despite
this, R.E.H.A. was able to successfully group these apps together thanks to its relaxed CDD
threshold (which allows for greater control flow manipulation) and to the use of the API vector
checks.
2.5.5 Performance
The performance of R.E.H.A. varies wildly in relation to the size of the dataset and the size of
the samples in the dataset. We conducted an empiric study, adding few APKs at a time from
the GENOME dataset and timing how much it took for the system to analyze them. Figure 2.13
details how much R.E.H.A. scales in comparison to a thorough pairwise comparison (which
would incur in a quadratic slowdown) and both linear and nlogn functions (ideals) in the worst
case. The total to run the similarity check for 38.149 methods was around 80 seconds, while it
would have taken more than 800 seconds (circa 14 minutes) without search space reduction.
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Figure 2.14:Workflow of StranDroid.
2.6 Methodology of the Compositional Approach
In this section we will describe our approach in detail, including some of the methodology in
[48] that initially inspired this work and delving deeper in the differences between our work
and [48].
A detailed workflow can be seen in Fig 2.14. A query APK is compared to the rest of the
dataset by first extracting all its methods and dividing them into basic blocks. Then, from
every method we generate the strands (see Section 2.1 and [48]) which are placed into buckets.
This is done for every sample in the dataset (only once, then it is saved for future runs). Every
strand from the query APK is compared with all the strands coming from each method of the
dataset samples using the Strand Similarity Measure. The Local Evidence Score is then computed
to gauge how significant the strand matching really is. Finally, the Global Evidence Score will
simply sum all the LES from the various strands in the methods and generate a score that
indicates how similar two methods are. In the rest of the section we go into detail for each of
the steps described above.
Use Case
StranDroid is a tool focused on the analysis and reverse engineering of malware. In order
to use the tool at its fullest, we first need a dataset of Android malware samples. Then, we
can input a query sample 𝑞𝑠 into the system and StranDroid will show which sample best
matches 𝑞𝑠 wrt its potentially malicious behaviors.
This comparison is done at the method level: the sample that shares the highest number of
methods with 𝑞𝑠 is selected as the result of the analysis. Along with this, StranDroid will
show a comprehensive list of all the common methods between the two samples and their
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Method Filtering and Collection
As a first step in the analysis, StranDroid builds an internal representation of all the APKs in
the dataset by collecting their methods. We filter out the methods that do not meet two basic
requirements: 1) a minimum length, and 2) presence of calls to Risky APIs (see Section 2.1 and
[94] for a brief introduction).
The minimum length of the methods is a variable parameter that can be set at the beginning
of the analysis and is meant to filter out common methods that are used in most APKs (such
as init methods) and would muddy the detection of actual malicious behaviours. In order to
further speed up the analysis, StranDroid will not consider methods that do not contain
at least one invocation to a risky API, since these methods only contain the internal logic of
the app and cannot exhibit malicious behaviors targeted towards either the user or the device
itself. Both of these heuristics have been adopted due to our previous experience with R.E.H.A.
[94] and they have been successfully tested empirically. During this initial scan of the methods
in the dataset, the code is parsed by StranDroid in order to speed up the next part of the
analysis.
Parsing
Program slicing requires isolating instructions that are correlated to the slicing criterion
through data flow [141] (control flow can be ignored since strands are extracted from basic
blocks), thus the first component of the tool is a parser for Smali. In order to generate def-use
chains it is essential to knowwhich variables are used and defined in each line. For this purpose,
our smali code parser extracts these variables using the pattern of the particular opcode: we
define 6 procedures covering all the possible Def-Use behaviors of the instructions and apply
the correct routine to each opcode.
Strand Extraction and Normalization
Once all the interesting methods have been collected and parsed for every APK in the dataset,
they are split into basic blocks by a simple heuristic. At this point, strands are extracted from
the basic blocks. Strands are static slices of the code contained in a basic block, obtained via
a simple backward slicing algorithm (see pseudocode at Figure 2.15). These strands then go
through a normalization process, where every variable encountered is renamed wrt its order
of appearance in the strand.
As an example, we show this on a snippet from a simplified method (its statements have
been shortened):
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1 strands = []
2 for inst in reverse(BB):
3 s <- new Strand
4 s <- s + inst
5 d <- defined_vars(inst)
6 u <- used_vars(inst)
7 BB <- BB - inst
8 for inst_1 in reverse(BB):
9 d_1 <- defined_vars(inst_1)
10 u_1 <- used_vars(inst_1)
11 for v in u:
12 if v in d_1:
13 u <- u + u_1
14 s <- s + inst_1
15 BB <- BB - inst_1
16 strands <- strands + reverse(s)
17 return strands
Figure 2.15: Strand Extraction Algorithm
1 move-object v4, v2
2 const/high16 v5, 0x10000000
3 invoke-virtual {v4, v5}, setFlags(I)
4 move-result-object v4
5 move-object v6, v1
6 move-object v7, v4
7 invoke-virtual {v6}, LstartService()
8 move-result-object v6
Assuming that the last statement is the slicing criterion, starting from it, the algorithm walks
backwards and collects all the statements that may affect the value of 𝑣6, which is the only
variable in the slicing criterion. This is the extracted strand:
1 move-object v6, v1
2 invoke-virtual {v6}, LstartService()
3 move-result-object v6
Clearly all the statements ignored do not contain a data-flow connection with 𝑣6. At this point
we normalize the strand by renaming the variables:
1 move-object v1, v2
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1 i g e t − o b j e c t v5 , p0 , Lcom / xxx / yyy /BBBB;−> re sponse : Lorg / apache / h t t p / Ht tpResponse ;
2 invoke − i n t e r f a c e { v5 } , Lorg / apache / h t t p / Ht tpResponse ;−> g e t E n t i t y ( ) Lorg / apache / h t t p /
H t t pEn t i t y ;
3 move− r e s u l t − o b j e c t v1
4 . l o c a l v1 , " e n t i t y " : Lorg / apache / h t t p / H t t pEn t i t y ;
5 invoke − i n t e r f a c e { v1 } , Lorg / apache / h t t p / H t t pEn t i t y ;−> ge tCon ten t ( ) L j ava / i o / Inpu tS t r eam ;
6 move− r e s u l t − o b j e c t v5
7 invoke − v i r t u a l { p0 , v5 } , Lcom / xxx / yyy /BBBB;−> g e n e r a t e S t r i n g ( L j ava / i o / Inpu tS t r eam ; )
L j ava / l ang / S t r i n g ;
1 i g e t − o b j e c t v9 , p0 , Lcom / xxx / yyy /BBBB;−> re sponse : Lorg / apache / h t t p / Ht tpResponse ;
2 invoke − i n t e r f a c e { v9 } , Lorg / apache / h t t p / Ht tpResponse ;−> g e t E n t i t y ( ) Lorg / apache / h t t p /
H t t pEn t i t y ;
3 move− r e s u l t − o b j e c t v2
4 . l o c a l v2 , " e n t i t y " : Lorg / apache / h t t p / H t t pEn t i t y ;
5 i g e t − o b j e c t v9 , p0 , Lcom / xxx / yyy /BBBB;−> re sponse : Lorg / apache / h t t p / Ht tpResponse ;
6 invoke − v i r t u a l { p0 , v9 } , Lcom / xxx / yyy /BBBB;−> ge tCon t en tCha r s e t ( Lorg / apache / h t t p /
Ht tpResponse ; )
7 move− r e s u l t − o b j e c t v0
8 . l o c a l v0 , " c h a r s e t " : L j ava / l ang / S t r i n g ;
9 invoke − i n t e r f a c e { v2 } , Lorg / apache / h t t p / H t t pEn t i t y ;−> ge tCon ten t ( ) L j ava / i o / Inpu tS t r eam ;
10 move− r e s u l t − o b j e c t v9
11 invoke − v i r t u a l { p0 , v9 , v0 } , Lcom / xxx / yyy /BBBB;−> g e n e r a t e S t r i n g ( L j ava / i o / Inpu tS t r eam ; )
Figure 2.16: Two semantically equivalent strands from method HppGet
This last step is done in order to thwart the all too common occurrence of statement
reordering, which happens both due to obfuscation attempts and the decompilation process. In
our tests, strand normalization has proven to be a necessary step, since the similarity measure
is very syntactic.
Strand Similarity Measure (𝑆𝑆𝑀)
In [48] the similarity between two strands was computed via a program verifier that checks
for input-output equivalence between the strands while pairing each variable from a strand
with the corresponding one in the other. This is done by lifting the binary procedure into
BoogieIVL [13] by first going through IDA pro, then LLVM IR [82] via BAP [22] and lastly
SMACK [114] is used to translate LLVM IR into BoogieIVL.
Lacking such a peculiar toolchain for our Android use case, we opted to simplify the strand
similarity measure and adopt the very common Jaccard index. Two strands 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are
compared wrt the Jaccard index of the instructions they contain. Let us recall the mathematical
definition of the Jaccard index between two sets:
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𝐽 (𝐴, 𝐵) = |𝐴
⋂︁
𝐵 |
|𝐴⋃︁𝐵 | = |𝐴⋂︁𝐵 ||𝐴| + |𝐵 | − |𝐴⋂︁𝐵 | (2.10)
Then our strand similarity measure (SSM) can be stated as:
𝑆𝑆𝑀 (𝑠1, 𝑠2) = 𝐽 (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 (𝑠1), 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 (𝑠2)) (2.11)
Where 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 (𝑠1) and 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 (𝑠𝑠) denote the set of statements contained in the normalized strands
𝑠1 and 𝑠2 respectively. For example, given the normalized strand in the previous section
(𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐴) we can have a similar strand extracted from a different method and then normalized
(𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐵):
1 move-object v1, v2
2 move-object v2, v1
3 invoke-virtual {v1}, LstartService()
4 move-result-object v1
This strand is almost equivalent to the previous but has an added linemove-object v2, v1 that
does not change the semantics of the strand (we found these types of meaningless insertions










4 = 0.75 (2.12)
This can be thought of as the likelihood of the two strands being similar. While 75% likelihood
might seem too low a value, it is mainly dictated by the reduced length of this example, as the
Jaccard index of two similar strands is usually higher for longer strands.
The design choice of using the Jaccard index as similarity between two strands comes from
the need for an efficient method to compute the function, as it must be computed for every
strand in every method. It is also convenient that the Jaccard index produces a value between
0 and 1, giving a sort of likelihood to the similarity of two strands. We will discuss possible
problems with this approach in Section 2.9.
Method Similarity Measure
When every strand is extracted both in the dataset and in the query sample 𝑞𝑠 , StranDroid
checks every method in 𝑞𝑠 against every method of the dataset with the following algorithm.
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likelihood of finding a strand 𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 (𝑡) such that 𝑠𝑞 and 𝑠𝑟 are semantically similar. This
is equal to the maximum of the SSM between the query strand 𝑠𝑞 and every strand contained
in 𝑡 :
P(𝑠𝑞 |𝑡) =𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑡 ∈𝑡 (𝑆𝑆𝑀 (𝑠𝑞, 𝑠𝑡 )) (2.13)
Continuing with the methodology first described in [48] we implement a function that
measures the statistical significance of a strand wrt the entire dataset. This is done in order
to give more weight to strands that are not common in the dataset, and should result in a
similarity measure that focuses on the more unique parts of the code. Given a query strand 𝑠𝑞
and all the strands in the dataset 𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 , we define:
P(𝑠𝑞,𝑇 ) =
∑︁
𝑠𝑡 ∈𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑀 (𝑠𝑞 |𝑠𝑡 )
|𝑇 | (2.14)
A lower value of P(𝑠𝑞,𝑇 ) represents a higher statistical relevance, as it means that 𝑠𝑞 has few
semantically similar strands in the dataset.
Following [48] we can now define the Local Evidence Score (𝐿𝐸𝑆) between a strand and a
method as:









The last function that we need to define in order to obtain a similarity measure between
methods is the Global Evidence Score (𝐺𝐸𝑆). Given a query method 𝑞 contained in the query
sample and a target method 𝑡 extracted from one of the samples in the database we have:
𝐺𝐸𝑆 (𝑞 |𝑡) =
∑︂
𝑠𝑞 ∈𝑞
𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑠𝑞 |𝑡) (2.16)
The measure of similarity between two methods is given by the sum of the individual values
of 𝐿𝐸𝑆 for every strand in the query method. This sum is, of course, lower-bounded by 0, but
does not have an upper bound, which can induce significant errors that we discuss in Sections





method in the dataset and returns only the method that generates the highest score, provided
it exceeds the set threshold of 4.
The sample 𝑟𝑠 that matches the most methods with the query sample 𝑞𝑠 is then returned as
the result of the analysis, along with a list of all similar methods between the two samples.
2.7 Evaluation of StranDroid
Figure 2.17: A screenshot of StranDroid, the new similar methods that were missed by R.E.H.A. are
highlighted in yellow. The only false positives of StranDroid are highlighted in green.
As a first step, StranDroid has been evaluated against the well known GENOME dataset
[156] simulating a classification task. Since our tool requires an existing dataset of known
malware, this proved to be the easiest test bed to ascertain its efficacy, even though the dataset
itself is showing its age. The GENOME dataset contains mostly malware that has not been
thoroughly modified, so these results, while encouraging, were not sufficient for a proper
evaluation. For this reason, a second evaluation has been conducted on the PraGuard dataset
[91], which contains samples with various program transformations such as string encryption,
class encryption and reflection.
We then tested StranDroid on samples selected from a dataset of Android ransomware and
malware previously used in the evaluation of R.E.H.A. [94], as this allowed us to easily spot
any inconsistencies between the two approaches. Unlike our previous approach, StranDroid
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refines the results we had with R.E.H.A.. Figure 2.18 shows a comparison between the two
tools by comparing the number of similar methods that were found among 8 pairs in the
dataset. R.E.H.A. almost always over-approximates and returns more similar methods than
StranDroid, except in a few cases where StranDroid actually discovers some methods that
eluded detection in R.E.H.A.. An example of the analysis results can be seen in Figure 2.17.
GENOME
We extracted around 600 samples from the GENOME dataset, excluding the families that
contained less than 20 samples each. One sample from each family was then selected and
removed from the dataset. We then used StranDroid with the removed samples as the query
APKs, in order to find similar APKs in the dataset. Our tool paired each query APK with
samples of their original family on 100% of the cases, thus validating the approach.
PraGuard
The PraGuard dataset [91] provided a few different code obfuscations applied to the GENOME
dataset. We tested StranDroid with these by extracting one sample from each class in
the obfuscated database and using it as a query APK against the entire original GENOME
dataset. The results on the samples modified using string encryption have been positive, with
every sample extracted randomly from each malware class being classified correctly with
other samples in the same class. This test proved that the string comparison, used to gauge
the equivalence of statements for the SSM between strands, does not negatively impact the
effectiveness of our tool when used for classification.
The next two obfuscation classes obtained from PraGuard, class encryption and reflection,
uncovered a lot of flaws in the approach. Both classes resulted in unsatisfactory classification,
with the samples obfuscated with class encryption resulting in zero similar APKs for many
of them. This negative result is unavoidable as the APKs are obfuscated with DexGuard [69],
which encrypts and compresses (with GZIP) every class in the APK. The content of the classes
is thus completely hidden to a static analyzer and is only revealed at runtime. Our approach
relies on extracting data flow information from methods statically, which means that the only
methods available for analysis were the ones used for runtime decryption.
The samples obfuscated with reflection instead generated many false positives, which is
easily explainable by the confined nature of our analysis (every strand comes from a single basic
block). In order to correctly calculate the similarity between strands, the method invocation






We used a dataset of 20 Android malware and ransomware samples, a reduced version of the
one collected in 2017 for [94], where each sample is similar to at least one other sample in
the dataset, giving a total of 10 semantically-similar program pairs (or families). By similar
samples, in this context, we mean that they contain some of the same malicious behaviors,
while the rest of the application (usually a piggy-backed legitimate app) is not considered
for the similarity. In Figure 2.18 we show a direct comparison between StranDroid and
R.E.H.A.. The latter almost always returns more similar methods but this is due to the presence
of false positives, while StranDroid is generally more precise for all the classes considered
and sometimes yields even fewer false negatives than R.E.H.A. (for example in 1-ransom).
Figure 2.18: Comparing the number of similar methods found in 8 pairs of the dataset. R.E.H.A. often
over-approximates and finds many false positives while StranDroid is more precise.
The dataset contains ransomware and malware samples and is fairly small to allow manual
verification of the results, since the goal of this evaluation phase is to challenge the ground-
truth extracted from an analysis by R.E.H.A.. In Section 2.10 we speculate on some possible
improvements of this step.
Precision
The nature of the similarity measure implemented in StranDroid should make it so that the
tool is not affected by certain types of code obfuscation such as structural transformations
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Figure 2.19: CFGs extracted from two semantically equivalent methods with bogus code insertions
dataset by running both R.E.H.A. and StranDroid and manually evaluating the results of
the analyses.
The results of our tests are overwhelmingly positive. Using StranDroid , we uncovered
the source of some false negatives in the analysis with R.E.H.A., mostly coming from samples
employing the two aforementioned modifications.
In Section 2.7.1 we explore two specific examples of these tests.
Normal Code Evolution
Since most malware nowadays consists of modified versions of existing malware, it is possible
that some of the transformations that we noticed in the samples are not always the result of
an attempt to obfuscate the code, but rather they could simply be the result of updated and
refined code for the new versions. Malware developers could add code to their samples not
just as dummy filler to fool signature based approaches (although that seems to work well
[55]), but also to add new behaviors. It is our opinion that this has to be investigated more, as
it is possible to use StranDroid to analyze the evolution of malware in the same family over






As anticipated in Section 2.6, the similarity between two methods is given by their𝐺𝐸𝑆 , which
is a summation of all the local 𝐿𝐸𝑆 between the strands and the method itself. This causes the
similarity measure to assume theoretically unbounded values (since it depends on the number
of strands in a methods), which means that setting a predefined threshold 𝑇𝑟 that works on all
methods is not a trivial task. If𝑇𝑟 is too small, it can cause false positives among methods that
are not similar but contain a lot of strands (as we will see in Section 2.9), and false negatives if
the methods are indeed similar but too small to reach 𝑇𝑟 . We thoroughly experimented with
our dataset and reached the conclusion that 𝑇𝑟 = 4 is a good threshold to decide the similarity
between two methods, as we encountered 71 methods in the class 7−𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 that are similar
between the two samples and returned a 𝐺𝐸𝑆 between 4 and 4.5.
2.7.1 Case Studies
The nature of strands, namely that they are confined in basic blocks, allows StranDroid
to be very precise when finding similarities between methods even when one of the control
flows is modified substantially. Another advantage of using buckets of strands is evident when
evaluating the similarity of methods where dummy code has been inserted, as the original
code (the code that is semantically relevant) is still present in the form of a composition of
strands. We now show two specific examples of these cases and highlight how focusing on
strands helped the analysis.
Modified CFG
HppGet() is a method that is present in two similar malware samples (𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒1 and 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒2)
in our reduced dataset and is used to communicate with a remote server with the use of the
Apache HTTP API. The peculiarity of the two versions of this method is that the one in 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒2
is heavily modified wrt its CFG compared to the version in 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒1 (both CFGs can be seen in
Figure 2.20).
This proved to be a challenge for the structural similarity approach taken by R.E.H.A.,
while StranDroid was able to recognize the meaningful strands in the code, ignoring the
modifications to the CFG. One of the meaningful strands from each ransomware sample can
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Dummy code insertion
onEnable() is a method extracted from two ransomware samples (𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒3 and 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒4). Both
versions of the method have been manually investigated and evidently perform the same
function, but the one in 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒4 is almost double the size of its original version in 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒3.
The CFG of the methods has not been modified, but around 20 lines of dummy code have been
inserted. This can be seen in Figure 2.19 where the weight parameter in the second basic block
shows that the amount of statements therein contained has doubled.
This is usually done in order to fool automatic malware recognition tools that rely on exact
file signatures and it also proved to be a challenge for R.E.H.A., since the similarity measure
relies heavily on the weight of the basic blocks (the number of statements in it). As expected,
the strand approach taken with StranDroid works flawlessly with transformations that
modify the structure of the CFG.






N. of APKs N. of Methods
Avg. Time
(per method)
TS_1 100 20489 0.9s
TS_2 150 27273 1.32s
TS_3 200 40277 2.15s
Table 2.6: Test set for performance evaluation
2.7.2 Performance
The method parsing and strand generation are relatively simple operations, as they only
require one pass for each smali file. Doing this to every sample in the dataset still yields a
linear complexity, meaning that even with hundreds of samples the extraction times are fairly
small. The true complexity of StranDroid comes from strand comparisons, as each strand
from every method in the query APK has to be compared (via SSM) with every strand from
every method in every sample of the dataset.
To gauge the actual performance of the tool we ran tests on a MacBook Pro with a 2.3 GHz
i5 dual-core processor and 8GB of RAM, against a test set composed of 3 different subsets of
the GENOME dataset with randomly extracted samples. The specifics of the test set can be
seen in Table 2.6, along with the average time it took to analyze a single method in the query
sample against every method in the test set. The query samples were also extracted randomly
from the original dataset, one for each of the 5 classes BeanBot, DroidDream, DroidKungFu,
Geinimi and GoldDream. The specific execution times for the tests on each sample against the




BB43 4m 18s 6m 15s 10m 39s 361
DDL7 3m 35s 5m 18s 8m 50s 234
DKF14 3m 58s 5m 44s 9m 45s 289
GEIN37 2m 50s 4m 23s 6m 58s 163
GD17 2m 24s 3m 58s 5m 55s 166
Avg. 3m 25s 5m 7s 8m 25s
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2.8 Related Work
In this section we will cover some existing works that closely relate to our approach.
Previous work on Android systems focused on detecting clones and code reuse in Android
apps, providing ways to cluster APKs, and detect and classify Android malware. Many of
the proposed methods employ static analysis to build features that can be used to cluster the
malware, and strive to make the analyses scalable while retaining good accuracy results.
Clone Detection and Code Reuse [51] employs Normalized Compression Distance (NCD)
on each method to find similar methods. Juxtapp [70] builds an application feature matrix and
proposes a scalable method to cluster and evaluate similarity between applications. [41, 42]
are instead based on Program Dependency Graph (PDG), where the former measures similarity
by first filtering methods, and then exploiting subgraph isomorphism to measure similarity.
The latter instead exploits Locality Sensitive Hashing LSH to find approximate near-neighbors
feature vectors. Wang et al. [137] use an approach based on filtering third party libraries, and
then building a feature vector using API calls, measuring the similarity by pairwise comparison
using the Manhattan distance.
Mobile Malware Classification and Clustering Mobile malware classification has been
mainly tackled using machine learning: [50] extracts a signature to represent repackaged
malware and tries to cluster malware samples into families. [152] is based instead on a peculiar
data structure calledWeighted Contextual API Dependency Graphs(WC-ADG) to capture the
semantics of the methods and use these to build a feature vector. An approach that employs
n-gram sequences of dex code is proposed in [88], with an intuition similar to the one in this
work: malware samples belonging to the same family share the payload. The most common
shared libraries are removed in order to lessen the impact of false positives. The similarity
measure between the malware fingerprints generated with the n-grams is the Jaccard distance,
making the work in [88] closely related to both our approaches in this thesis. Our approach in
StranDroid is more focused on the control structure of the methods so it has a higher-level
view of the programs compared to n-grams and it is more efficient (computationally-wise)
and arguably more malleable to transformations. At the same time, strands are likely a better
choice for semantic similarity since they have semantic significance beyond simple n-grams.
Dynamic analysis is also employed in [75], where the authors classify Android malware by
first building a “behavior profile” dynamically. After generating this profile for the samples in a
specific family, the new samples to be classified undergo the same treatment and the behavior
profiles can be checked for matches with a custom similarity function.
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Android Malware Analysis Similar ideas have been proposed to tackle malware detec-
tion: [7] employs static analysis to extract a set of features that is then classified via linear
Support Vector Machines to detect if a sample is malicious. An interesting instance is proposed
by [60] and is based on feature space embedding based on call graphs. [2] evaluates how
several machine learning algorithms score with an API-based features set. Previous work also
explored the use of Markov chains [98] for behavioral models, and Hidden Markov Models
(HMM) and structural entropy [24] to achieve mobile malware detection. An interesting work
that tackles the problem of detecting variants of known malware samples is in [56], where the
authors seek to detect variants of existing malware using a similarity digest hashing algorithm
to generate a 64 byte static feature set. As stated in their conclusions, some of their false
positives come from the original apps (benign) from which the malware authors crafted their
malicious samples. This is likely because in the approach there is no applied methodology to
distinguish malicious behaviour from normal behaviour, which in our work is done mainly via
risky APIs filtering. A slightly different approach is taken by [29], which employs a features
set obtained via both static and dynamic analysis. It differs from our work mostly because
of the use of dynamic features and machine learning, but we share the view that certain API
calls (“sensitive API calls” in their paper) can help distinguish between malicious and benign
behaviours.
In [140], the authors highlight how important it is to develop more precise descriptions of
the behaviors for existing malware datasets. They conduct a large-scale study where they
analyze specific samples in various families that have been classified by existing anti-virus
scans. Our approach shares the same goal of achieving a more precise analysis, but it differs in
the methodology.
Many Android malware analysis tools have been developed recently using machine learning.
There are works such as [150] that we already mentioned in Section 2.1 for sharing our view
on risky APIs, and more recent works that employ modern ML techniques such as LSTM and
autoencoders in order to better classify Android malware [145, 138]. Even if our approach is
static, with no ML influence, we share the goal of finding the best features that can predict the
maliciousness of an Android malware.
2.9 Limitations and Future Work
The two approaches described in this chapter suffer from different limitations. We list some of
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2.9.1 R.E.H.A. Limitations
Code Obfuscation. While R.E.H.A. managed to classify apps that were employing CFG
obfuscation techniques, it still suffers from code obfuscation. This means that it might not be
able to handle advanced obfuscated code. Some features could be better extracted in a dynamic
way. For example, our risky_api vector stores the number of times a certain API is written
in the method’s body, while it would be far more interesting to know how many times it is
actually called at runtime.
There are some downsides to extracting dynamic features. First of all, it is a costly endeavour,
especially in Android. In order to run Android software in an environment apt to extract
dynamic features, it needs to be installed in an emulator. The software itself then needs to be
stimulated in order to produce the execution traces. Another reason why dynamic analysis
is costly, especially in Android, is that it needs to run the right instructions in order to cover
enough behaviours. Chapter 4 expands on some of the weaknesses encountered by dynamic
analysis.
All these downsides notwitstanding, the dynamic extraction of the API calls would drastically
reduce the number of false positives.
Whitelisting Known Libraries. Many of R.E.H.A.’s false positives come from popular ad
libraries (especially admob), since they often use a subset of the risky APIs and are common
enough to be found in many samples. The worst cases happen when some parts of an appli-
cation without ads have been cloned, and the clone has ads. If the parts of the application
responsible for ads are more significant than the cloned parts, the application will appear to be
more similar to other applications that employ ads than to its own original. For this reason it
is usually good practice to whitelist popular ad packages and it is an approach taken by other
works that try to pinpoint the payload with a similarity measure such as [88].
Granularity. Right now, our analysis only considers similarity at the method level. However
instructions can easily be spread among different methods, or some methods could be grouped,
making our approach unsound. A good approach could be to consider the CFG of the entire
application and search for common subgraphs. This is of course a problem that is incredibly
hard to tackle (NP-hard in fact) and would require new heuristics and solutions to make it
viable.
Performance. As almost every algorithm employed in R.E.H.A. is parallelizable, in the
future we will adopt a cluster of machines with GPUs to divide the workload and speed up
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the application by quite a bit. For now, parts of the method similarity functions have been
rewritten with multi-threading in mind, leading to a considerable speed-up especially on
systems with at least 8 cores. The experiments and their run times collected in this chapter
have been collected without the use of parallelization.
Implementation. As previously explained in Section 2.4.2, every feature and every report
is saved on disk in plain text using some serialization libraries. This requires the program
to load a huge json file into memory at each start-up and the RAM usage takes quite a hit
without running the analysis. We think it could be better to utilize a database driver such as
PostgreSQL or MySQL to store the results.
On that note, we re-implemented the tool with MongoDB, a popular NoSQL database, with
mixed results. The loading time of the tool has improved consistently but the run time of
the analysis has incurred a considerable slowdown. Every method comparison has to query
the database at least twice, leading to significant overhead that more than doubles the usual
execution time.
All the times and results recorded in this chapter have been done without the MongoDB
implementation.
2.9.2 StranDroid Limitations
Our tests with the PraGuard dataset [91] and the manual assessment of the results with our
reduced malware/ransomware dataset have unveiled some limitations of our approach.
String Comparison
When calculating the SSM as the Jaccard index between two strands, the union operator
considers the strands as sets and the statements therein contained as strings. This means
that our algorithm will judge the uniqueness of a statement in the set by using exact string
equivalence. This has proven to not be a problemwhen analyzingmost samples in the GENOME
dataset [156] but has resulted in a slightly reduced number of equivalent methods found when
using samples from PraGuard obfuscated with string encryption.
It might be a good idea to replace the strings with a generic token instead of mining them
directly. This would likely solve the aforementioned problems but could introduce new false
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Static Thresholds
The value 4 as a threshold for the𝐺𝐸𝑆 between two methods has proven to be a good estimate
for method similarity throughout the tests. This value is highly dependent on the size of the
methods and on the number of strands, thus it could be useful to have a threshold that adapts
to these parameters, or conversely, implement an algorithm that learns the correct threshold
given the parameters.
Unbounded Similarity Measure
Related to the previous point, the 𝐺𝐸𝑆 is calculated as a summation of the 𝐿𝐸𝑆 between all
strands. This makes its value theoretically unbounded, which further exacerbates the problem
of having a static threshold for the similarity measure. Future evolutions of this work could
consider a measure of central tendency such as the arithmetic mean.
Unique Result
As introduced in Section 2.6, StranDroid returns only one method as a result of the similarity
analysis for each method in the query APK. This effectively means that, given a dataset
containing families of malware and a query APK that belongs to one of the families, the result
APK is going to be unique. In other words, no other APKs containing less similar methods
(but still similar) is going to be returned. This might be too strict of a design choice, as our
similarity measure is in no way perfect.
Improvements
Strand comparisons are independent of each other, which means that the performance of
our tool could be increased by a great factor if we employed code parallelization. The tool
also suffers from the bare-bones Python implementation, where a great number of string
comparisons means a great decrease in performance. We are currently looking into Cython
[14] in order to leverage the faster C implementation for string comparison.
2.10 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we explored the malware classification and clustering in scenario 1, using
Android as the open system from which we could gather the source code of the samples. We
developed two different approaches for code similarity in Android starting from the smali





Both approaches share the intuition that malware samples by nature need to utilize system
APIs that allow them to effectively disrupt the users experience and/or steal data. From this
simple intuition, we generated a short list of “risky APIs” and used it to filter out all the
methods that do not call any of them. These methods could not do any real damage and are
therefore effectively whitelisted.
This simple initial heuristic allows us to filter many methods that would have cluttered the
analysis otherwise. The two methodologies developed for this chapter are discussed below.
R.E.H.A.
The first approach utilized a feature called 3D-CFG that approximates the CFG of each method
in an APK by synthesizing all its structural information into a single 4-valued vector called
3D-CFG centroid. This feature has the advantage of being relatively easy to extract, as it
only requires one whole pass of the source code, while also being reasonably robust. It
works especially well against code transformation techniques that do not affect the program
control structure too much and of course also works well with programs that have not been
transformed at all. Another advantage is the low computational complexity of the resulting
similarity measure, since it only involves vector algebra that can be solved in constant time
(with very small constants too).
The downsides of the technique stem from the lack of precision introduced by the features.
The CFG of a program is an abstraction of the code and by itself does not lead to good results
since many methods share the same CFG structure. A few heuristics have been presented in
this chapter in order to quell the amount of false positives resulting from the bare analysis.
Two additional vectors are collected during the first pass of the code, counting respectively
which system APIs have been used in the methods and how many times these APIs have been
called, still in the context of a single method.
The methodology has been tested first, and with good results, against the GENOME dataset
as it represents a solid ground truth. We then collected two novel datasets with malware and
ransomware and ran our tool to discover whether the label assigned by the main antivirus
services was correct. The results of this analysis allowed us to discover that many labels
were applied incorrectly. Our tool was able to correctly group together malware samples that
were split into different families by commercial antivirus software while also separating some
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StranDroid
For the second approach herein presented, we decided that we could forgo some speed in order
to gain precision. To this end, we extract a finer semantic feature called “strand” introduced in
[48] and applied to Android for the first time in [109]. A strand is just a backward slice limited
to the confines of a single basic block. After each method is decomposed into its strands, it is
compared to the other methods and their strands. We developed a method similarity measure
by treating methods as sets of strands and using the Jaccard index to understand how similar
they are to each other.
We tested the methodology with the same process described for the previous tool. This
allowed us to directly compare the two approaches and appreciate how StranDroid has
a much lower rate of false positives than R.E.H.A. and allows us to be more precise in the
semantic categorization of Android malware.
It is only due to the accessibility of the source code that we were able to craft these two
custom code similarity techniques. We relied heavily on domain expertise to understand what
made the first approach prone to false positives and again to improve this aspect with the
second methodology. In the next chapters we will not have the same luxury.
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3 Deep Learning on Compiled Programs
In this chapter we consider the malware classification task as described in the second scenario:
a semi-closed system where the source code of the malware samples is not available. This
section introduces and motivates the malware classification problem, places it into the context
of the second scenario, and outlines our contributions.
The Problem
In scenario 2, the only available information about the program is the compiled binary. The
binary cannot be reverse-engineered back into its source code (otherwise this would be scenario
1) so it has to be used as is. In order to classify these program samples, as in the previous
chapter, two elements are needed:
1. Some representation(s) of each program
2. A similarity measure between the program representations
This time, since the representations need to be generated from the entire compiled binary,
they cannot be syntactic code abstractions as in scenario 1. This is not easy to do, as the
long sequences of zeros and ones in binaries are encoded to work only on a specific hardware
architecture and rarely represent recognizable syntactic or semantic features on their own.
The result is that in this scenario it is not possible to rely on the same expertise as in the
previous one. Classifying malware into different families according to their behaviour requires
the design of new techniques for program similarity.
For statically extracted code features, it is clear what their expressive power is and which
obfuscations can fool them. With features extracted from binaries, there is less information
available and thus less expertise can be applied. In the case of malware classification, this can
also be seen as a positive factor. In scenario 1, we were able to extract semantic abstractions
from the source code and both their expressive power and their weaknesses were known.
The attackers (malware developers) had the same knowledge available and could apply their
expertise to circumvent the similarity analysis by using the correct type of obfuscations.
In scenario 2 the defenders have lost most of their ability to directly apply their expertise to
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and understood effects on the source code, they could be used to specifically target an analysis.
On compiled programs, however, code transformations have a less controllable effect. As the
programs go through the compilation process, they are transformed and often optimized to the
point where some obfuscations can be removed outright. This lack of control by the attackers
is something that can be exploited. If we find a proper way to defend (classify malware) in
scenario 2, then it would be harder for the attackers to circumvent our analysis.
Considering that in this scenario, the malware samples are vectors of zeros and ones
with no clear way to measure the similarity between them, the easiest way to approach a
classification task would be to utilize machine learning techniques. This comes with some
inherent advantages. First of all, machine learning algorithms basically infer the similarity
function without a need to specify it. This is of course invaluable in this scenario as it allows
to defer our expertise to the machine directly. Many machine learning algorithms still require
expertise to extract the program representation for a classification task in a process called
feature extraction. This would be a problem in scenario 2, but thankfully certain neural network
architectures do not require such a process and instead learn both the program representation
and the similarity function.
The fact that the similarity measure and the representations are learnt and not hard-coded
means that attacking this type of classification is inherently harder. The attackers not only
have less control over the object of our classification (binary vs. source code), they also do
not have a deterministic attack vector like the obfuscations against the abstractions in the
previous chapter.
Of course there are also some disadvantages to this approach. In order to properly classify
malware into different families the first requirement is a dataset of properly labeled malware.




When a dataset is too small it makes it hard to apply certain types of deep learning architectures
as they tend to overfit easily. If a dataset is imbalanced, that means that some classes are over
or under-represented and thus generate a less reliable classifier. A mislabeled dataset is, of
course, the worst offender in this list but it is also the hardest to combat since it requires a lot
of human expertise and extensive resources.
In this chapter, we explore the classification of malware according to their binary and
hypothesize some solutions to the aforementioned problems.
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The proliferation of malware increases steadily year after year [99]. In a way this phenomenon
is due to most households owning one or more devices that can be attacked. In another way,
the financial interests of many users are tied to their internet-bound devices, which then
become ideal attack vectors. It is thus imperative to find fast and reliable techniques to identify
and fight new malware.
Modern-day malware samples are often heavily protected against reverse engineering
and many types of program analysis. For example, malware is frequently modified through
obfuscations [122]. These are syntactic code transformations that take a program as input
and generate a different program that is more difficult to analyze while still maintaining its
functionality [32]. The combination of obfuscations with the code optimization algorithms
usually embedded in compilers makes the reverse engineering of malware harder, often slowing
down or obstructing parts of the disassembly process [4]. For this reason it is imperative to find
techniques that deal with the raw binary instead of relying on higher-level features stemming
from reverse engineering attempts.
Obfuscations are widely used in malware [149, 104] and they make it harder to classify
emerging malware into their specific families. This task is called malware classification, and it
is usually achieved with machine learning techniques. These can range from shallow models
that require manual feature engineering before the training process, to deep learning models
that can work directly on the raw data. The downside of shallow models is that they require
specific domain expertise, which means that time and resources are needed to analyze the
samples in the dataset before proceeding to the learning phase. On the upside, the input of
human-engineered features usually renders the model and the results easier to interpret. With
new malware spreading at an alarming pace, the cost of this manual work is simply unfeasible.
Deep learning techniques can automatically extract the features from the dataset samples
without the need for time consuming feature engineering or specific domain expertise. This
advantage makes deep learning the go-to paradigm for malware classification.
Data Augmentation
One of the drawbacks of deep learning techniques, compared to shallower models, is their
tendency to overfit when trained with small datasets [129]. This can be a problem in fields like
program analysis, and especially in malware classification, as gathering enough samples with
the proper ground-truth takes many resources and even more time.
This problem is also common in other fields, such as in image recognition and image
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new data points can be generated from existing ones by applying some semantics-preserving
transformations to the images such as rotations, translations in space or selective cropping.
This process of generating new data from existing samples is known as data augmentation
and it is a staple of deep learning.
Transfer Learning
Another way to mitigate the problems that models can find with few data-points is to reuse a
part of an already trained model, usually the part dedicated to feature extraction. These models
can be trained with millions of data points and then they can be repurposed for a different
problem setting by removing the head of the model (dense layer) and re-training a new head
while “freezing” the rest of the network. This process is of course less time expensive, but it
also does not incur the problem of needing more data to train, as the majority of the weights
are “frozen” and thus do not appear as free variables. This technique is called transfer learning
[108].
Our Approach
Clearly most (if not all) data augmentation techniques applied in the vision field cannot be
reliably applied to the classification of programs. It is thus imperative to find a suitable
alternative.
Since obfuscations generate syntactic variants of programs but maintain their semantics,
they can be used as data-augmentation transformations specific to code. This is the main
intuition of [95], where 47 small programs with different semantics have been transformed
iteratively by applying obfuscations and generating 200 variants each, resulting in a final
dataset that contains 9 400 samples divided in 47 classes.
Generating the dataset this way allows for fine control on the size of the dataset itself and
its class balance (that can often be a problem in real-world datasets [74]). Another upside
of this technique is that it uses obfuscations in a novel way. Obfuscations are no longer a
shield that prevents the classification of malware, but they become an integral part of the
classification task itself. This process allows us to clearly see if there are some obfuscations
that modify the programs in such a way that makes them harder to classify. Applying the same
data augmentation process to datasets classified with different architectures can show whether
certain obfuscations are more powerful or resilient to the particular learning architecture itself.
In this chapter we generate a dataset of 18 800 obfuscated programs with the aforementioned
technique, reaching a size that is roughly double than the one generated in [95] with the same
technique. We then train two deep neural network models, a convolutional neural network
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(CNN) and a bi-directional long short-term memory (LSTM) and achieve an average accuracy
around 93% on the generated dataset. We provide an analysis of the classification errors
that highlight the strength of certain obfuscations against the classification effort and the
weaknesses of the trained models.
To prove that the techniques and models used in this work are suited for real-life scenarios
involving malware we train the CNN and the LSTM on two malware datasets heavily used
in literature, the dataset from the The Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge hosted on
Kaggle [78] (referred to as the MsM2015 dataset from now on) and the MalImg dataset [101].
These datasets will be thoroughly described in Section 3.2.
We then experiment with transfer learning, taking the features from the models trained on
the custom dataset and using them to classify the two aforementioned malware datasets. We
verify that it is indeed possible to use the features learnt from the classification of a custom-
made dataset of binaries in order to classify a real-world dataset. This has the obvious potential
of allowing big networks to be trained on huge datasets and then be reused for smaller and
newer datasets at a very low cost. In Section 3.4 we show the results of our experiments with
transfer learning by training a model on our custom generated dataset and then verifying that
the learnt features can be used to classify the other two datasets. The positive results achieved
make us believe that this technique has a lot of potential and could help mitigate the problems
encountered when applying deep learning techniques to small malware datasets.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• a novel data augmentation approach for images extracted from binaries
• the design of two neural network models that can classify obfuscated binaries from their
images
• thorough comparison of the approaches
• validation of the models on two state of the art malware datasets
• successful transfer learning experiments between models trained with different datasets
The rest of the chapter is thus structured:
• Section 3.1 contains most background knowledge needed to appreciate the chapter.
These include a short introduction to obfuscations and more in-depth descriptions of
the two learning models used.
• Section 3.2 introduces the 3 different datasets used to train the models. The focus is on
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• Section 3.3 shows the structure of the learning models in detail. The main design choices
are explained in this section, e.g. classification scores and how the dataset is split into
training, validation and testing.
• The results obtained from the experiments are described in Section 3.4. The end is
focused on the analysis of the classification errors.
• A compendium of related works can be found in Section 3.5. The papers presented here
only deal with the problem of malware classification with the binaries.
• Section 3.6 closes the chapter with a summary of what has been discovered and some
considerations about possible future work and limitations.
3.1 Background
This section serves as a primer on a few of the key concepts that we use in our study and
are unique to this chapter, such as deep learning, data augmentation and transfer learning.
Obfuscations have been properly introduced in previous chapters so what follows is only a
small reminder. For a more in-depth discussion the reader should see Section 1.2.3 in the first
chapter.
3.1.1 Obfuscations
Obfuscations are program transformations that change the syntax of the program without
altering its semantics. They are meant to confuse analyzers and reverse engineers, although
the amount of confusion added cannot yet be reliably measured [23, 26].
Let Prog be the set of all programs. An obfuscation is a program transformation 𝑂 : Prog →
Prog that given a program 𝑃 ∈ Prog produces a new program𝑂 (𝑃) with the same functionality
as 𝑃 but that is “unintelligible” in some sense [11].
In this work, obfuscations are used to design a novel data augmentation technique for
machine learning tasks involving images extracted from programs. We then apply the technique
to generate the first dataset from which we design both our learning models. The programs in
the datasets have been created by running the Tigress C obfuscator [1] on simple C programs





Input Hidden Layers Output
Figure 3.1: Structure of a generic artificial neural network
3.1.2 Artificial Neural Networks and Deep Learning
Artificial neural networks are a class of algorithms for machine learning. Their structure takes
heavy inspiration from the way the human brain is configured, or at least the way it was
thought to be configured in the 50s when they were first introduced. They are mad up of
neurons that communicate with each other by sending “signals” if a predetermined threshold is
met. The signals are in the form of real numbers that act as inputs to other connected neurons.
Typically the neurons are grouped in “layers”, where the first and last layer are reserved for
input and output respectively. The layers between the first and last are referred to as “hidden”
layers. Figure 3.1 illustrates this configuration.
When a network comprises enough layers it can fall under the umbrella term “Deep Learning”.
To this day it is unclear how many layers are sufficient for an architecture to be rightfully be
considered “deep”.
3.1.3 Convolutional Neural Networks [CNN]
CNNs are feed-forward neural network models that take inspiration from the human visual
cortex and are widely used in image recognition and classification [115, 83]. Their success in




Deep Learning on Compiled Programs
INPUT
Convolutional Max-pooling Convolutional Max-pooling Dense
Output
Figure 3.2: Structure of a convolutional neural network
allows them to be used to solve problems such as face recognition [83] or handwritten character
recognition [84]. In general, CNNs are very good at extracting spatial features from the data.
At their core, CNNs consist of at least one convolutional layer connected to a dense layer.
The convolutional layer operates a convolution on the input in order to isolate the features
that the network deems important during the training phase. This process greatly reduces the
number of weights needed since the input images are condensed into a smaller feature set. The
convolutional network usually is connected to a max pooling layer that contributes further to
the reduced size of the features detected by combining the values of multiple neurons into
a single value, usually the maximum value (thus max-pooling) or the average value. After
a combination of the aforementioned layers the CNN architecture is completed by at least
one fully connected (or dense) layer. This layer is responsible for the classification process
itself and acts as a multi-layer perceptron that takes as input the features extracted from the
previous layers. To prevent overfitting, regularization techniques are commonly used and
can be applied anywhere in the network. This reduces the possibility of the network purely
memorizing the training data, thus allowing for better generalization [81].
3.1.4 Recurrent Neural Network and Long Short Term Memory [RNN and
LSTM]
As stated in the previous subsection, CNNs excel at extracting spatial features from data This
is invaluable when classifying or generally working with natural images, but images extracted
from code reveal different types of patterns altogether and therefore comprise a different
learning problem [95].
The sequential nature of code, and thus of compiled programs, indicates that a learning


















Figure 3.3: Structure of a LSTM cell
(RNNs), which are designed to process sequences of data of arbitrary length from beginning to
end, is one example.
Generally, the hidden state ℎ𝑡 of a RNN depends on the output of the previous state ℎ𝑡−1
and so on, which means that the state ℎ𝑡 contains a distributed representation of all the
tokens observed in the sequence up to the time step 𝑡 . This way, the network can generate
probabilistic dependencies from previously seen data. One common pitfall of this structure is
that the dependencies between tokens that are far apart from each other in the sequence are
hard to manage. This stems from the nature of the gradient descent algorithm over time steps,
which makes the components either decay or grow exponentially [16, 72].
Long short-term memory was developed to mitigate precisely this problem [72]. By storing
information at particular timesteps, LSTMs provide a mechanism to specify when to remember
certain information, and more importantly, when to forget it. A representation of a single
LSTM cell can be seen in Figure 3.3, where 𝜎 represents the sigmoid layer, h is the hidden state
and c is the memory state. The first sigmoid layer takes in input the previous hidden state
of the LSTM combined with the new input read and passes it to the “forget gate” which will
modify the memorized state accordingly. The next two layers combine to decide how much
information from the current hidden state should be memorized for the next iteration. The
vertical arrow with h(t) represents the output of the cell at time t.
The LSTM used in this work is bidirectional, meaning that the input stream is read in both
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which read the input in the two directions and then combine the resulting vectors to produce
a unified result.
In Section 3.3 we outline the specific architecture of our neural networks.
3.1.5 Data Augmentation
Deep neural networks tend to overfit because the number of parameters that are learnt (the
weights in the network) can exceed the size of most datasets. This makes it possible for the
network to memorize the data and generate a classifier that works perfectly with the training
set but that is sub-par with new data. For this reason, another way to avoid overfitting is
generally to select huge datasets.
This is not always possible, thus there needs to be a way to generate new samples that fit in
the dataset while being different enough from the existing samples. This process is called data
augmentation.
Let us take image classification as a working example. If we are using a deep neural network
to recognize which pictures belong to a specific class but our dataset is too small, we can use
many data augmentation techniques in order to enlarge the dataset.
Assume we are trying to recognize faces and classify them with the name of their owner,
but the writer of this thesis is shy and only allows one flattering picture to be part of the public
dataset. Then there are a number of transformations that can be applied to the image to create





It is imperative that these transformations preserve the meaning of the image (its semantics)
otherwise we are generating new samples that would not belong to the right class. These
transformations can also be applied iteratively and stacked upon each other, which means
we can generate many images from a single starting sample. A few examples can be seen in
Figure 3.4.
In this workwe are indeedworkingwith images but we cannot use the above transformations





Figure 3.4: Some common data augmentation techniques for images
3.1.6 Transfer Learning
As mentioned in previous sections, a big problem of deep learning tasks is finding datasets
that are big enough to allow learning without overfitting. Training deep networks is also very
time consuming and requires adequate computing resources. Transfer learning can alleviate
both these problems [112], by leveraging the information learnt from one task in order to
solve a different task. Some common applications of transfer learning are of course in vision,
where huge models trained from the ImageNet dataset [49] can be re-purposed for new image
classification tasks.
To illustrate how transfer learning works we can imagine a typical CNN as described earlier,
trained on a dataset of images for classification. The convolutional layers are tasked with
extracting the features from the inputs while the dense layers towards the output provide the
actual classification of the dataset. One way to properly perform transfer learning is to remove
the dense layer from the CNN and “freeze” the convolutional layers (meaning, the gradient
descent will not modify their weights). The convolutional layers contain information on what
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Figure 3.5: Transfer learning on a CNN
higher-level feature. The general structure of transfer learning on a generic CNN can be seen
in Figure 3.5.
At this point a new dense layer can be applied with the proper output shape (the number
of classes for the new learning problem) and the network can be trained on the new dataset.
Since the convolutional layers do not have to be trained again, the learning process is sped up
considerably. The size of the dataset is also less important, since the number of free variables
(weights) that can be modified is much smaller than those in the original network, thus making
overfitting less of a problem. The convolutional layers of the CNN will provide the necessary
features for the classification task at virtually no cost as the feed-forward part of the network
is relatively inexpensive.
In this work we use transfer learning between different datasets of images generated from
compiled programs. This allows us to gauge if the features extracted from one dataset can be
used to classify the others. The applications of this can lead to many interesting opportunities
that will be discussed in future sections.
3.1.7 Bicubic Interpolation
In order to resize the images in our custom dataset we use bicubic interpolation as implemented
in OpenCV [21]. This algorithm infers the intensity of an unknown pixel by applying bicubic






Figure 3.6: Three examples of interpolation in CV2, all on a sample of class theme_park obfuscated
with Split, InitImplicitFlow and EncodeLiterals
counterpart when the quality of the resulting image is more important than the computational
resources used, which fits our scenario.
In Figure 3.6 we show three different types of interpolation offered by OpenCV. On the left
the bicubic interpolation method used in this work, followed by a linear and a nearest neighbor
interpolation.
3.2 Datasets
This section describes the datasets used in this work. We start from the novel data augmentation
technique developed in this thesis, which we then use to generate of our custom OBF dataset.
Afterwards we summarize the peculiarities of the two malware datasets, MalImg and MsM2015.
3.2.1 OBF Dataset
We start with 32 programs that are downloaded from a beginners programming website [113].
These are very simple programs that average 23 lines and they were selected so that the full
images extracted from the programs would fit the models in [95]. In Figure 3.7 we show the
programs, their names should be well descriptive of what they compute.
Small programs work well enough to illustrate the methodology but bigger programs can
lend some validity. For this reason 15 more programs have been added to the original dataset,




















16. n is palindrome.c
17. n is prime.c
18. n is sum of primes.c
19. positive or negative.c
20. power n.c












Figure 3.7: The initial dataset
and represent a more real-world scenario with source code that spans between 28 lines and
200. The list of programs taken from Google Code Jam is in Figure 3.8.
These programs are all solutions to problems given during Google Code Jam in different
rounds of the competition and spanning multiple years. Therefore they each form their own
unique semantic equivalence class. Additional attention has been given to the uniqueness of
the authors in order to avoid possible code reuse which could potentially inject uncertainty in
the classification process.
Data Augmentation for Programs
Naturally, 47 programs do not constitute a dataset that easily lends itself to classification,
especially because all 47 belong to different equivalence classes. This is be the perfect scenario
in which data augmentation can come in handy.
Since we are classifying images it could be argued that we can apply the same data aug-
mentation techniques listed in Section 3.1.5. This has some downsides. Rotating, tilting and
zooming into a picture of a face does not alter the human perception of the image. It is still
the same face, although slightly adjusted. Its meaning (its semantics) is preserved.











7. minimum scalar product.c
8. multibase happiness.c
9. rotate.c
10. saving the universe.c
11. snapper chain.c
12. theme park.c
13. train time table.c
14. watersheds.c
15. welcome to codejam.c
Figure 3.8: Google Code Jam solutions
example, zooming into the image will remove some data from the program, rotating the
image will re-order the bits and the same can be said when flipping it. Removing bits from a
program or rearranging them will inevitably generate a different program, or possibly just
a new sequence of zeros and ones that has lost all its meaning as a program. None of the
transformation listed in Section 3.1.5 can preserve the semantics of the original program, they
all generate a new version that does not fit in the same class as the original sample. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.9.
For this reason we need to find a new data augmentation technique that can work on images
extracted from programs.
Our Approach
We have introduced obfuscations in Chapter 1, where we explain that they are program
transformations that are meant to make the analysis “harder” in some way. In this section
obfuscations are not to be feared, as they provide the semantics-preserving transformations
that we need in order to enlarge our starting dataset.
The idea is very simple, we select 8 obfuscations and apply them iteratively on the 47 files
of the original dataset. In order to apply the obfuscations we leverage the Tigress C obfuscator,
which is a tool that operates at the C source code level, leveraging the CIL [102] system for
the transformations. The tool offers several syntactic transformations that can be stacked
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Figure 3.9: Common data augmentation techniques for images applied to a program
• Flatten: implements code flattening by completely removing the original control flow
structure of the program and replacing it with a switch statement [136]. The switch
control variable is then modified dynamically to decide the order in which the basic
blocks are executed, which produces a "flattened" control flow. An interesting feature
of this transformation is that it allows the basic blocks to be organized randomly in
memory.
• Split: splits a function into two separated functions that perform the same semantic
function when combined
• RandomFuns: inserts a random function into the code
• EncodeArithmetics: encodes any arithmetic operation into a semantically equivalent but
syntactically harder to decipher operation. For example the expression 𝑧 = 𝑥 +𝑦 +𝑤 can
be replaced by 𝑧 = (((𝑥𝑦) + ((𝑥 ∧𝑦) << 1)) ∨𝑤) + ((𝑥𝑦) + ((𝑥 ∧𝑦) << 1)) ∧𝑤). There
are many of these transformation (all taken from the book Hacker’s Delight [139]) and
they are chosen randomly at each run.





• InitOpaque: adds specific data structures that can be used to insert opaque predicates
• InitEntropy: adds new variables in order to collect entropy
• InitImplicitFlow: initializes handlers for implicit flow analysis
These obfuscations have been selected because they represent different types of syntactic
transformations. For example, the first 2 deal with structural transformations of the control
flow graph while EncodeArithmetics and EncodeLiterals perform a more symbolic kind of
transformation. RandomFuns has been added specifically because it adds new functions to the
code, preserving the basic semantics of the original program but at the same time augmenting
it. This is akin to what happens in some malware, where the payload is consistent between
different samples of a family but the surrounding program can have different semantics [50].
On top of these obfuscations, Tigress automatically generates random variable names and
function names for every generated variant.x
All 8 obfuscations are applied to every sample in the initial dataset, generating 376 (47 ∗ 8)
new syntactic variants of the base programs. Then the process is repeated, but this time the
new programs are each obfuscated with a new transformation, thus generating 2 632 (376 ∗ 7)
variants. The reason why only 7 obfuscations can be selected is that we do not allow for
repeated obfuscations. After all, most transformations do not result in a new interesting
variant when applied twice. For example, Flatten applied to a function that has already been
flattened would result in exactly the same program, as it is idempotent. We iterate the algorithm
4 times, reaching a final size of 18 800 samples.
After generating the dataset we transform each program into an image. Every sample of the
dataset is imported as a raw file in a Python script and then it is converted using the numpy
package in order to represent it as a list of hexadecimal numbers (164 max value). This list is
then translated into a matrix with width 64, following the steps taken in [95]. At this point all
programs are represented by matrices that have the same width but varying length.
In [95], three different resizing techniques were considered in order to have a dataset of
homogenously sized images but all methods either lost too much information (by cropping) or
added too much noise (by padding).
For this work all images are resized into two main shapes (64 × 64 and 256 × 64) using the
standard functions in the OpenCV library [21] with bicubic interpolation over a 4x4 pixel
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Figure 3.10: 8 samples from the classes armstrong_n and calculator of OBF






















































































One of the advantages of generating such a dataset from scratch is that the resulting classes will
be as balanced as needed. Some datasets in literature are heavily imbalanced, for example, both
the MalImg dataset (used in this chapter) and the GENOME [156] dataset for Android malware
(see previous chapter) suffer from this. It is expected to find such imbalance in datasets found
in the wild, but this leads to problems in the classification process, or more properly, in the
accuracy measurement.
For instance, let us imagine a dataset of malware that contains 25 classes distributed in a
balanced way. Given a random sampling of the test set, a simple classifier could always guess
one of the classes and get it right 1/25 of the time, thus obtaining around 4% accuracy. This
is evidently a bad result and would alert the researchers to the inherent incapability of the
learning model. On the other hand, the MalImg dataset contains 9 458 samples divided into
25 classes and the largest class has 2 949 elements, with the second largest one closing in at
1 591. A simple classifier could learn to distinguish between these 2 big classes, then guess all
samples to be contained in them and still reach almost 50% accuracy. Of course this is not a
good result by itself, but it can trick anyone into thinking that the model is actually learning
something from the dataset when that is certainly not the case.
Another advantage of our dataset generation technique is that we can ensure that the
obfuscations applied will cause pervasive structural changes in the binaries, generating visually
distinctive images that belong in the same class. This is not always the case, especially for
datasets that have been collected in the wild, since many code transformations do not act on
the global structure of the executable file. This can be easily seen in Figure 3.14, which shows
samples from the same classes looking very similar. We will expand on this later.
The dataset generated from the simple programs iteratively obfuscated will be called
OBF from now on. In Fig. 3.10 we show 8 programs taken randomly from two classes,
‘armstrong_n’ and ‘calculator’. At the bottom of each figure there is a list of all the obfus-
cations applied to the specific sample. It should be evident that the syntactic transformations
of the source code also result in visually distinctive binaries, and thus the images extracted
from them also have distinctive features.
The images generated vary in size, from 24x64 for the smallest sample to 9800x64 for the
largest one. The application of resizing with bicubic interpolation brings them to one coherent
size. In Fig. 3.11 we show the same samples as in Fig. 3.10 but with interpolation applied
to them. Even at first glance, the difference in the images caused by the obfuscations is still
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Figure 3.12: Left: the original version of a sample from the family ‘Autorun.K’ of MalImg.
Right: its resized and zoomed in version, showing the embedded icons
3.2.2 Microsoft Malware Dataset [MsM2015 ]
The MsM2015 dataset consists of more than 20 000 malware samples for Windows, collected
by the Microsoft corporation and distributed by Kaggle for a competition in 2015 [118]. Each
sample in the dataset belongs to one of 9 known malware families. The dataset provides each
datapoint as the hexadecimal representation of its executable and as a collection of metadata
generated by IDA pro. The total size of the dataset is around 500GB of data, making it less
than nontrivial to work with.
For this study we utilized only the byte representation of the samples, loading it in python
using the same technique applied in [95] and representing every sample as an image with a
set width of 64.
Each sample is then resized to either 64x64 or 256x64 using bicubic interpolation, generating
a more manageable dataset. Since images generated from the MsM2015 dataset are sourced
from real-life malware, they come in varying sizes that far surpass those of the OBF dataset.





Figure 3.13: Left: the original version of a sample from the family ‘VB.AT’ of MalImg.
Right: its zoomed in version, showing the embedded icons
3.2.3 MalImg Dataset
The MalImg dataset is a collection of 9 458 malware samples divided into 25 families. The main
characteristic of this dataset is that the malware samples are not provided directly, but rather
as their images as they appear on disk. In a similar way to the work in [95], the bytes of the
executable files are trivially mapped to floats, which will then be interpreted as pixel values of
grayscale images.
As anticipated, the classes in the dataset are heavily imbalanced: the biggest one (‘Allaple.A’)
contains 2 949 samples, while the smallest one contains only 80 samples.
In Figure 3.14 we show 8 random samples taken from two classes of the dataset. It should
be readily evident that the images from each class have distinctive patterns that allow us to
tell samples from one family apart from samples in the other family. This is again true for
samples processed by bicubic interpolation, as shown in Figure 3.15. The observation that
different families of malware had a distinctive ‘look’ is part of what has driven the original
work in [101]. This is not always the case with binaries. Being able to tell at a glance that two
executable files belong to the same class is a luxury that we do not have in the OBF dataset.
Figure 3.10 shows this clearly, and in fact, the second sample in the first family appears most
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Windows binaries also have the peculiarity of allowing embedded icons (which are unsup-
ported so far in ELF files), and some families in the MalImg dataset can be easily recognized by
the use (and positions) of such icons. However, it is not easy to do so in the original format of
the images.
For example, in the leftmost part of Figure 3.13 is shown a sample from the family ‘Autorun.K’.
Its size has been set to 683×768 by the authors of the original paper and it is based on empirical
observations. It is not clear which observations these might be but the result is that most
images in the dataset tend to be somewhat square.
At the bottom 10% of the image a clear repeating pattern can be spotted that stands out
from the previous white-noise that is typical of executable files. If the image is resized to
5464 × 96, then it becomes too tall to be printed in its entirety in this thesis. Zooming into the
image, roughly showing only the rows between indexes 4800 and 5200, we can generate what
is shown in the rightmost part of Figure 3.13. From this new perspective it is evident that the
malware was trying to pass as an Office Words file. This simple resizing trick can be done to
all samples in the family with roughly the same results.
Another interesting example of this is the family ‘VB.AT’, whose sample is shown in Figure
3.12. In its original shape it is hard to discern anything except the clear demarcation of different
areas full of white noise. When resized with the same technique as above (the width set to 96
is key here) then many patterns suddenly appear in the binary. The top pattern makes it seem
like the malware sample is not sure whether it is pretending to be a Words doc or an Excel file,
while the bottom pattern recalls a windows command-line.
The fact that these icons are so distinctive within samples of certain families raises the
question whether they substantially simplify the classification task. This is certainly not the
case with the families in the OBF dataset, which might explain its lower average classification
accuracy.
3.3 Experimental Setup
In this section we describe the details of our experiments, from reproducibility and gener-
alizability concerns to model architecture and considerations on how to best present our
results.
3.3.1 Preprocessing
Throughout the rest of this chapter the size of the images considered for classification has





img size timesteps features accuracy (%) time
32x128 32 128 92.4 279s
128x32 128 32 92.6 743s
64x64 64 64 93.4 392s
64x128 64 128 92.8 402s
128x64 128 64 93.2 712s
128x128 128 128 93.1 641s
32x256 32 256 92.9 364s
256x32 256 32 92.4 1 516s
64x256 64 256 92.2 461s
256x64 256 64 92.1 1 251s
128x256 128 256 91.9 673s
256x128 256 128 92.9 1 341s
Table 3.1: Accuracies of the bidirectional LSTM when trained with different timesteps and image
shapes
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accuracy for both models. The training accuracy for various image sizes (resulting in multiple
time step values and features) can be seen in Table 3.1. As made evident by the experimental
results, the two selected values are among the optimal ones according to classification accuracy.
These experiments were done on the OBF dataset but empirical observations led us to keep
the same fixed image size for the classification of all the datasets.
Our choice of setting the width to 64 is made mainly because it is a power of 2 and represents
the maximum bit size that an instruction can take in a 64 bit system such as the one we work on.
This ultimately proved to be a good choice, since this parameter affects the learning process.
In order to investigate whether the width of the images affect the classification accuracy
in a simple image recognition problem, we held some experiments with the MNIST dataset
[85] in our system. The differences in the prediction scores are not significant and the CNN is
able to recognize the digits even if they are scrambled in a way that no human could recognize
them anymore (see Table 3.2 and Fig. 3.17).
Figure 3.17: A digit from the MNIST dataset with varying widths: 28x28, 56x14 and 112x7
In our initial investigation published in [95] we perform the same tests on our dataset of
images extracted from obfuscated binaries, with the distinction that the samples have not been
processed with bicubic interpolation and the resizing is done by either padding or slicing. The
results reveal a negligible difference in both train and test accuracy only when the width of
the binary image is changed from 64 to 32. While when considering other width values (still
powers of 2) the classification accuracy drops, and it reaches 0.04 in the test set with a set
width of 256, an accuracy that is slightly better than random guessing (see Table 3.3). This is
one of the first observations that leads us to believe that our classification problem is vastly
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Table 3.2: Width change in MNIST
MNIST 28x28 56x14 112x7 14x56 7x112
train 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96
test 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96
Table 3.3: Width change in SimpleObfuscatedDataset
OBF ?x32 ?x64 ?x128 ?x256
train 0.98 0.97 0.43 0.10
test 0.89 0.91 0.33 0.04
3.3.2 Training, Validation and Testing Sets
In order to guarantee a degree of generalization we split each dataset in training, validation
and testing sets. During the learning stages we experimented with different ratios for the splits
with the goal of maximizing the fairness of the generalization [116] but also to preserve as
many samples as possible for the training stage. The ratio of the hold-out test set for all of the
experiments in this chapter is 0.2, meaning that 20% of the dataset is reserved for the testing
phase that happens after the training and it is not used to tweak any of the parameters. Of
the remaining samples in the dataset, 10% is kept for the validation set, which is used at every
training epoch to calculate the validation loss, while the rest is the training set with which the
weights of the network will be trained.
All the results from the subsequent sections have been achieved using the hold-out test set,
averaged after running the experiments up to 20 times. This should ensure the generalizability
of the approach, as any unfortunate division of the dataset should be prevented by the average
over multiple random splits.
3.3.3 Models
The two models considered have been fully coded in Python with Keras [107] and deployed
on Google Colab notebooks freely available online to simplify the reproducibility of the study.
The untrained models for these experiments can be found at [97] but we cannot provide a
download link for the MsM2015 and the MalImg datasets as they are made available by each
respective owner on their own terms. The OBF dataset is already available in the notebooks,
along with methods that can adapt the other two datasets to the models.





classes precision recall f1-score support
alien_lang 0.99 0.99 0.99 80.0
armstrong_n 0.84 0.84 0.84 80.0
bot_trust 0.98 0.99 0.98 80.0
calculator 0.89 0.94 0.91 80.0
candy_split 0.93 0.82 0.87 80.0
char_freq 0.99 0.96 0.97 80.0
count_digits 0.82 0.88 0.85 80.0
count_vowels 0.90 0.88 0.89 80.0
factorial 0.85 0.90 0.88 78.0
factorial_rec 0.94 0.98 0.96 82.0
factors 0.96 0.88 0.92 80.0
fair_warn 1.00 0.99 0.99 80.0
fib_1 0.75 0.82 0.79 80.0
fib_2 0.79 0.85 0.82 80.0
fly_swatter 0.95 0.96 0.96 80.0
gcd 0.83 0.78 0.80 81.0
gcd_rec 0.87 0.82 0.84 79.0
hello_world 0.99 0.95 0.97 80.0
lcm 0.78 0.82 0.80 80.0
leap_year 0.87 0.84 0.85 80.0
magicka 0.99 1.00 0.99 80.0
min_product 0.97 0.90 0.94 80.0
multibase_hap 1.00 0.98 0.99 80.0
n_palindrome 0.89 0.82 0.86 80.0
n_is_prime 0.84 0.88 0.86 80.0
n_sum_of_p 0.92 0.88 0.90 80.0
pos_or_neg 0.91 0.91 0.91 80.0
power_n 0.70 0.84 0.76 80.0
prime_n 0.84 0.79 0.81 80.0
pyramid 0.87 0.91 0.89 80.0
quot_remainder 0.79 0.85 0.82 80.0
remove_char 0.95 1.00 0.98 80.0
reverse_int 0.91 0.78 0.84 80.0
rotate 0.93 0.95 0.94 80.0
saving_univ 1.00 0.99 0.99 80.0
snapper_chain 0.98 0.99 0.98 80.0
store_struct 0.94 0.96 0.95 80.0
strcat 0.81 0.80 0.81 80.0
strcpy 0.89 0.88 0.88 80.0
stringsort 0.94 0.99 0.96 80.0
strlen 0.91 0.92 0.92 80.0
sum 0.86 0.81 0.83 80.0
theme_park 0.98 1.00 0.99 80.0
times_table 0.86 0.80 0.83 80.0
train_t_tab 0.99 0.99 0.99 80.0
watersheds 1.00 1.00 1.00 80.0
welcome_cjam 0.99 1.00 0.99 80.0
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CNN We implement a convolutional neural network in Keras, an almost direct translation of
the one employed in [95] (which was built on barebones TensorFlow). The network has a base
of two convolutional layers, each followed by a max pooling layer. Each convolutional layer
has a kernel size of 5 and employs a rectified linear unit (relu) as the activation function, with
32 filters in the first layer and 64 in the second. Both max pooling layers have a size of 2x2 with
padding set to ‘same’ in order to avoid shrinking the input image. The head of the network is
a dense layer followed by a dropout layer that flows in the last dense layer. The dropout layer
is a form of regularization which, as anticipated in Section 3.1, prevents the network from
memorizing the training set and thus hopefully allows it to better generalize. With a value set
to 0.2, the drop out layer randomly selects 20% of the neurons of the previous layer and sets
their activation to zero. The network is then trained via gradient descent through the Adam
optimizer with default values for both the learning rate and epsilon. The loss measure selected
is categorical cross-entropy.
Training is guided by the accuracymeasured on the validation set at each epoch. The network
keeps training until a set number (patience) of epochs have passed since the validation accuracy
has improved (patience is set to 40). After these epochs have passed without improvement, the
network will stop updating its weights and restore the ones that achieved the best validation
accuracy 40 epochs earlier. This is generally a good technique to avoid overfitting, since many
deep models can train on the training set until they basically commit it to memory. After this
point it is almost impossible for the network to generalize on unseen data points. For this
reason, once the validation accuracy stops increasing for multiple epochs it is better to halt
the learning process, as it is assumed that the network is starting to lose generalization.
This network has also been thoroughly tested on the MNIST dataset of hand-written digits
[85], where it reaches accuracy values up to 99%. The purpose of testing it on a dataset
with simple images is to show that, while the approach is meant to work on any image
recognition task, it can generalize to arguably more difficult tasks. Further, according to the
experiments in [95], it is the smallest network that can learn and generalize on the OBF dataset.
It is important to contain the size of the network because bigger models tend to overfit and
generally underperform unless they are trained with huge datasets [67]. Bigger networks also
require far more computing power and RAM, which is one of the reasons why many recent
seminal works that highly touted in the image classification field are increasingly hard to
reproduce outside the big laboratories where they originate.
We tested with many image sizes, taking the approach shown in [95] but using interpolation
to resize the images instead of cropping and zero-padding. Among the various sizes we only
show the results with square images of size 64 pixels by 64 pixels and 256 by 64 (64x64 and






64x64 256x64 64x64 256x64
OBF 90.9% 92.3% 93.4% 92.6%
MsM2015 90.8% 92% 93.8% 90%
MalImg 98.1% 98.3% 98.5% 98.2%
Table 3.5: Average classification accuracy
LSTM The long short-term memory has also been implemented in Keras. It consists of two
recurrent units, specifically bi-directional LSTM units with 141 and 94 units respectively. In
order to quell overfitting the network has been equipped with a patience of 30 epochs, meaning
that the model will stop learning 30 epochs after the validation loss has stopped decreasing.
The LSTM model clearly performs better than the CNN in all 3 datasets considered, given
the initial input size of 64x64. The advantage of the LSTM model is not only in the improved
accuracy but also in its considerably smaller size, although it results in a higher training time.
An interesting aspect of the LSTM models is that they do not perform better with bigger
images, in fact, the accuracy drops quite a bit. A way to slighly mitigate this effect is to encode
the images as 64x256 (short and fat instead of tall and thin). This likely has something to do
with the fact that the increase in the height of the image corresponds to an equal increase in
the timesteps of the recurrent network. Keeping the number of timesteps to 64 maintains the
performance of the network but the improvement on the classification results is not particularly
noticeable.
We show the average accuracy for all models and datasets in Table 3.5, while a graph of the
validation accuracy during training is shown in Figure 3.18 for the LSTM and CNN trained on
images of size 256x64.
3.3.4 Classification Scores
The main results in this chapter are reported as measure of test set accuracy, that being the
percentage of samples classified into the right class. Due to the unbalanced nature of the
MalImg dataset we also report the precision, recall and f1 measure for each class.
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CNN and LSTM accuracy on OBFS 256x64
CNN accuracy
LSTM accuracy
Figure 3.18: Validation accuracy of the CNN and LSTM models on OBF dataset, with sizes 256x64
pixels
classes precision recall f1-score support
Obfuscator.ACY 0.92 0.86 0.89 252.0
Simda 0.11 0.12 0.12 8.0
Ramnit 0.85 0.87 0.86 314.0
Vundo 0.88 0.82 0.85 89.0
Gatak 0.86 0.84 0.85 202.0
Lollipop 0.86 0.92 0.89 509.0
Kelihos_ver1 0.98 0.93 0.95 88.0
Tracur 0.69 0.65 0.67 145.0
Kelihos_ver3 1.00 0.99 1.00 566.0





classes precision recall f1-score support
Obfuscator.ACY 0.95 0.90 0.92 252.0
Simda 0.40 0.25 0.31 8.0
Ramnit 0.90 0.92 0.91 314.0
Vundo 0.92 0.93 0.93 89.0
Gatak 0.91 0.92 0.92 202.0
Lollipop 0.96 0.94 0.95 509.0
Kelihos_ver1 0.93 0.97 0.95 88.0
Tracur 0.84 0.88 0.86 145.0
Kelihos_ver3 1.00 1.00 1.00 566.0
Table 3.7: Classification scores for the LSTM on MsM2015
Intuitively, if a classifier has high precision for a specific class 𝐴 it means that it guesses
correctly when a sample belongs to 𝐴 and will not classify foreign samples to this class. It is
the percentage of correct guesses when the classifier guesses 𝐴. However this does not take
into account the samples belonging to 𝐴 that have been wrongly assigned to other classes.





The recall of a classification task for the class 𝐴 is the percentage of correct guesses made by
the model when it should have guessed 𝐴.
To better visualize the difference between accuracy and these measures we can add the true
negatives (𝑇𝑁 ) and then define accuracy as:
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃 +𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 +𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
(3.3)
Precision and recall are often combined in the 𝐹1 measure via their harmonic mean:
𝐹1 = 2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙




Deep Learning on Compiled Programs
classes precision recall f1-score support
alien_lang 0.91 0.99 0.95 80.0
armstrong_n 0.89 0.84 0.86 80.0
bot_trust 0.99 0.95 0.97 80.0
calculator 0.93 0.80 0.86 80.0
candy_split 0.98 0.80 0.88 80.0
char_freq 0.96 0.92 0.94 80.0
count_digits 0.86 0.84 0.85 80.0
count_vowels 0.89 0.85 0.87 80.0
factorial 0.94 0.79 0.86 85.0
factorial_rec 0.97 0.88 0.92 75.0
factors 0.83 0.84 0.83 80.0
fair_warn 0.96 0.98 0.97 80.0
fib_1 0.81 0.79 0.80 80.0
fib_2 0.77 0.82 0.80 80.0
fly_swatter 0.81 0.90 0.85 80.0
gcd 0.92 0.69 0.79 85.0
gcd_rec 0.84 0.92 0.88 75.0
hello_world 0.95 1.00 0.98 80.0
lcm 0.80 0.74 0.77 80.0
leap_year 0.88 0.86 0.87 80.0
magicka 0.97 0.85 0.91 80.0
min_product 0.82 0.90 0.86 80.0
multibase_hap 1.00 0.95 0.97 80.0
n_palindrome 0.78 0.81 0.80 80.0
n_is_prime 0.84 0.86 0.85 80.0
n_sum_of_p 0.75 0.74 0.74 80.0
pos_or_neg 0.83 0.84 0.83 80.0
power_n 0.69 0.79 0.74 80.0
prime_n 0.83 0.81 0.82 80.0
pyramid 0.90 0.95 0.93 80.0
quot_remainder 0.74 0.92 0.82 80.0
remove_char 0.89 0.88 0.88 80.0
reverse_int 0.85 0.89 0.87 80.0
rotate 0.91 0.92 0.92 80.0
saving_univ 0.87 0.94 0.90 80.0
snapper_chain 0.88 0.89 0.88 80.0
store_struct 0.88 0.96 0.92 80.0
strcat 0.89 0.88 0.88 80.0
strcpy 0.87 0.90 0.88 80.0
stringsort 0.91 0.92 0.92 80.0
strlen 0.91 0.94 0.93 80.0
sum 0.89 0.84 0.86 80.0
theme_park 0.99 0.99 0.99 80.0
times_table 0.84 0.91 0.87 80.0
train_t_tab 0.94 0.94 0.94 80.0
watersheds 0.95 0.99 0.97 80.0
welcome_cjam 0.99 0.98 0.98 80.0





3.4 Results and Analysis
This section is devoted to presenting our results on both architectures presented in the previous
section against the datasets presented in Section 3.2. At the end of the section we briefly discuss
how the results obtained can be analyzed.
3.4.1 OBF Dataset
CNN: On the OBF dataset the CNN model achieves an average accuracy of 92.3% on the
hold-out test set with the input images resized to 256x64. This result is a definite improvement
from 88% which was the average accuracy on the same dataset with the CNN in [95], where
the images had a bigger height (596 pixels) and were not compressed.
This tells us that the information needed by the CNN for the classification is not reduced
by the interpolation process. In fact, interpolating the images results in better classification
accuracy than the cropping and padding methods used in [95]. The better performance in the
classification of 256x64 images reinforces the observation that bigger size correlates with more
information for the model (at least for the CNN) and thus results in an easier classification
process. In Table 3.8 we show the classification scores of the CNN.
LSTM: The same consideration cannot be done by looking at the LSTM results, where the
accuracy for the OBF dataset oscillates around 92.6% for images of size 256x64, compared to
93.4% for the smaller square images. This result has to be attributed to the difficulty encountered
by the LSTM due to the increase of the timesteps, which also incurs a loss of training speed.
The nearly tripled training time is noticeable in Figure 3.18, where we show the validation
accuracy of the CNN and the LSTM on images of size 256x64. Whatever advantage there
might be in having bigger images is then lost to the vanishing information in long recurrent
networks. Interestingly enough, the classification accuracy does not improve when we switch
the height with the width of the images and learn with the LSTM, while the training time does
indeed decrease due to the reduced number of timesteps.
This result is definitely better than the CNN but incurs a processing time overhead. The
training process for the LSTM takes about twice as long than the one for the CNN. This is
expected, as CNNs are renowned for being very fast models, and furthermore the LSTM is
bi-directional so the input must be scanned in 2 directions.
In Table 3.4 we show the classification scores of the LSTM for every family in OBF. It should
be noted how the subdivision of the families in this dataset is more balanced than in the others.
This is of course due to the fact that the OBF dataset is generated from scratch and thus does





























































































































































122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2949 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1590 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 140 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 380 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 134 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 158 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 118 9 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 113 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 406 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0












more outliers when the classes are distributed differently between the training set and the
test set, thus this is avoided through a simple balancing algorithm that results in the almost
uniform distribution clearly shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.8.
3.4.2 MsM2015 and MalImg Datasets
The same architectures described above are used to classifymalware samples from theMsM2015
and MalImg datasets.
CNN: The accuracy for the CNN models trained on the two malware datasets is higher than
the accuracy achieved on the OBF dataset. Classifying the hold-out test set samples of the
MsM2015 dataset yields 92% accuracy on average, while on the MalImg we record results of
up to 98.3% average accuracy. The classification scores for the individual classes of CNN on
the MsM2015 and MalImg datasets are in Table 3.6 and Table 3.10 respectively.
LSTM The LSTM reaches an average accuracy of 94.2% on the MsM2015 dataset and 98.5%
on MalImg. Since the MalImg dataset contains a noticeable class imbalance we provide various
classification scores for the single classes with the LSTM in Table 3.9 and with the CNN in
Table 3.10. Analyzing these scores it is easy to spot two classes in particular, ‘Swizzor.genE’
and ‘Swizzor.GenI’, that appear to be difficult to classify for both the LSTM and the CNN.
The confusion matrix shown in Figure 3.19 provides a clearer picture on the classification
errors for these two classes, where it is clear that the models struggle with deciding whether
some samples belong to the ‘Swizzor.genE’ class or the ‘Swizzor.GenI’ class. Since these
malware samples are simple variants of the same family they appear very similar and cannot
be reliably distinguished by our models.
In Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we show the scores for the classification of the MsM2015 dataset on the
CNN and LSTM respectively. It is easy to notice that the class ‘Simda’ is very hard to classify
for both models, achieving an F1 score of 0.12 with the CNN and 0.31 with the LSTM. This is
easily explained by the support shown as the last column, which is the number of samples
against which the classifier has been tested (the samples in the test set for a specific class). The
class ‘Simda’ is very under-represented, in fact only 40 samples exist of this class in the whole
dataset, while the biggest classes feature thousands of samples each. This of course leads to
problems with the classification accuracy, as 40 samples is not nearly enough for the class to
be relevant in the training process. Some previous works that used this dataset decided to
remove the class altogether [].
Both models generate better results for the two malware datasets compared to the OBF
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LSTM and CNN classification errors on OBF, normalized
LSTM
CNN





classes precision recall f1-score support
Adialer.C 1.00 1.00 1.00 26.0
Agent.FYI 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.0
Allaple.A 1.00 1.00 1.00 604.0
Allaple.L 1.00 1.00 1.00 314.0
Alueron.genJ 1.00 1.00 1.00 40.0
Autorun.K 1.00 1.00 1.00 25.0
C2LOP.P 0.80 0.89 0.84 27.0
C2LOP.geng 0.88 0.92 0.90 38.0
Dialplatform.B 1.00 1.00 1.00 43.0
Dontovo.A 0.97 1.00 0.99 34.0
Fakerean 0.96 1.00 0.98 75.0
Instantaccess 1.00 1.00 1.00 90.0
Lolyda.AA1 1.00 1.00 1.00 45.0
Lolyda.AA2 1.00 1.00 1.00 25.0
Lolyda.AA3 1.00 1.00 1.00 24.0
Lolyda.AT 1.00 1.00 1.00 29.0
Malex.genJ 1.00 0.97 0.99 35.0
Obfuscator.AD 1.00 1.00 1.00 25.0
Rbotgen 1.00 1.00 1.00 28.0
Skintrim.N 1.00 1.00 1.00 21.0
Swizzor.genE 0.67 0.22 0.33 27.0
Swizzor.genI 0.46 0.62 0.52 26.0
VB.AT 1.00 0.99 0.99 78.0
Wintrim.BX 0.87 1.00 0.93 13.0
Yuner.A 1.00 1.00 1.00 156.0


































































obfuscations for the LSTM and CNN classification errors on OBF, normalized
CNN
LSTM
Figure 3.21: Obfuscations frequency in the classification errors for the CNN and LSTM on the OBF
dataset
the intra-class similarities and the inter-class differences are not as definite as the samples
found in the wild for the other datasets. One advantage of the OBF dataset is the size of the
original programs before obfuscation. Since the programs are very small and usually consist
of a single function with few auxiliaries, it is easy to change the structure of the programs
in a more effective way, generating more pervasive changes, and this reflects on the binaries
themselves (and thus on the images).
3.4.3 Transfer Learning
Having trained a CNN on three different datasets we investigate whether the features learnt in
one of them can generalize to the other two. In order to do this we employ transfer learning, a
technique that is very popular nowadays as it allows to re-use an already trained architecture
for a completely different problem.
As explained in 3.1, the convolution layers of the CNN are concerned with feature extraction,
along with max pooling and activations. The head of the model, two dense layers and a drop
out layer in our case, is tasked with using the features to classify the programs into their
respective classes. This of course is also true for the bi-directional LSTM that we trained,
removing the dense layer from a model and applying a new dense layer with proper outputs
provides with a new model that can use pre-trained features for a new classification problem.
Thanks to this neat subdivision of tasks, it has become good practice to download pre-





classes precision recall f1-score support
Adialer.C 1.00 1.00 1.00 26.0
Agent.FYI 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.0
Allaple.A 1.00 1.00 1.00 604.0
Allaple.L 1.00 1.00 1.00 314.0
Alueron.genJ 1.00 1.00 1.00 40.0
Autorun.K 1.00 1.00 1.00 25.0
C2LOP.P 0.82 0.85 0.84 27.0
C2LOP.geng 0.92 0.87 0.89 38.0
Dialplatform.B 1.00 1.00 1.00 43.0
Dontovo.A 1.00 1.00 1.00 34.0
Fakerean 0.97 1.00 0.99 75.0
Instantaccess 1.00 0.99 0.99 90.0
Lolyda.AA1 1.00 1.00 1.00 45.0
Lolyda.AA2 0.96 1.00 0.98 25.0
Lolyda.AA3 1.00 1.00 1.00 24.0
Lolyda.AT 1.00 1.00 1.00 29.0
Malex.genJ 1.00 0.97 0.99 35.0
Obfuscator.AD 0.96 1.00 0.98 25.0
Rbotgen 0.97 1.00 0.98 28.0
Skintrim.N 1.00 1.00 1.00 21.0
Swizzor.genE 0.70 0.59 0.64 27.0
Swizzor.genI 0.54 0.58 0.56 26.0
VB.AT 1.00 1.00 1.00 78.0
Wintrim.BX 1.00 1.00 1.00 13.0
Yuner.A 1.00 1.00 1.00 156.0
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new purposes. This allows huge networks such as the ones trained on ImageNet [49] for
days (often with very expensive equipment) to be used by people that would otherwise not
have the possibility to access such architectures. The hope is that features extracted from a
comprehensive image dataset such as ImageNet will hopefully generalize to other image-based
learning problems.
In our case we train all the models with images extracted from binaries, thus there could be
an interesting intersection in the features as they come from the same problem domain. What
needs to be investigated is if the features extracted from one dataset of compiled programs
can be used to classify another dataset in the same domain. This is akin to using the networks
trained on ImageNet for different (and usually smaller) datasets, since it can save time and
resources. At the same time it can open up future possibilities, where big networks are trained
on huge datasets of images extracted from compiled programs which can then be repurposed
in order to classify smaller and newer datasets.
In the rest of this section we illustrate our experiments with transfer learning with both
models on all the datasets.
MsM2015 → MalImg [LSTM]: A bi-directional LSTM model has been trained for 200
epochs on the MsM2015 dataset, achieving around 94% accuracy. After removing the dense
layer we set the base as untrainable, thus preventing the optimizer from modifying the weights
of the two LSTM units and preserving the features learned from the MsM2015 dataset. We then
added a new dense layer with 25 outputs (as opposed to the 9 for the previous classification
problem) and we trained on the MalImg dataset for a little over 321 epochs, achieving 98.4%
accuracy on the hold-out dataset. This result is on par or even slightly better than most models
trained using only the MalImg dataset. The performance of the LSTM on the MalImg dataset is
already very good and adding the transfer learning actually increased the learning time from
around 100 epochs to more than 400 for the same accuracy.
MsM2015→MalImg [CNN]: The CNN model performs very well on the MalImg dataset,
taking between 45 to 50 epochs to achieve 98.4% accuracy. This is the best result for the CNN
so far and the fastest training time.
After downloading a trained model for the MsM2015 dataset (which achieved around 92%
accuracy on said dataset), we attach a new dense layer and retrain it for 80 epochs. The final
accuracy is 98.2%.
These experiments led us to believe that there is some untapped potential in the process of
transfer learning applied to our problem setting. The positive results could stem from the fact





amount of samples. It also certainly helps that the programs from both datasets are for the
Windows system, thus possibly sharing many visual features. This hypothesis is tested in the
next attempt.
OBF→ MalImg [CNN and LSTM] The process described above has been tried with a
CNN and an LSTM, both trained on the OBF dataset. The CNN model on the MalImg dataset,
with the base of the network set as untrainable, achieved 97% accuracy on the hold out set. This
confirms that the features learned by the CNN model to solve the classification problem for
the OBF dataset are in fact applicable to the MalImg dataset. An analysis of the classification
errors revealed that the same problems persist with the new model. In particular, the classes
‘Swizzor.genE’ and ‘Swizzor.genI’ are still very hard to tell apart. Since the new network
allows updates only on the weights for the dense layers, the training time is also greatly
reduced, going from an average 70 seconds to around 18 seconds with only a slight reduction
in accuracy. This also confirms that the features learned from the MsM2015 dataset are better
suited to classify samples in MalImg. This might be due to their shared architecture or simply
because they both contain real programs and not just small samples.
The LSTM model also improves on the training time but the accuracy decreases to around
87%, making it less viable.
OBF→MsM2015 [CNN and LSTM] The models generated with transfer learning for the
MsM2015 dataset perform slightly worse than the ones for the MalImg dataset. The average
accuracy for the CNN model trained on OBF and then transferred to the classification of
MsM2015 is around 78%, a full 14 points lower than its counterpart trained solely on the
MsM2015 dataset. The LSTM does not fare better, its accuracy hovering around 70%.
These results come solely from training on images of size 64x64 so the lower accuracy
could come from the original model not learning enough features from the OBF dataset. The
MsM2015 dataset is also generally harder to learn from when compared to MalImg.
MalImg→MsM2015 [CNN and LSTM] For completeness we tried to apply the models
trained on the MalImg dataset to classify samples in the MsM2015 dataset. The accuracy
achieved by the CNN model obtained via transfer learning is around 76%, only slightly lower
than the previous experiment with the model trained on OBF. Once again the LSTM model
achieves a lower score than the CNN with around 70% accuracy.
This experiment suffers from the small size of the MalImg dataset and from the apparent dif-
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3.4.4 Error Analysis
As anticipated, the custom nature of the OBF dataset allows us to monitor the effect of the
obfuscations on the classification results. In order to do this we collected all the mistakenly
classified samples from every run of both models against the OBF dataset and counted the
obfuscations that have been applied to such samples. The obfuscation count is then averaged
through the runs (in our case 20 runs) and then finally normalized, so we can have a number
between 0 and 1 that is easy to compare between the different models.
In Figure 3.21 we show the result of this study in a bar graph. The CNN results (in the blue,
wider bars) clearly show that the network has the most trouble classifying programs that have
been transformed by the InitOpaque transformation, while the Flatten transformation, with
around half the errors on average, comes in at second place. This big discrepancy between
the errors makes it clear that the spatial features extracted by the CNN have trouble when
programs are obfuscated with InitOpaque, possibly due to the huge amount of entropy added
to the binary (easily seen in Figure 3.10).
The LSTM (in orange, slimmer bars) has a more uniform distribution of the errors wrt the
applied obfuscations. InitOpaque is still one of the obfuscations that are harder to classify, but is
preceded by RandomFuns and Flatten, while being followed closely by Split and EncodeLiterals.
What we can gauge from this analysis is that the LSTM does not have a particular weakness
toward specific obfuscations but struggles relatively uniformly on the hardest obfuscations.
Another point of interest is that both models find it very easy to classify programs that are
encoded with InitEntropy and InitImplicitFlow. This makes it clear that using a specific model
to classify binaries by looking at their images has its drawbacks, highlighted by the general
lack of precision of the models trained on OBF. It is also clear that certain obfuscations are
more effective than others against this specific classification technique. As with images, the
transformation used to fool the classifier can be more or less effective and part of this work is
to show that this is the case.
In Figure 3.20 we show the errors with a focus on the classes of the OBF dataset. The
errors of the LSTM are again more uniformly distributed while the CNN presents few taller
peaks. It is interesting to note that some programs that appear on the higher end of error
count for the LSTM are among the easiest to classify for the CNN (i.e. ‘factorial_rec’ and
‘alien_language’). This again highlights the difference in strength of the two models.
3.4.5 Comparison with Existing Work
We decided not to directly compare the accuracy values recorded with the twomalware datasets





of this work is not to raise the ever-raising bar of classification accuracy in a specific domain,
as that can usually be achieved by simply spending more time over-tuning the parameters or
throwing more expensive hardware at the problem. At the same time, the accuracy level that
we report is always taken from a hold-out test set that has been extracted randomly from the
main dataset. This is a different approach than the one taken in most works we surveyed
3.5 Related Work
In this section we explore the most relevant works that approach the program classification
problem using only compiled binaries. We do not include works that use features extracted
from the source code of the programs or from the assembly, as our methodology is based on
the premise of not possessing either.
It has to be noted that the focus of our study is not only on malware classification but
on any obfuscated binary. This is why the two malware datasets have been used mainly for
validation. Furthermore, none of the surveyed studies train an LSTM on the images extracted
from binaries. This model provides new insights on the classification of images extracted from
binaries.
Since the classification of binaries according to their images is done mainly on only two
datasets, the MalImg and MsM2015 ones, we will group the related works accordingly.
MalImg papers To our knowledge, the first work that utilizes images extracted from binary
files in order to classify them is by Nataraj et al. [101]. The general idea of this paper comes
from the consideration that malware samples often appear similar in layout and texture when
translated into images. For this reason this study approaches the feature selection with GIST
[105], using wavelet decompositions of the images. The classifier used is a simple k-nearest
neighbors with Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity. Other than the different models
used and the different features used, our approach also does not assume that the samples from
the same classes in our database look anything alike. In fact the opposite can be said, since the
obfuscations applied generate visually different variants for each class. Nonetheless we use
the dataset from this work to show that our approach can generalize to datasets that have not
been created ad hoc.
The study by Cui et al. [43] also considers malware classification as as a means to its
main goal. The paper argues (rightfully so) that the MalImg dataset is heavily imbalanced,
which can potentially lead to less than accurate results. To quell the problem, they perform
under-sampling of the dataset (removing samples from specific classes) and demonstrate that
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Yakura et al. [148] designed a CNN with attention mechanism in order to highlight which
parts of the malware image were being considered for the purpose of classifying them into
families. Their approach allows the learning process to output specific regions of the image
that are being used for classification, thus providing useful information for further manual
analysis.
In [117], the authors take the deep residual network architecture with 50 layers from [71]
and use it to classify malware from the MalImg dataset. The network is first trained on a
typical object detection task, then the last layer is dropped from the model and a new dense
model with 25 output nodes is added to classify the malware samples into their respective
families. Other recent works such as [28] and [17] have proposed slight variations of the
aforementioned approach, always pre-training their model on common image classification
tasks.
The intuition of the previous papers is that the malware in the MalImg dataset present
specific visual features that make them distinctive to the human eye [117], thus a neural
network trained to classify real-life objects could carry enough features to also classify the
malware samples.
Our approach starts with the assumption that we can already extract meaningful features
from compiled programs, so we need to verify that these features map easily to new datasets.
For this reason we use a network that is pre-trained on our custom dataset and a malware
dataset in order classify a different malware dataset.
A CNN has been used for malware classification in [74], along with an extreme learning
machine (ELM). The main goal of this work is to compare the efficiency of the two models
when put to the task of classifying malware images. This study uses the images from the
dataset of Nataraj et al. [101] to train their models and the results indicate that ELMs are more
suited for the task at hand, being faster and more accurate than CNNs.
MsM2015 The MsM2015 dataset has been extensively used in literature for malware classi-
fication tasks. For example, the work by Kang et al. [76] uses word-to-vec approach with an
LSTM network to classify the samples in each family. As many other studies on this subject,
they do not consider the binary as is but rather generate an assembly file for each sample and
collect opcodes and API functions that will then constitute the bulk of the features utilized.
A very interesting work that uses both the MalImg dataset and images extracted from the
binaries in the MsM2015 dataset is [135]. The goal of the paper is to evaluate cost-sensitive
approaches to malware image classification and for this purpose the authors combine a CNN
with various RNN models in order to gauge the effectiveness of the approaches.
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3.6 Summary, Discussion and Limitations
In this chapter we explored the second scenario hypothesized in Chapter 1, where the source
code of the malware samples is not available. While classifying malware according to their
binary it is harder to employ expertise in order to generate both the program representations
and the similarity measure. For this reason we decided to extract images from the binaries and
employ machine learning techniques to them.
The goal of the chapter was then to make the learning process more effective. In order to
improve the process we investigated what are the common pitfalls for this task and found
that the datasets employed can either be too small to effectively benefit from deep learning
techniques or they can suffer from heavy class imbalance. Both these aspects are due to the
nature of malware: certain families are more common than others.
These issues are not uncommon in other areas of machine learning and they can be mitigated
in various ways. For example, in an image classification task the lack of data points is often
solved with data augmentation techniques appropriate for images. These techniques clearly
do not work as well for programs, as they change their semantics. We then hypothesized that
it is possible to obtain the same effect as the data augmentation transformations for images by
applying semantics-preserving transformations to the programs in our datasets.
We then developed two deep learning models (a CNN and an LSTM) and we have shown how
they fare in a classification task on a generated dataset and two real-life malware datasets. The
models have been built with an image classification task in mind and have been fine-tuned with
a custom dataset generated with our aforementioned data augmentation technique. The results
clearly show that the LSTMmodel performs better in all the classification tasks, reaching 98.5%
average accuracy on a hold-out set of the MalImg dataset which is on par or superior to other
studies in the state of the art.
Transfer learning is another technique that can aid the learning process when lacking the
huge datasets often needed to train deep networks. For this reason, the models trained with
the MalImg and MsM2015 datasets have then been subjects of transfer learning experiments,
generating new models that have been trained on one dataset, while classifying samples from
the other. With the accuracy of both these classifiers generated through transfer learning we
verified that the features learned from either dataset can be used to classify malware from the
other. This is a great result because it means that, not only can we use the images extracted
from executable malware samples in order to classify them into their respective families, we
can also transfer the knowledge gathered during such process to classify a new malware
dataset. Akin to the results in image recognition, this can potentially save a lot of computation
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Discussion. The promising results listed in this work led us to believe that there is a lot of
untapped potential in transfer learning applied to malware classification. Further experiments
are needed to have a more comprehensive view of the potentials and limitations of this
technique. For example we envision future experiments with a different starting pool of
programs to generate a new, bigger dataset to which we can apply the obfuscations. Having
more classes in the OBF dataset would allow for more diversity and bigger programs could be
included since the size limitations of [95] have been overcome with bicubic interpolation. The
pool of obfuscations can also be considerably expanded.
Different visualization techniques could also be needed in the future. It is evident that merely
changing the way the images are resized greatly impacts the learning process, this means
that the way we extract images from the binaries is important. We wonder if designing new
techniques that are not meant for generic images (such as bicubic interpolation) but catered
specifically to programs could aid the learning process. On a related note, it would be also
interesting to see what features are extracted by the networks when encountering different
obfuscations. An attention based network could point out which of these features is important
to distinguish the programs in different classes and which ones are merely introduced by the
obfuscations.
Limitations. One of the main limitations in applying our data augmentation technique is
that it requires the source code of the programs. This requirement obviously cannot be met
for most malware distributed, rendering the technique itself limited in its efficacy when not
paired with transfer learning.
There are many attacks that can be perpetrated against image classification tasks. Some
notorious examples include adversarial learning, where some samples are generated specifically
to fool the classifier into misclassification. It is unclear whether the malware classification
technique explored in this chapter can be easily fooled by malware developers.
Another major limitation in this work is the lack of a proper deep-learning architecture. All
the experiments have been done in Google Colab, whose resources greatly exceed those used
in our first foray [95]. Even then, we encountered many difficulties in dealing with RAM and
disk space, which is one of the reasons why the size of the images is so small. With proper





This chapter represents a big change of pace from the rest of the thesis as it presents a strictly
theoretical result without a clear practical counterpart. A small background explanation is
needed to understand how we decided to establish a formal foundation for dynamic analysis
in the context of this thesis.
In scenario 3 (closed system), neither the source code of programs nor their binary is
available, but the program can be run in order to obtain the execution traces. These represent
all the program states that are reached during the execution and they can be used to analyze
what instructions have been executed in order to have a truthful analysis.
There are two immediately evident limitations to this approach, since there is finite time to
execute the analysis : 1) the traces extracted have to be of finite length and 2) there can only
be a finite number of them.
Many ways of employing dynamic analysis in the program similarity scenario can be
hypothesized. In general, we need to leverage some of the advantages of dynamic analysis to
offset the glaring limitations. For example, we could extract the CFG of two methods mirroring
our approach in Chapter 2, but using dynamic analysis instead of the usual static analysis.
This approach surely would not suffer from opaque predicate insertion nor any other static
obfuscation meant to add spurious information, making the extracted CFG more faithful to
the real one. Dynamic analysis, after all, sees exactly what is executed, without added noise.
Another crude approach for program similarity would be to execute two programs with the
same inputs and see if they produce the same outputs. This could be problematic however,
as many execution traces that are mined from programs have to be cut short due to the time
it often takes to do a program run and their similarity might be apparent only at the end of
the complete trace. Another problem is that in order to consider the behaviours of a program
we need to take into account many of the intermediate states and system calls that have
occurred during the run. For these reasons, considering only the input and output states can
be inefficient and insufficient.
A more sophisticated approach found in literature is to find a “semantic alignment” between
different execution traces. An example of this can be seen in a brilliant work by Churchill et al.
[30] called “Semantic Program Alignment for Equivalence Checking”. In this work, the authors
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can be used to “align” the traces. Once a suitable alignment is found, the traces are tested for
semantic equivalence. The goal of the paper, of course, is not program similarity in the same
context as in this thesis, in fact, the technique is meant mostly as an automatic approach to
prove semantic program equivalence between different code optimizations found in compilers.
We could hypothesize many more dynamic code similarity techniques, but there is one
aspect that is still not well explored. In previous scenarios, we saw how obfuscations can fool
static analysis by generating spurious information that impacts the analysis even though it
does not actually appear at run time. Certainly dynamic analysis can also be fooled by certain
types of obfuscations, but these cannot work the same way as in the static analysis world.
There are no false positives in scenario number 3, since everything that is seen by the analysis
has actually been executed. In this chapter, we investigate what it means to effectively fool
dynamic analysis.
Poisons and Antidotes
The inspiration for this work came after hypothesizing a new type of obfuscation called
“poisons and antidotes”. We show how the obfuscation works in an intuitive way by following
an example. Take a simple program 𝑃 that computes the square of the input:
1 x = input()
2 y = x * x
3 return y
Intuitively, a “poison” is just a modification of the value of a variable that will be affected by
a random seed, it is introduced by the program transformation T𝑃 . This way, the value of the
poisoned variable will change depending on the seed at every execution trace. It makes the
most sense to poison a variable that affects the output of the program, for example, the input
variable. Assuming our programming language has a function 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 that accepts two integers
𝑎, 𝑏 as input and outputs 𝑖 such that 𝑎 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑏, we can poison 𝑥 and generate T𝑃 (𝑃):
1 i = input()
2 r = rand(1,4)
3 x = i + r
4 y = x * x
5 return y
The output of the function is no longer the input value squared, but rather the square of 𝑥 +𝑟 ,
where 𝑟 ∈ [1, 4]. Naturally this is not an obfuscation, as it does not preserve the semantics of
the original program. In order to cure the poison we need an antidote, which is added right
before the function return so that the effect of the poison is maximized. The poisoned program
is then modified through the antidote transformation, producing T𝐴 (T𝑃 (𝑃)):
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1 i = input()
2 r = rand(1,4)
3 x = i + r
4 y = x * x
5 w = r * r
6 t = r * i
7 z = t + t
8 a = w + z
9 y = y - a
10 return y
Now the program computes the square of the input, just like 𝑃 . Proving this is simple: starting
with the end value for 𝑦 (the return variable) we can backtrack and substitute each variable
with the right-hand value of the statement(s) where it is defined. The assignment statements
appear on top of each arrow in brackets:
𝑦 = 𝑦 − 𝑎
[𝑎=𝑤+𝑧 ]
−−−−−−→ 𝑦 = 𝑦 −𝑤 − 𝑧
[𝑧=𝑡+𝑡 ]
−−−−−→ 𝑦 = 𝑦 −𝑤 − 2 ∗ 𝑡
[𝑡=𝑟∗𝑖 ]
−−−−−→ (4.1)
𝑦 = 𝑦 −𝑤 − 2 ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝑖
[𝑤=𝑟∗𝑟 ]
−−−−−−→ 𝑦 = 𝑦 − 𝑟 2 − 2 ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝑖
[𝑦=𝑥∗𝑥 ]
−−−−−−→ 𝑦 = 𝑥2 − 𝑟 2 − 2 ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝑖 (4.2)
[𝑥=𝑖+𝑟 ]
−−−−−→ 𝑦 = (𝑖 + 𝑟 )2 − 𝑟 2 − 2 ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝑖 = 𝑖2 + 𝑟 2 + 2 ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝑖 − 𝑟 2 − 2 ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝑖 = 𝑖2 (4.3)
At the end of the chapter we go into more detail on poisons and antidotes, which, while not
yet totally well defined, provide an interesting window into possible future work.
Through abstract interpretation we can quickly show that poisons and antidotes do work
effectively against a static analysis executed with the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 domain introduced in chapter
1. We start by monitoring the value of the variable 𝑖 with an input value of 2, then at each
program point we add the value of the variables that are changed at that specific line. The
computation starts with the variable set to the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 representation of 2: 𝛼 (2) = [2, 2].
𝑖 = [2, 2] → 𝑟 = [1, 4] → 𝑥 = [3, 6] → 𝑦 = [9, 36] → 𝑤 = [1, 8] → 𝑧 = [2, 8] → 𝑧 = [4, 16] →
(4.4)
→ 𝑧 = [5, 24] → 𝑦 = [4, 12]
(4.5)
The result of the abstract interpretation of the program with the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 domain can
be written as [[T𝐴 (T𝑃 (𝑃))]]A ( [2, 2]) = [4, 12]. Now we can abstract the result of the con-
crete execution of the program and pinpoint the exact amount of information that was lost:
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This very simple check allows us to prove that the program 𝑃 , when obfuscated with
poisons and antidotes, adds enough spurious information to its semantics such that abstract
interpretation with the 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 domain is fooled. Since poisons affect the values encountered
in execution traces, we postulate that they can in fact deter some types of dynamic analysis.
For example, the technique described in [30] would probably have a harder time in finding the
semantic alignments in the execution traces, since the values vary randomly. Unfortunately,
we do not have a framework like abstract interpretation to show the same effect on dynamic
analysis, nor a way to formally prove whether it has any effect at all.
The problem identified in this chapter is indeed the lack of a proper formal foundation to
prove the effectiveness of obfuscations against dynamic analysis. In order to build this we
leave the program similarity path and focus on what it means to fool dynamic similarity in
general.
Motivation
Program analysis allows us to infer information about program behaviour, or in other words:
the semantics of the program. We showed in the introductory chapter how, due to Rice’s
theorem, in general it is not possible to decide whether a given program satisfies a semantic
property. For this reason analysts resort to approximation either by static or dynamic analysis.
Static analysis computes an over-approximation of program semantics while dynamic analysis
under-approximates program semantics, meaning that static analysis generally encounters
false positives (spurious information) while dynamic analysis generates false negatives (missing
information). In both cases, we have a decidable evaluation of the semantic property on an
approximation of program semantics.
For this reason, what we can conclude regarding the semantic property of programs has to
take into account false positives for static analysis and false negatives for dynamic analysis.
Static analysis is precise when it is complete (no false positives) and this relates to the well
studied notion of completeness in abstract interpretation [38, 39, 65]. Dynamic analysis is
precise when it is sound (no false negatives), which only happens when the execution traces
considered by the dynamic analysis exhibit all the behaviours of the program that are relevant
wrt the semantic property of interest. The most common way to evaluate the soundness of
dynamic analysis (i.e. the absence of false negatives) is by using code coverage [3].
Program analysis has been originally developed for program verification and debugging and
researchers have put great effort into developing efficient analysis techniques and tools that
reduce the number of both false positives and false negatives. In this setting, the precision of the
analysis relates to the ability to identify bugs and vulnerabilities that may lead to unexpected
behaviours, or that may be exploited by an adversary for malicious purposes.
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Figure 4.1: Code obfuscation
Software protection is another interesting scenario where program analysis plays a central
role, but in a dual way. Indeed, in the software protection scenario, program analysis is used
by adversaries to reverse engineer proprietary code and then illicitly reuse portions of the
code or tamper with the code in some unauthorised way. Here, the intellectual property and
integrity of programs is guaranteed when the analysis is imprecise or very expensive since this
complicates the attacks. In this setting, researchers have developed program transformations,
called code obfuscations, with the explicit intent of complicating program analysis.
In the last years many different kinds of obfuscation techniques and tools have been proposed
[31]. Code obfuscation has proven its efficiency in degrading the results of static program
analysis while it seems to be less efficient with respect to dynamic program analysis [123].
For example, consider a programwhose control flow graph is depicted on the left of Figure 4.1
where we have three blocks of sequential instructions𝐴, 𝐵 and𝐶 executed in the order specified
by the arrows 𝐴→ 𝐵 → 𝐶 . A true opaque predicate OP𝑇 is a predicate that always evaluates
to true, but this invariant behaviour is not known to the attacker who also considers the
execution of the false branch as possible [33]. In the middle of Figure 4.1 we can see what
happens to the control flow graph when we insert a true opaque predicate, where block 𝐷 has
to be considered in the static analysis of the control flow even if it is never executed at runtime.
Thus, 𝐴→ OP𝑇 → 𝐷 → 𝐶 is a false positive path added by obfuscation to static analysis.
On the other hand, a dynamic analysis would execute the program and only hit the trace
𝐴 → OP𝑇 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 over and over again. The obfuscation failed to add any imprecision to
the dynamic analysis.
In a way, we could say that dynamic analysis is impervious to opaque predicates. Again, this
is intuitively true, but this time we are lacking a formal framework that allows us to prove it.
On the right of Figure 4.1 we have the control flow graph of the program obtained by
inserting an unknown opaque predicate. An unknown opaque predicate OP? is a predicate
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to diversify program executions by inserting in the true and false branches sequences of
instructions that are different but functionally equivalent (e.g. blocks 𝐵 and 𝐵1) [33]. This
means that at execution time it does not matter which path is taken by the program, since
they are semantically equivalent. A static analyzer would obviously not be fooled by the
transformation as it would see both paths and correctly assume they are both executed.
Dynamic analysis on the other hand would be affected, since a dynamic analyzer would have
to consider more execution traces in order to observe all possible program behaviours. Indeed,
if the dynamic analysis observes only traces that follow the original path 𝐴→ OP? → 𝐵 → 𝐶
it may not be sound as it misses the traces that follow 𝐴→ OP? → 𝐵1 → 𝐶 (false negative).
Code obfuscation hampers static analysis by exploiting its conservative nature, namely by
increasing its imprecision (false positives) while preserving the intended program behaviour.
The abstract interpretation framework has been used to formally prove the efficiency of code
obfuscation in making static analyzers imprecise [44]. It has been observed that adding false
positives to the analysis can be formalised in terms of incompleteness in the analysis of the
transformed program [44, 47, 62, 64]. In general the imprecision added by these obfuscating
transformations to confuse a static analyzer is not able to confuse a dynamic attacker that
looks at the real program execution and thus cannot be deceived by false positives. Dynamic
analysis observes only paths that are actually executed.
For this reason common deobfuscation approaches often resort to dynamic analysis to
understand obfuscated code [19, 34, 127, 147].
It is clear that to hamper dynamic analysis we need to develop obfuscation techniques that
exploit the Achilles heel of dynamic analysis and that increase the number of false negatives.
In the literature there are defense techniques that focus on hampering dynamic analysis
[9, 106, 110, 121].
The central goal of this chapter is to provide a formal framework in which it is possible to
prove and discuss the efficiency of these techniques that confuse dynamic analysis, in terms of
the imprecision (false negatives) that they introduce in the analysis. This will allow us to better
understand the potential and limits of code obfuscation against dynamic program analysis.
We start by providing a formalisation of dynamic analysis and software protection techniques
in terms of program semantics and equivalence reactions over semantic domains, and then
we characterise when a program transformation hampers a dynamic analysis in terms of
topological features.
The contributions of this chapter are:






• formal definition of software-based protection transformations against dynamic attacks
that induce imprecision in dynamic analysis (false negatives)
• validation of the model on some known software-based defense strategies
• introduction of poisons and antidotes, a new obfuscation meant to disrupt the run-time
value of variables
The rest of the chapter is thus structured:
• Section 4.1 establishes the mathematical foundation needed to define our formal frame-
work
• Section 4.2 contains the our formalization of dynamic analysis
• What it means to harm dynamic analysis is introduced in Section 4.3
• In Section 4.4 we show how our framework can be applied to real life obfuscations and
provide proof that they work against dynamic analysis
• Poisons and antidotes are explored in Section 4.5
• Section 4.6 lists the works that most closely are connected to this chapter
• Section 4.7 closes the chapter with a summary and some considerations for future work
and limitations
4.1 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the mathematical preliminaries that are used throughout the
chapter. Some of the notation used should be very familiar to the readers already acquainted
with abstract interpretation. Our framework, after all, aims to be used to verify the strength of
dynamic analysis by leveraging some topological properties of the semantics, mirroring the
approach of abstract interpretation for static analysis.
Basic lattice and fix-point theory: Given two sets 𝑆 and 𝑇 , we denote with ℘(𝑆) the
powerset of 𝑆 , with 𝑆 ×𝑇 the Cartesian product of 𝑆 and 𝑇 , with 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑇 strict inclusion, with
𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 inclusion, with 𝑆 ⊆𝐹 𝑇 the fact that 𝑆 is a finite set.
⟨𝐶, ≤,∨,∧,⊤,⊥⟩ denotes a complete lattice on the set𝐶 , with ordering ≤, least upper bound
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Let𝐶 and 𝐷 be complete lattices. Then,𝐶 m−→𝐷 and𝐶 c−→𝐷 denote, respectively, the set and
the type of all monotone and (Scott-)continuous functions from𝐶 to 𝐷 . Recall that 𝑓 ∈ 𝐶 c−→𝐷
if and only if 𝑓 preserves lub’s of (nonempty) chains if and only if 𝑓 preserves lub’s of directed
subsets.
Let 𝑓 : 𝐶 → 𝐶 be a function on a complete lattice𝐶 , we denote with lfp(𝑓 ) the least fix-point,
when it exists, of function 𝑓 on 𝐶 . The well-known Knaster-Tarski’s theorem states that any
monotone operator 𝑓 : 𝐶 m−→𝐶 on a complete lattice 𝐶 admits a least fix point. It is known
that if 𝑓 : 𝐶 c−→𝐶 is continuous then lfp(𝑓 ) = ∨𝑖∈ℕ 𝑓 𝑖 (⊥𝐶 ) , where, for any 𝑖 ∈ ℕ and 𝑥 ∈ 𝐶 ,
the 𝑖-th power of 𝑓 in 𝑥 is inductively defined as follows: 𝑓 0(𝑥) = 𝑥 ; 𝑓 𝑖+1(𝑥) = 𝑓 (𝑓 𝑖 (𝑥)).
Given a relation R ⊆ 𝐶 × 𝐷 between two sets 𝐶 and 𝐷 , and two elements 𝑥 ∈ 𝐶 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝐷 ,
then (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ R denotes that the pair (𝑥,𝑦) belongs to the relation R. A binary relation R on
a set 𝐶 , namely R ⊆ 𝐶 × 𝐶 , is an equivalence relation if R is reflexive ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐶 : (𝑥, 𝑥) ∈ R,
symmetric ∀𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝐶 : (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ R ⇒ (𝑦, 𝑥) ∈ R and transitive ∀𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐶 : (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ R∧(𝑦, 𝑧) ∈
R ⇒ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ R. Given a set 𝐶 equipped with an equivalence relation R, we consider for
each element 𝑥 ∈ 𝐶 the subset [𝑥]R of 𝐶 containing all the elements of 𝐶 in equivalence
relation with 𝑥 , i.e., [𝑥]R = {𝑦 ∈ 𝐶 | (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ R}. The sets [𝑥]R are called equivalence
classes of 𝐶 wrt relation 𝑅. Let eq(𝐶) be the set of equivalence relations over the set 𝐶 . The
equivalence classes of an equivalence relation R ∈ eq(𝐶) form a partition of the set 𝐶 , namely
∀𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝐶 : [𝑥]R = [𝑦]R ∨ [𝑥]R ∩ [𝑦]R = ∅ and ∪{[𝑥]R | 𝑥 ∈ 𝐶} = 𝐶 . The partition of 𝐶
induced by the set of equivalence classes of relation R is called the quotient set of 𝐶 and it is
denoted by 𝐶/R .
A partition 𝐶/R1 is a refinement of a partition 𝐶/R2 , namely R1 if finer than R2 or R2 is
coarser than R1, if every equivalence class in 𝐶/R1 is a subset of some equivalence class in
𝐶/R2 . We denote with R1 ⊑ R2 the fact that the equivalence relation R1 is finer than the
equivalence relation R2. Given a subset 𝑆 ⊆ 𝐶 we denote with R(𝑆) the set of equivalence
classes of the elements of 𝑆 , namely R(𝑆) = {[𝑥]R | 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆}, and with 𝑆/R the partition of the
subset 𝑆 induced by the equivalence relation R, namely 𝑆/R= {[𝑥]R ∩ 𝑆 | 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆}.
The concepts just explained with subset partitions can be as easily expressed with atomistic
lattices. Let us recall the notion of atom in a lattice 𝐿. We say that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑎 ≠ ⊥ is an atom of 𝐿
if for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝐿, with 𝑥 ≠ ⊥, we have that ⊥ ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎 implies 𝑥 = 𝑎. The purpose of building
a system that has the same mathematical foundation as abstract interpretation is that one day
we might be able to express dynamic and static analysis using the same formal framework.
Program semantics: Let ℙ be a set of programs ranged over by 𝑃 .
Let v ∈ 𝕀 denote a possible input and let 𝕀∗ denote the set of input sequences ranged over by
I, let PP denote the set of program points ranged over by pp, let Com denote the set of program
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statements ranged over by 𝐶 and let Mem denote the set of memory maps that associates
values to variables ranged over by𝑚 : Var → Values. 𝛴 = 𝕀∗ × PP × Com ×Mem is the set of
program states. Thus, a program state 𝑠 ∈ 𝛴 is a tuple 𝑠 = ⟨I, pp,𝐶,𝑚⟩ where I denotes the
sequence of inputs that still needs to be consumed to terminate the execution, pp denotes the
program point of the next instruction 𝐶 that has to be executed, and𝑚 is the current memory.
We denote with 𝐶1;𝐶2 the sequential composition of statements and we refer to skip as the
identity statement whose execution has no effects on memory. Given a program 𝑃 we denote
with 𝕀𝑃 ⊆ 𝕀∗ the set of the initial input sequences for the execution of program 𝑃 , and with
Init𝑃 = {𝑠 ∈ 𝛴 | 𝑠 = ⟨I, pp,𝐶,𝑚⟩,I ∈ 𝕀𝑃 } the set of its initial states. We use 𝛴∗ to denote the
set of all finite and infinite sequences or traces of states, where 𝜖 ∈ 𝛴∗ is the empty sequence,
|𝜎 | the length of sequence 𝜎 ∈ 𝛴∗. 𝛴+ ⊂ 𝛴∗ denotes the set of finite sequences of elements of
𝛴 . We denote the concatenation of sequences 𝜎, a ∈ 𝛴∗ as 𝜎a . Given 𝜎, a ∈ 𝛴∗, a ⪯ 𝜎 means
that a is a subsequence of 𝜎 , namely that there exists 𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∈ 𝛴∗ such that 𝜎 = 𝜎1a𝜎2. Given
𝑠 ∈ 𝛴 we write 𝑠 ∈ 𝜎 when 𝑠 is an element occurring in sequence 𝜎 , and we denote with
𝜎0 ∈ 𝛴 the first element of sequence 𝜎 and with 𝜎𝑓 the final element of the finite sequence
𝜎 ∈ 𝛴+. Let 𝑅 ⊆ 𝛴 × 𝛴 denote the transition relation between program states, thus (𝑠, 𝑠 ′) ∈ 𝑅
means that state 𝑠 ′ can be obtained from state 𝑠 in one computational step. The (finite) trace
semantics of a program 𝑃 is defined, as usual, as the least fix-point computation of function






|︁|︁ (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖+1) ∈ 𝑅, 𝜎𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑋 }︁
The trace semantics of 𝑃 is [[𝑃]] = lfp(F𝑃 ) =
⋃︁
𝑖∈ℕ F 𝑖𝑃 (⊥𝐶 ). Den[[𝑃]] denotes the denotational
(finite) semantics of program 𝑃 which abstracts away the history of the computation by
observing only the input-output relation of finite traces. Therefore we have Den[[𝑃]] = {𝜎 ∈
𝛴+ | ∃[ ∈ [[𝑃]] : [0 = 𝜎0, [𝑓 = 𝜎𝑓 }.
4.2 Topological Characterisation of the Precision of Dynamic
Analysis
We start our investigation by considering dynamic analysis that observes features of single
execution traces, for example: the order of successive accesses to memory, the order of
execution of instructions, the location of the first instruction of a function, the target of jumps,
function location, possible data values at certain program points, etc. The extension of the
framework to properties of sets of traces (hyper-properties) and relational properties among
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The simplest way to model properties of single traces is in terms of equivalence relations
over program traces. Indeed, an equivalence relation R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) groups together all those
execution traces that are equivalent wrt the property used to establish the equivalence for R.
In this setting, each equivalence class [𝜎]R ⊆ 𝛴∗ represents the set of execution traces that
are equivalent to 𝜎 wrt R, namely all those execution traces that R is not able to distinguish
from 𝜎 . In general, given a program 𝑃 ∈ ℙ and an equivalence relation R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) it
may not be possible to precisely observe property R of program semantics, namely the set
R([[𝑃]]) = {[𝜎]R | 𝜎 ∈ [[𝑃]]} may not be precisely observable. This means that it may not be
possible to decide whether R([[𝑃]]) ⊆ 𝛱 , for some 𝛱 ∈ ℘(𝛴∗/R), a set of equivalence classes
representing a possible feature of program execution that can be expressed in terms of R. In
order to verify these features, analysts resort to approximation either by static or dynamic
analysis.
Example 1. Consider function ] : 𝛴 → 𝕀 that observes the first input value 𝑣 ∈ 𝕀 of a program
state, namely ] (⟨vI, pp,𝐶,𝑚⟩) def= v. We can define the equivalence relation R] as (𝜎, a) ∈ R]
iff ] (𝜎0) = ] (a0), grouping together traces with the same starting input values. Based on
R] we can define features of program behaviour as for example 𝛱1, 𝛱2 ∈ ℘(𝛴∗/R] ) where
𝛱1 = {[𝜎]R] | ] (𝜎) ≥ 0} observes the equivalence classes of traces whose first input value is
positive, and 𝛱2 = {[𝜎]R] | ] (𝜎) ∈ [𝑙, 𝑢]} observes the equivalence classes of traces whose first
input value is in the interval [𝑙, 𝑢].
We can think about the relation R as the granularity at which the analysis observes program
executions. Given R1 ⊑ R2 we have that R1 describes an analysis that is more precise than
R2 in distinguishing program traces, while R2 describes an analysis that groups together
more traces than R1. The equivalence classes can then be combined to describe properties of
programs at different levels of abstraction.
In the literature there exists a formal investigation of the effects of code obfuscation to
the precision of static analysis [44, 47, 62, 64]. This has lead to a better understanding of
the potential and limits of obfuscation, and it has been useful in the design of obfuscation
techniques that target specific program properties [47, 62, 63].
In the following, we apply a similar approach to dynamic analysis. To this end, we formalise
the absence of false negatives, namely the precision of dynamic analysis, in terms of topological
properties of program trace semantics and of the equivalence relation R modelling the property
to be observed. False negatives occur when dynamic analysis fails to consider some traces that
would modify the equivalence classes observed by property R. We show how to transform a
program in order to hinder the dynamic analysis of a property R, that is, to make the dynamic
analysis of the transformed program not sound.
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Figure 4.2: Dynamic analysis
4.2.1 Modelling Dynamic Program Analysis
Dynamic analysis observes a finite subset of finite execution traces of a program and tries to
draw conclusions on the whole program behaviour from this partial observation.
Definition 1 (Dynamic Execution). The execution traces of program 𝑃 with initial states in






|︁|︁ |𝜎 | ≤ 𝑡, 𝜎 = 𝑠0𝜎 ′, 𝑠0 ∈ 𝑇𝑃 }︁
Note that Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) is a finite set and that each trace in Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) is finite (it has at most
𝑡 states). This correctly implies that: Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) ⊆𝐹 [[𝑃]]. The goal of dynamic analysis is to
derive knowledge of a semantic property of a program by observing a finite subset Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)
of its execution traces. Dynamic analysis is therefore specified as the set of observed execution
traces Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) and of an equivalence relation on traces R ∈ eq(𝛴∗).
Definition 2 (Dynamic Analysis). A dynamic analysis of property R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) of program
𝑃 ∈ ℙ, is defined as a pair ⟨R, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩.
Let us consider program 𝑃 on the left of Figure 4.2 where the block of code to execute
depends on the input value of 𝑥 . Consider a property of traces R̄ ∈ eq(𝛴∗) that observes
which block 𝐵1, 𝐵2 or 𝐵3 of program 𝑃 is executed. On the right of Figure 4.2 we represent the
partition of the traces of program 𝑃 induced by property R̄ where 𝑥Init denotes the input value
of variable 𝑥 .
Traces are grouped together according to an equivalence relation R depicted as red circles
around traces, so we have that 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 are in the same equivalence class, that 𝜎3 and 𝜎4
are in the same equivalence class while 𝜎5 is in a different equivalence class. In Figure 4.2
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In Figure 4.3 we can see on the left a set of program traces {𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎3, 𝜎4, 𝜎5} that represents
the trace semantics [[𝑃]] of some program 𝑃 . The three dynamic analyses pictured give an
intuitive view to the concept of soundness in dynamic analysis.
Dynamic analysis ⟨R, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩ can precisely observe property R of the semantics of 𝑃
(no false negatives) when Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) contains at least one trace for each one of the equivalence
classes of the traces of [[𝑃]].
Definition 3 (Soundness). Given 𝑃 ∈ ℙ and R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) a dynamic analysis ⟨R, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩
is sound if ∀𝑥 ∈ [[𝑃]] : [𝑥]R ∈ R(Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)).
When a dynamic analysis ⟨R, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩ is sound we have no false negatives, namely
∀𝑦 ∈ [[𝑃]] : [𝑦]R ∈ R(Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)). When this happens, all the behaviours of program 𝑃
that relation R is able to distinguish are taken into account by the partial observation of
program behaviour Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡). In the example in Figure 4.2 we have that a dynamic analysis
⟨R̄, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩ is sound if Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) contains at least one execution trace for each one of
the three equivalence classes depicted on the right of Figure 4.2. In the example in Figure 4.3
we can see that DA1 is not sound since it does not consider any trace in the equivalence class
[𝜎3]R = [𝜎4]R that is a false negative of the analysis. The dynamic analyses DA2 and DA3 are
both sound since they consider at least one trace for each equivalence class of the traces in
[[𝑃]].
To formalise this constraint we introduce the following notion.
Definition 4 (Covers). Given 𝑃 ∈ ℙ, and R ∈ eq(𝛴∗), we say that 𝑆 ⊆ [[𝑃]] covers 𝑃 wrt R
when: R(𝑆) = R([[𝑃]]).
It is clear that when 𝑆 covers 𝑃 wrt R we have that the partial observation 𝑆 of the behaviours
of 𝑃 is sound wrt R, since it allows us to observe all the equivalence classes of R that we would
observe by having access to all the traces in [[𝑃]] (no false negatives). Thus, in the example
in Figure 4.2 we have that the set of traces {𝜎1, [1} does not cover 𝑃 wrt R̄, while the set of
traces {𝜎1, [1, [2, `2} does.
Similarly, in the example in Figure 4.3 the set of traces observed by DA1 does not cover [[𝑃]]
wrt R, while the sets of traces observed by DA2 and DA3 cover [[𝑃]] wrt R.
The following theorem comes straight from the definitions.
Theorem 2. Given 𝑃 ∈ ℙ and R ∈ eq(𝛴∗), if Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) covers 𝑃 wrt R then the dynamic
analysis ⟨R, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩ is sound (no false negatives).
The goal of dynamic analysis of a property R on a program 𝑃 , is to identify the set 𝑇𝑃 of
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Figure 4.3: Dynamic analysis and soundness
analysis sound (no false negatives) wrt R. Thus, a possible way to hamper dynamic analysis is
to transform programs in order to increase the number of traces that is necessary to observe
to ensure soundness. In a way, by tying the precision of dynamic analysis to the observation
of a wider set of traces (worst case being the observation of all possible traces) we are limiting
the advantages of using dynamic analysis.
In order to formalise this idea, in the following section we provide a characterisation of the
set of traces that are needed to guarantee the soundness of the dynamic analysis of a program
𝑃 wrt a semantic property R. We use this characterisation to formalize what it means for a
software-based defense transformation to harm dynamic analysis. We validate our model by
showing how it naturally relates to the notion of code coverage of dynamic analysis, and by
showing how existing techniques for hindering dynamic analysis fit into our framework.
4.3 Harming Dynamic Analysis
In this section we formally characterize what it means to harm dynamic analysis in our
framework.
Given an equivalence relation R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) concerning what we can observe and a set of
equivalence classes 𝑋 ∈ ℘(𝛴∗/R) we would like to characterise the minimal sets of traces that




A Formal Approach for Dynamic Analysis
Definition 5 (Core). Consider R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) and 𝑋 ∈ ℘(𝛴∗/R):
Core(𝑋,R) def=
{︃
𝑇 = {𝜎 ∈ 𝛴∗ | [𝜎]R ∈ 𝑋 }
|︁|︁|︁|︁ ∀𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∈ 𝑇, 𝜎1 ≠ 𝜎2 ⇒ [𝜎1]R ≠ [𝜎2]R∀[a]R ∈ 𝑋 : ∃𝜎 ∈ 𝑇 : [𝜎]R = [a]R }︃
Theorem 3. Consider R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) and 𝑋 ∈ ℘(𝛴∗/R):
1. Given 𝑇 ∈ Core(𝑋,R) we have that: R(𝑇 ) = 𝑋
2. ∀𝑆 ∈ ℘(𝛴∗): If R(𝑆) = 𝑋 then ∃𝑇 ∈ Core(𝑋,R) : 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆
This means that Core(R([[𝑃]]),R) characterises the minimal sets of execution traces that
provide a sound dynamic analysis of property R for program 𝑃 . In the example in Figure 4.2
we have that Core( [[𝑃]], R̄) identifies those sets of trace that have exactly three traces: one
trace with 𝑥init < 50, one trace with 50 ≤ 𝑥init ≤ 100 and one trace with 𝑥init > 100.
Likewise, in the example in Figure 4.3 the set of traces considered by the dynamic analysis
DA3 belongs to Core( [[𝑃]],R) while this does not hold for the analyses DA1 and DA2. However,
dynamic analysis DA2 is sound since it observes the set of traces {𝜎2, 𝜎3, 𝜎4, 𝜎5} which contains
the set {𝜎2, 𝜎3, 𝜎5} ∈ Core( [[𝑃]],R), while DA1 is not sound since it observes a set of traces
that does not contain a set in Core( [[𝑃]],R).
Corollary 1. Given 𝑃 ∈ ℙ and R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) we have that:
• ∀𝑇 ∈ Core(R([[𝑃]]),R) we have that 𝑇 covers [[𝑃]] wrt R.
• Given 𝑇𝑃 ⊆𝐹 Init𝑃 and 𝑡 ∈ ℕ the dynamic analysis ⟨R, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩ is sound iff ∃𝑇 ∈
Core(R([[𝑃]]),R) such that 𝑇 ⊆ Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡).
• For every semantic feature 𝛱 ∈ ℘(𝛴∗/R) expressed in terms of equivalence classes of R,
we have that if Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) covers [[𝑃]] wrt R then we can precisely evaluate [[𝑃]] ⊆ 𝛱
by evaluating Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) ⊆ 𝛱 .
Thus, a dynamic analysis ⟨R, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩ is sound if Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) observes at least one
execution trace for each one of the equivalence classes of the traces in [[𝑃]] for the relation R.
In the worst case we have a different equivalence class for every execution trace of 𝑃 .
When this happens, a sound dynamic analysis of property R on program 𝑃 has to observe
all possible execution traces. Of course, this is unfeasible in the general case. For this reason, if
we want to protect a program from a dynamic analysis that is interested in the property R, we







Figure 4.4: Transformation Potency
This allows us to define when a program transformation is potent wrt a dynamic analysis,
namely when a program transformation forces a dynamic analysis to observe a wider set
of traces in order to be sound. See [31] for the general notion of potency of a program
transformation, i.e., a program transformation that foils a given attack (in our case a dynamic
analysis).
Definition 6 (Potency). A program transformation T : ℙ→ ℙ that preserves the denotational
semantics of programs is potent for a program 𝑃 ∈ ℙ wrt an observation R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) if the
following two conditions hold:
1. ∀𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∈ [[T (𝑃)]] : [𝜎1]R = [𝜎2]R we have that ∀a1, a2 ∈ [[𝑃]] : Den(a1) = Den(𝜎1) ∧
Den(a2) = Den(𝜎2) then [a1]R = [a2]R
2. ∃a1, a2 ∈ [[𝑃]] : [a1]R = [a2]R for which ∃𝜎1, 𝜎2 ∈ [[T (𝑃)]] : Den(a1) = Den(𝜎1) ∧
Den(a2) = Den(𝜎2) such that [𝜎1]R ≠ [𝜎2]R
Figure 4.4 provides a graphical representation of the notion of potency. On the left we have
the traces of the original program 𝑃 partitioned according to the equivalence relation R, while
on the right we have the traces of the transformed program T (𝑃) partitioned according to R.
Traces that are denotationally equivalent have the same shape (triangle, square, circle, oval), but
are filled differently since they are, in general, different traces. The first condition means that
the traces of T (𝑃) that property R maps to the same equivalence class (triangle and square),
are denotationally equivalent to traces of 𝑃 that property R maps to the same equivalence
class. This means that what is grouped together by R on [[T (𝑃)]] was grouped together by R
on [[𝑃]], modulo the denotational equivalence of traces. The second condition requires that
there are traces of 𝑃 (circle and oval) that property R maps to the same equivalence class and
whose denotationally equivalent traces in T (𝑃) are mapped by R to different equivalence
classes. This means that a defense technique against dynamic analysis wrt a property R is
successful when it transforms a program into a functionally equivalent one for which property
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execution traces in order for the analysis to be precise. At the limit we have an optimal defense
technique when R varies at every execution trace.
Example 1. Consider the following programs 𝑃 and 𝑄 that compute the sum of natural




while x < 50
• ≀ 𝑋 = [0, 49] ≀
sum := sum + x;
x := x + 1;
𝑄
input x;
n : = select(N,x)
x := x * n;
sum := 0;
while x < 50 * n
• ≀ 𝑋 = [0, 𝑛 ∗ 50 − 1] ≀
sum := sum + x/n;
x := x + n;
x := x/n;
Consider a dynamic analysis that observes the maximal value assumed by 𝑥 at program point
•. For every possible execution of program 𝑃 we have that the maximal value assumed by 𝑥 at
program point • is 49.
Consider a state 𝑠 ∈ 𝛴 as a tuple ⟨I, pp,𝐶, [val𝑥 , valsum]⟩, where val𝑥 and valsum denote
the current values of variables 𝑥 and sum respectively. We define a function 𝜏 : 𝛴 → ℕ that
observes the value assumed by 𝑥 at state 𝑠 when 𝑠 refers to program point •, and function
Max : 𝛴∗ → ℕ that observes the maximal value assumed by 𝑥 at • along an execution trace:
𝜏 (𝑠) def=
{︃
val𝑥 if pp = •
∅ otherwise Max (𝜎)
def
= max ({𝜏 (𝑠) | 𝑠 ∈ 𝜎})
This allows us to define the equivalence relation RMax ∈ eq(𝛴∗) that observes traces wrt the
maximal value assumed by 𝑥 at •, as (𝜎, 𝜎 ′) ∈ RMax iff Max (𝜎) = Max (𝜎 ′).
The equivalence classes of RMax are the sets of traces with the same maximal value assumed
by 𝑥 at •. We can observe that all the execution traces of 𝑃 belong to the same equivalence class
of RMax . In this case, a dynamic analysis ⟨RMax, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩ is sound if Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) contains
at least one execution trace of 𝑃 . This happens because the property that we are looking for is
an invariant property of program executions and it can be observed on any execution trace.
Let us now consider program𝑄 . 𝑄 is equivalent to 𝑃 , i.e., Den[[𝑃]] = Den[[𝑄]], but the value
of 𝑥 is diversified by multiplying it by the parameter 𝑛. The guard and the body of the while





RMax on𝑄 , we have that the maximal value assumed by 𝑥 at program point • is determined by
the parameter 𝑛 generated in the considered trace. The statement n:=select(N,x) assigns
to 𝑛 a value in the range [0, 𝑁 ] depending on the input value 𝑥 .
We have that the traces of program𝑄 are grouped by RMax depending on the value assumed
by 𝑛. Thus, R([[𝑄]]) contains an equivalence class for every possible value assumed by 𝑛
during execution. This means that the transformation that rewrites 𝑃 into𝑄 is potent according
to Definition 6.
Dynamic analysis ⟨RMax, Exe(𝑄,𝑇𝑄 , 𝑡)⟩ is sound if Exe(𝑄,𝑇𝑄 , 𝑡) contains at least one execu-
tion trace for each of the possible values of 𝑛 generated during execution.
4.4 Model Validation
In this section, we show how the proposed framework can be used to model existing code
obfuscation techniques. In particular, wemodel the way these transformations deceive dynamic
analysis of control flow and data flow properties of programs. We also show how the measures
of code coverage used by dynamic analysis tools can be naturally interpreted in the proposed
framework.
4.4.1 Control Flow Analysis
The control flow graph 𝐶𝐹𝐺 of a program 𝑃 is a graph CFG𝑃 = (𝑉 , 𝐸) where each node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉
is a pair (pp,𝐶) denoting a statement 𝐶 at program point pp in 𝑃 , and 𝐸 ⊆ 𝑉 ×𝑉 is the set
of edges such that (𝑣1, 𝑣2) ∈ 𝐸 means that the statement in 𝑣2 could be executed after the
statement in 𝑣1 when running 𝑃 . Thus, we define the domain of nodes as Nodes
def
= PP × Com,
and the domain of edges as Edges def= Nodes × Nodes.
Dynamic Extraction of the Control Flow Graph.
It is possible to dynamically construct the CFG of a program by observing the commands
that are executed and the edges that are traversed when the program runs. Let us define
[ : 𝛴 → Nodes that observes the command to be executed together with its program point,
namely [ (𝑠) = [ (⟨I, pp,𝐶,𝑚⟩) def= (pp,𝐶). By extending this function on traces we obtain
function path : 𝛴∗ → Nodes × Edges that extracts the path of the CFG corresponding to the
considered execution trace, abstracting from the number of times that an edge is traversed or
a node is computed:
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Figure 4.5: CFG of 𝑃
where 𝑠 ∈ 𝜎 means that 𝑠 is a state that appears in trace 𝜎 and 𝑠𝑠 ′ ⪯ 𝜎 means that 𝑠 and 𝑠 ′ are
successive states in 𝜎 .
This allows us to define the equivalence relation RCFG ∈ eq(𝛴∗) that observes traces up
to the path that they define, as (𝜎, 𝜎 ′) ∈ RCFG iff path(𝜎) = path(𝜎 ′). Indeed, RCFG groups
together those traces that execute the same set of nodes and traverse the same set of edges,
abstracting from the number of times that nodes are executed and edges are traversed.
The CFG of a program 𝑃 can be defined as the union of the paths of its execution traces,
namely CFG𝑃 =
⨆︁{path(𝜎) | 𝜎 ∈ [[𝑃]]}, where the union of graphs is defined as (𝑉1, 𝐸1) ⊔
(𝑉2, 𝐸2) = (𝑉1 ∪ 𝑉2, 𝐸1 ∪ 𝐸2). The dynamic extraction of the CFG of a program 𝑃 from the
observation of a set 𝑋 ⊆𝐹 [[𝑃]] of execution traces, is given by
⨆︁{path(𝜎) | 𝜎 ∈ 𝑋 }. In the
general case we have
⨆︁{path(𝜎) | 𝜎 ∈ 𝑋 } ⊆ CFG𝑃 .
Preventing Dynamic CFG Extraction.
Control code obfuscations are program transformations that modify the program’s control
flow in order to make it difficult for an adversary to analyze the flow of control of programs
[31]. According to Section 4.3, a program transformation T : ℙ → ℙ is a potent defense
against the dynamic extraction of the CFG of a program 𝑃 when T diversifies the paths taken
by the execution traces of T (𝑃) wrt the paths taken by the traces of 𝑃 .
In the following, we show how two known defense techniques for preventing dynamic
analysis actually work by diversifying program traces with respect to property RCFG .
We start with a simple program 𝑃 that computes integer division.
1 input(x)





3 x = x/2
4 else:
5 x = x+1
6 x = x/2
7 printf(x)
Listing 4.1: P
The CFG of 𝑃 can be seen in Figure 4.5.
Range Dividers: Range Divider (RD) is a transformation designed to prevent dynamic
symbolic execution and it is an efficient protection against the dynamic extraction of the CFG
[9].
RD relies on the existence of 𝑛 program transformations T𝑖 : ℙ→ ℙ with 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] that:
1. Preserve the denotational semantics of programs:
∀𝑃 ∈ ℙ, 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] : Den[[𝑃]] = Den[[T𝑖 (𝑃)]]
2. Modify the paths of the CFG of programs in different ways:
∀𝑃 ∈ ℙ, ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑛]: RCFG ( [[T𝑖 (𝑃)]]) = RCFG ( [[T𝑗 (𝑃)]]) ⇒ 𝑖 = 𝑗 .
Given a program 𝑃 , the RD transformation works by inserting a switch control statement
with 𝑛 cases whose condition depends on program inputs. Every case of the switch contains
a semantically equivalent version T𝑖 (𝑃) of 𝑃 that is specialised wrt the input values. Thus, de-
pending on the input values we would execute one of the diversified programs T1(𝑃), . . . ,T𝑛 (𝑃).
Since for each variant T𝑖 (𝑃) with 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] the set of execution traces are mapped by RCFG into
different equivalent classes, we have that property RCFG has been diversified among the traces
of RD(𝑃). Thus, the transformation RD is potent wrt RCFG and harms the dynamic extraction
of the CFG.
The graph in Figure 4.6 represents the CFG of program 𝑃 transformed by RD. The CFG
of program RD(𝑃) has four different paths depending on the value of the input variable 𝑥 .
Each one of these paths is functionally equivalent to the corresponding path in 𝑃 (case 0
and case 2 are equivalent to the path taken when 𝑥 is even, while case 1 and case 3 are
equivalent to the path taken when 𝑥 is odd). We can easily observe that in this case the paths
of RD(𝑃) have been diversified wrt the paths of 𝑃 . Indeed, a dynamic analysis has to observe
two execution traces to precisely build the CFG for 𝑃 , while four traces are need to precisely
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input x;
if x is even:
















Figure 4.6: CFG of RD(𝑃)
Gadget Diversification: In [121] the authors propose a program transformation, denoted
GD : ℙ→ ℙ that hinders the dynamic CFG analysis.
GD starts by identifying a sequence 𝑄seq of sequential command (no branches) in program
𝑃 . Next, GD assumes to have access to a set of diversifying transformations T𝑖 : ℙ → ℙ
with 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛] that diversify command sequences while preserving their functionality. These
transformations are then applied to portions of 𝑄seq in order to generate a wide set 𝑆seq =
{𝑄1..𝑄𝑚} of command sequences where each𝑄 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆seq is functionally equivalent to𝑄seq, while
every pair 𝑄 𝑗 , 𝑄𝑙 ∈ 𝑆seq are such that RCFG ( [[𝑄 𝑗 ]]) ≠ RCFG ( [[𝑄𝑙 ]]). This means that each
execution trace generated by the run of a sequence in 𝑆seq belongs to a different equivalence
class wrt relation RCFG , while being denotationally equivalent by definition.
Transformation GD proceeds by adding a branching function to the original program
𝑃 that, depending on the input values, deviates the control flow to one of the sequences of
commands in 𝑆seq. Thus, depending on the input values, GD diversifies the path that is executed.
This makes the transformation GD potent wrt RCFG according to the proposed framework.
A simple example of GD can be observed in the graph of Figure 4.7, where the original
program is transformed to reveal a peculiar CFG structure. The branch function is symbolized
here as the central block from which all other blocks are called and to which all other blocks























Figure 4.7: CFG of GD(𝑃)











We can easily observe that the paths of GD(𝑃) have been diversified wrt the paths of 𝑃 and
while the dynamic construction of the CFG for 𝑃 requires to observe two execution traces, we
need to observe 4 execution traces to precisely build the CFG of GD(𝑃).
4.4.2 Code Coverage
Most dynamic algorithms use code coverage to measure the potential soundness of the analysis
[3]. Intuitively, given a program 𝑃 and a partial observation Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) of its execution traces,
code coverage wants to measure the amount of program behaviour considered by Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)
wrt the set of all possible behaviours [[𝑃]]. We now describe some known code coverage
measures.
Statement coverage considers the statements of the program that have been executed by the
traces in Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡).
This is a function st : 𝛴∗ → Nodes that collects commands annotated with their program
point, that are executed along a considered trace: st (𝜎) def= {[ (𝑠) | 𝑠 ∈ 𝜎}. This allows us to
define the equivalence relation Rst ∈ eq(𝛴∗) that groups together traces that execute the same
set of statements.
Count-Statement coverage considers howmany times each statement of the program has been
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relation R+st ∈ eq(𝛴∗) that groups together traces that execute the same set of statements the
same amount of times. It is clear that relation R+st is finer than relation Rst , namely R+st ⊑ Rst .
Path coverage observes the nodes executed and edges traversed by the traces in Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡).
This precisely corresponds to the observation of property RCFG ∈ eq(𝛴∗) defined above,
where the paths of the CFG are observed by abstracting the number of times that edges are
traversed. It is clear that relation RCFG is finer than relation Rst , namely RCFG ⊑ Rst .
Count-Path coverage considers the different paths in Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡), where the number of times
that edges are traversed in a trace is taken into account. This can be formalised in terms of an
equivalence relation R+CFG ∈ eq(𝛴∗) that groups together traces that execute and traverse the
same nodes and edges the same number of times. It is clear that relation R+CFG is finer than
relation RCFG , namely R+CFG ⊑ RCFG .
Trace coverage considers the traces of commands that have been executed abstracting
from the memory map. In this case we can define the code coverage in terms of function
trace : 𝛴∗ → Com×PP defined as trace(𝜖) def= 𝜖 and trace(𝑠𝜎) def= [ (𝑠)trace(𝜎). The equivalence
relation Rtrace ∈ eq(𝛴∗) is such that (𝜎, 𝜎 ′) ∈ Rtrace if trace(𝜎) = trace(𝜎 ′). This equivalence
relation is finer than R+CFG since it keeps track of the order of execution of the edges.
In order to avoid false negatives, dynamic analysis algorithms automatically look for inputs
whose execution traces have to exhibit new behaviours with respect to the code coverage metric
used (e.g., they have to execute new statements or execute them a different number of times,
traverse new edges or change the number of times edges are traversed, or execute nodes in a
different order). This can be naturally formalised in our framework. Given a set Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)
of observed traces, an automatically generated input increases the code coverage measured as
Rst (or R+st,RCFG,R+CFG,Rtrace) if the execution trace 𝜎 generated by the input is mapped in a
new equivalence class of Rst (or R+st,RCFG,R+CFG,Rtrace), namely in an equivalence class that
was not observed by traces in Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡), namely if [𝜎]Rst ∉ Rst (Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)) (analogously
for R+st , RCFG , R+CFG , Rtrace). We have seen above that some of the common measures for code
coverage can be expressed in terms of semantic program properties with different degrees
of precision id ⊑ Rtraces ⊑ R+CFG ⊑ RCFG ⊑ Rst . This means, for example, that automatically
generated inputs could add coverage for R+CFG but not for Rst . Indeed, a new input generates a
new behaviour depending on the metric used for code coverage.
Fuzzing and dynamic symbolic execution are typical techniques used by dynamic analysis
to automatically generate inputs in order to extend code coverage. The metrics that fuzzing






Fuzzing: The term fuzzing refers to a family of automated input generating techniques that
are widely used in the industry to find vulnerabilities and bugs in all kinds of software [132].
In general, a fuzzer aims at discovering inputs that generate new behaviors, thus one measure
of success for fuzzers is code coverage. Simple statement coverage is rarely a good choice,
since crashes do not usually depend on a single program statement, but on a specific sequence
of statements [151]. Most fuzzing algorithms choose to define their own code coverage metric.
American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) is a state of the art fuzzer that has seen extensive use in the industry
in its base form, while new fuzzers are continuously built on top of it [128]. The measure used
by AFL for code coverage lays between path and count-path coverage as it approximates the
number of times that edges are traversed by specified intervals of natural numbers ([1], [2],
[3], [4 − 7], [8 − 15], [16 − 31], [32 − 127], [128,∞]). Libfuzzer [126] and honggfuzz [133]
employ count-statement coverage. To the best of our knowledge trace coverage is never used
as it is unfeasible in practice [58].
Dynamic Symbolic Execution: DSE is a well known dynamic analysis technique that
combines concrete and symbolic execution [68]. DSE typically starts by executing a program
on a random input and then generates branch conditions that take into account the executed
branches. When execution ends, DSE looks at the last branch condition generated and uses
a theorem prover to solve the negated predicate in order to explore the branch that was not
executed. This is akin to symbolic execution, but DSE can use the concrete values obtained in
the execution to simplify the job of the theorem prover. The ideal goal of DSE is to reach path
coverage, which is always guaranteed if the conditions in the target program only contain
linear arithmetics [68]. Thus, the efficacy of DSE in generating new inputs is measured in
terms of path coverage formalised as RCFG in our framework.
Let us denote with R ∈ eq(𝛴∗) the equivalence relation modelling the code coverage metric
used either by fuzzing or symbolic execution or any other algorithm for input generation.
When Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) covers 𝑃 wrt R, we have that the fuzzer or symbolic execution algorithm
has found all the inputs that allow us to observe the different behaviours of 𝑃 wrt R. In general,
a dynamic analysis may be interested in a property R𝐴 ∈ eq(𝛴∗) that is different from the
property R used to measure code coverage. When R ⊑ R𝐴 we have that if Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) covers
𝑃 wrt R, then Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡) covers 𝑃 also wrt R𝐴 and this means that the code coverage metric
R can help in limiting the number of false negative of the dynamic analysis ⟨R𝐴, Exe(𝑃,𝑇𝑃 , 𝑡)⟩.









while x < 2*50
• 𝑋 = [𝑥, 2 ∗ 50 − 1]
sum := sum + x/2;






while x < n*50
• 𝑋 = [𝑥, 𝑛 ∗ 50 − 1]
sum := sum + x/n;





x := 𝐻𝑒 (n,x);
sum := 𝐻𝑒 (n,0);
while x <𝐻 𝐻𝑒 (n,50)
• 𝑋 = [𝑥, 𝐻𝑒 (𝑛, 50) − 1]
sum := sum +𝐻 x;
x := x +𝐻 𝐻𝑒 (n,1);
x:= 𝐻𝑑 (x);
Figure 4.8: From the left: programs T (𝑃), T𝑛 (𝑃) and T𝐻 (𝑃)
4.4.3 Harming Dynamic Data Analysis
Data obfuscation transformations change the representation of data with the aim of hiding both
variable content and usage. Usually, data obfuscation requires the program code to be modified,
so that the original data representation can be reconstructed at runtime. Data obfuscation is
often achieved through data encoding [31, 123].
More specifically, in [52, 92] data encoding for a variable 𝑥 is formalised as a pair of state-
ments: encoding statement𝐶enc = 𝑥 := 𝑓 (𝑥) and decoding statement𝐶dec = 𝑥 := 𝑔(𝑥) for some
function 𝑓 and 𝑔, such that 𝐶dec;𝐶enc = skip. According to [52, 92] a program transformation
T (𝑃) def= 𝐶dec ; 𝑡𝑥 (𝑃);𝐶enc is a data obfuscation for 𝑥 where 𝑡𝑥 adjusts the computations involving
𝑥 in order to preserve program’s functionality, namely Den[[𝑃]] = Den[[𝐶dec; 𝑡𝑥 (𝑃);𝐶enc]]. In
Fig. 4.8 we provide a simple example of data obfuscation from [52, 92] where 𝐶enc = 𝑥 := 2 ∗ 𝑥
and𝐶dec = 𝑥 := 𝑥/2 and T (𝑃) = 𝑥 := 𝑥/2; 𝑡𝑥 (𝑃);𝑥 := 2∗𝑥 and program 𝑃 is the one considered
in Example. 1:
1 input x;
2 sum := 0;
3 while x < 50
4 sum := sum + x;
5 x := x + 1;
This data transformation induces imprecision in the static analysis of the possible values
assumed by 𝑥 at program point •, right inside the while loop.
It is easy to see how the static analysis of the interval of values of 𝑥 at program point • in





𝑥 at • in 𝑃 . However, the dynamic analysis of properties on the values assumed by 𝑥 during
execution at the different program points (e.g., maximal/minimal value, number of possible
values, interval of possible values) has not been hardened in T (𝑃). The values assumed by 𝑥
at • in T (𝑃) are different from the values assumed by 𝑥 at • in 𝑃 but these properties on the
values assumed by 𝑥 are precisely observable by dynamic analysis on T (𝑃).
The transformation T (𝑃) changes the properties of data values wrt 𝑃 , but it does it in an
invariant way: during every execution of T (𝑃) we have that 𝑥 is iteratively incremented by 2
and the guard of the loop becomes 𝑥 < 2 ∗ 50 − 1, and this is observable on any execution of
T (𝑃). This means that by dynamic analysis we could learn that the maximal value assumed
by 𝑥 is 99(= 2 ∗ 50 − 1). Thus, transformation T is not potent wrt properties of data values
according to Definition 6 since it does not diversify the properties of values assumed by
variables among traces.
In order to hamper dynamic analysis we need to diversify data among traces, thus forcing
dynamic analysis to observe more execution traces to be sound. We could do this by making
the encoding and decoding statements parametric on some natural number 𝑛 as described by
the second program T𝑛 (𝑃) = 𝑥 := 𝑥/𝑛; 𝑡𝑥,𝑛 (𝑃);𝑥 := 𝑛 ∗ 𝑥 in Fig. 4.8 (which is the same as 𝑄 in
Example. 1). Indeed, the parametric transformation T𝑛 (𝑃) is potent wrt properties that observe
data values since it diversifies the values assumed by 𝑥 among different executions thanks to
the parameter 𝑛. For example, to observe the maximal value assumed by 𝑥 in T𝑛 (𝑃) we should
observe an execution for every possible value of 𝑛.
This confirms what is observed in [123]: existing data obfuscation makes static analysis
imprecise but it is less effective against dynamic analysis. Interpreting data obfuscation in our
framework allows us to see that, in order to hamper dynamic analysis, data encoding needs to
diversify among traces. This can be done by making the existing data encoding techniques
parametric.
Homomorphic encryption: As argued above, in order to preserve program functionality the
original program code needs to be adapted to the encoding. In general, automatically deriving
the modified code 𝑡𝑥 (𝑃) for a given encoding on every possible program may be complicated.
In this setting, an ideal situation is the one provided by fully homomorphic encryption where
any operation on the original data has its respective version for the encrypted data. It has
been proven that fully homomorphic encryption is possible on any circuit [61]. Let 𝐻𝑒 and 𝐻𝑑
be the fully homomorphic encryption and decryption procedures.
We could design a data obfuscation for the variables in 𝑃 as 𝐻𝑑 ; 𝑃𝐻 ;𝐻𝑒 where the program
variables are encrypted with 𝐻𝑒 , the computation is carried on the encrypted values by using
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variables are decrypted with 𝐻𝑑 . Thus, the original program 𝑃 and 𝑃𝐻 are exactly the same
programs where the operations have been replaced by their homomorphic version.
In Fig. 4.8 on the right we show how a homomorphic encoding of program 𝑃 would
work, where the subscript 𝐻 denotes the homomorphic operations on the encrypted values.
Encryption and decryption procedures have a random nature and use a key (that may be
dependent on input values). Thus, the values of encrypted data varies among program traces.
Moreover, since successive encryptions of the same values would lead to different encrypted
values, we have that re-runs on the same values would generate different encrypted values.
This proves that homomorphic encryption could be useful to design a potent data obfuscation
against dynamic analysis: as it can diversify the encrypted data values among traces and the
original values are retrieved only at the end of the computation.
Abstract Software Watermarking: In [40] the authors propose a sophisticated software water-
marking algorithm and prove its resilience against static program analysis. The watermark can
be extracted only by analysing the program on a specific congruence domain that acts like a
secret key. The authors discuss some possible countermeasures against dynamic analysis that
could reveal the existence of the watermark (and then remove it). Interestingly, the common
idea behind these countermeasures is diversification of the property of data values that the
dynamic analyzer observe.
4.5 Poisons and Antidotes
In this section we introduce a novel class of program transformations that are designed to
disrupt the normal flow of values in a program. The general idea is simple: a source of
randomness is added to a program and is made to majorly affect its semantics, usually by
using it to modify the input value (which hopefully will influence the output of the program).
The randomness is then removed with subsequent operations before the program return,
making the denotational semantics of the modified program equal to those of the original
program. These two phases of the obfuscation are called “poisons” and “antidotes”, signifying
the addition of the randomness (which negatively affects the semantics of the program) and
its subsequent removal before the return point.
The language used in examples is a simplified subset of Python that only considers operations
between integers. To this language we add a 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 function that, given two integers 𝑎.𝑏 such
that 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 will return 𝑖 ∈ ℕ.𝑎 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑏, not unlike the existing Python function 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑡 in the
package 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚. It is easy to see how in the future this could be made to generalize to other





4.5.1 Poisons: Making Programs Run Amok
Poisoning the semantics of a program means introducing randomness to a variable that is
directly used to calculate the output. This is done by injecting additional code at a set point in
the program, guaranteeing that the output will be affected by the added randomness.
It is important to identify and study different types of poisons in order to diversify the
semantics as much as possible and afterwards to craft the correct antidote. In this work, we
will limit the transformations to two types of poisons (and subsequent antidotes): additive and
multiplicative.
Additive Poison (T +
𝑃
) As the name implies, this poison involves adding a randomly gener-
ated value to the poison targets (usually the input variable(s)).
As a simple example we can show the difference between the two types of poisons and
antidotes with the same program shown in the introduction to this chapter. Consider the
program 𝑃 :
1 x = input()
2 y = x * x
3 return y
Listing 4.2: P
This is a program that returns the square of the input value. Using an additive poison means
that we add a random 𝑛 to the initial variable 𝑥 , making the semantics behave wildly, or, as
wild as they can be with the few choices granted by the function 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 .
1 n := rand(2, 5)
2 i = input()
3 x = i + n
4 y = x * x
5 return y
Listing 4.3: T +
𝑃
(𝑃) = 𝑃1
Naturally the semantics (both denotational and trace semantics) of the program have radically
changed as it returns an integer between (𝑖 + 2)2, (𝑖 + 3)2, (𝑖 + 4)2 and (𝑖 + 5)2. Before showing
the related antidote, we introduce the second type of poison.
Multiplicative Poison (T ∗
𝑃
) As the name implies, this transformation multiplies the input
variable by a random value 𝑛. Continuing the example of the program 𝑃 at Listing 4.2, we can
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1 n = rand(2, 5)
2 x = 2 * n
3 y = x * x
4 return y
Listing 4.4: T ∗
𝑃
(𝑃) = 𝑃 ′1
This resulting program can either return (𝑖 ∗ 2)2, (𝑖 ∗ 3)2, (𝑖 ∗ 4)2, or 102.
As with real-world poisons, these transformations will cause trouble if left unchecked. For
this reason we define the antidotes in the following section.
4.5.2 Antidotes: Preserving Input-Output Semantics
An antidote undoes the effects of the poison: by restoring the denotational semantics of
the original program, it allows a run-time convergence of the semantics into its original
output. This transformation can occur at any point after a poison, but is trivial to implement
if placed immediately after the poison. If the antidote is applied too soon, it will have a very
localized impact on the overall trace semantics of the program. If the poison is introduced
at the beginning of the program and the antidote is added right before the end, then the
transformation has the best obfuscating impact on the overall semantics of the program.
On the other hand, the longer the wait after the poison, the hardest it is to properly concoct
a suitable antidote.
Additive Antidote (T +
𝐴
) Antidotes depend on the poison type, so additive poisons can be
“cured” by additive antidotes. A simple example of an additive antidote, when applied to 𝑃1, is
as follows:
1 r = rand(2, 5)
2 i = input()
3 x = i + r
4 y = x * x
5 w = r * r
6 t = r * i
7 z = t + t
8 a = w + z
9 y = y - a
10 return y
Listing 4.5: 𝑃2 = T +𝐴 (T +𝑃 (𝑃)) = T +𝐴 (𝑃1)
Applying the antidote returns the program to its un-poisoned state and the program resumes





by the variable 𝑎 in the code above. The variable involved in the antidote contains all the
spurious information that was added to the computation by the poison.
Consider the trace semantics of the program (S[[𝑃]]) as a function that returns all the states
that have been traversed during the computation. Then the denotational semantics (D[[𝑃]])
is the input-output semantics, meaning that it only returns the final computed value of the
program.
For this example we can then write:
D[[𝑃]] = D[[𝑃2]] ∧ S[[𝑃]] ≠ S[[𝑃2]] (4.6)
Multiplicative Antidote (T ∗
𝐴
) Taking the program at Listing 4.4 we can apply the multi-





1 r = rand(2, 5)
2 i = input()
3 x = i * r
4 y = x * x
5 a = r * r
6 y = y / a
7 return y
Listing 4.6: 𝑃3 = T ∗𝐴 (T ∗𝑃 (𝑃)) = T ∗𝐴 (𝑃 ′1)
Again, the semantic equivalence to 𝑃 is very easy to prove. Starting from the last value of y
and backtracking every instruction of the previous code snippet:
𝑦 = 𝑦/𝑎
[𝑎=𝑟∗𝑟 ]
−−−−−→ 𝑦 = 𝑦/𝑟 2
𝑦=𝑥∗𝑥
−−−−→ 𝑦 = 𝑥2/𝑟 2 𝑥=𝑖∗𝑟−−−−→ 𝑦 = 𝑖2 ∗ 𝑟 2/𝑟 2 = 𝑖2 (4.7)
Adding this to the previous example we have:
D[[𝑃]] = D[[𝑃2]] = D[[𝑃3]] ∧ S[[𝑃]] ≠ S[[𝑃2]] ≠ S[[𝑃3]] (4.8)
Of course, the strength of this obfuscation is not only in the introduction of new trace
semantics for the programs affected, but rather the fact that the values observed at each execu-
tion can change randomly, leading to a non deterministic trace semantics while maintaining a
deterministic denotational semantics.
The previous examples have been constructed using simple programs for illustrative pur-
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2 z = x
3 y = 1
4 while z > 0:
5 y = y * z
6 z = z - 1
7 return y
Listing 4.7: Factorial function in Python
A version of this function that has been transformed with poisons and antidotes is the




2 i = 0
3 n = random.randint(1, 4) #r1 -> probabilistic branching
4 z = x * n #p1 -> poison
5 y = n
6 while z > 0:
7 y = y * z
8 z = z - n
9 y = t1(x, y, n) #t1 -> confluence function
10 return y
11
12 def t1(x, y, n):
13 z = x
14 c = n
15 while z > 0:
16 z = z - 1
17 c = c * n
18 y = int(y / c) #a1 -> antidote
19 return y







This is evidently a multiplicative poison followed by a multiplicative antidote. The construction
of the antidote has been rendered explicit by defining a confluence function, and the actual
antidote application is just the last operation of this function (y = int(y/c)).
Another reason to define a separate confluence function is that it makes it easier to show
what happens when we poison a program twice. We explained earlier how it makes sense to
poison variables that influence the output of the program, which means that we could locate
more than one of such variables. Another important decision has to be made on the location
of the poisoning. In this first example, the variable that we have poisoned is the input variable





We can now perform a more complex poison and antidote transformation to the newly




2 n = random.randint(1, 4) #r1 -> first probabilistic branching
3 z = x * n #p1 -> first poison (multiplicative)
4 y = n
5 m = random.randint(0, 3) #r2 -> second probabilistic branching
6 while z > 0:
7 y = y + m #p2 -> second poison (additive)
8 y = y * z
9 z = z - n
10 y = t2(x, y, n, m) #t2 -> confluence function for r2
11 y = t1(x, y, n) #t1 -> confluence function for r1
12 return y
13
14 def t2(x, y, n, m):
15 z = x * n
16 c = 0
17 while z > 0:
18 c = c + m
19 c = c * z
20 z = z - n
21 y = y - c #a1 -> first antidote (additive)
22 return y
23
24 def t1(x, y, n):
25 z = x
26 c = n
27 while z > 0:
28 z = z - 1
29 c = c * n
30 y = int(y / c) #a2 -> second antidote (multiplicative)
31 return y










This time the poisoned variable is the output variable 𝑦, and the poison location is line 7, in
the while loop. It should be noted that in this example there are both additive and multiplicative
poisons and antidotes. Another interesting thing to notice is that the first antidote applied is
for the second poison. This is a common behaviour for this transformation, as the last poison
added is always the first one to be cured.
The proof of the correctness for this last example could run for many pages, for the more
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Figure 4.9: Monitoring the value of 𝑦 in 𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑃2
𝐴2
the validity of the function, along with more information about the execution traces [97].
In Figure 4.9 we show the value of the variable 𝑦 in multiple runs of the program we just
generated, with 4 as the input value. It can be observed that the values observed converge
twice, first partially at 7 and then finally at the end of the function. In the bulk of the program,
the values of 𝑦 vary wildly as per the design of poisons and antidotes.
4.5.3 Poisons and Antidotes Against Dynamic Analysis
We have anticipated in the introduction to this chapter that the discovery of poisons and
antidotes has led us to generate the formal framework for dynamic analysis that has become
the real focus of this work. The initial motivation was that, while intuitively it is easy to
imagine how introducing randomness to the executed traces could disrupt dynamic analysis,
in practice, there is no formal way of proving it.
In an anti-climatic twist, our framework cannot prove that poisons and antidotes work
against dynamic analysis. Intuitively, the reason is that the transformation does not force the
analysis to explore more paths to observe the same property, at least not in a deterministic
way. The randomness added to the semantics provide more of a probabilistic type of protection





run will confuse any analysis that monitors the computed values in execution traces, but it is
also possible that the property is revealed in one run with a stroke of luck. This leads us to
believe that our framework can be extended to consider probabilistic code protections. The
potency of the transformation can then be expressed with the likelihood of it succeeding, or
with the expected value of executions needed to have a successful analysis.
Another weakness of poisons and antidotes is that, at least for now, it consists only of a
few templates that work with specific operations so they cannot be reliably applied to every
program. This is not unlike certain obfuscations, for example, EncodeArithmetics introduced
in Chapter 3 cannot be applied to programs that have no clear arithmetic operations. Poisons
and antidotes is even more limited than that, and its potency still has to be ascertained against
most analyses. The added computational overhead could also be a problem, as can be seen in
the last example for the factorial function.
4.6 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to propose a formal framework for dynamic
analysis efficacy based on semantic properties. Other works have proposed more empirical
ways to assess the impact of dynamic analysis.
Evaluating Reverse Engineering. Program comprehension guided by dynamic analysis has
been evaluated with specific test cases, quantitative measures and the involvement of human
subjects [35].
For example, comparing the effectiveness of static analysis and dynamic analysis on the
feature location task has been carried out through experiments involving 2 teams of analysts
solving the same problem with a static analysis and a dynamic analysis approach respectively
[142].
In order to compare the effectiveness of different reverse engineering techniques (which
often employ dynamic analysis), Sim et al. propose the use of common benchmarks [131].
The efficacy of protections against human subjects has been evaluated in a set of experiments
by Ceccato et al., finding that program executions are important to understand the behavior of
obfuscated code [25]. Our approach characterizes dynamic attacks and protections according
to their semantic properties, which is an orthogonal work that can be complemented by more
empirical approaches.
Obfuscations Against Dynamic Analysis. One of the first works tackling obfuscations specif-
ically geared towards dynamic analysis is by Schrittwieser and Katzenbeisser [121]. Their
approach adopts some principles of software diversification in order to generate additional
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Similar to this approach, Pawlowski et al. [110] generate additional branches in the CFG
but add non-determinism in order to decide the executed path at runtime. Both of these works
empirically evaluate their methodology and classify it with potency and resilience, two metrics
introduced by Collberg et al. [33]. Banescu et al. empirically evaluated some obfuscations
against dynamic symbolic execution (DSE) [9], finding that DSE does not suffer from the
addition of opaque branches since they do not depend on program input. To overcome this
limitation they propose the Range Dividers obfuscation that we illustrated in Section 4.4. A
recent work by Ollivier et al. refines the evaluation of protections against dynamic symbolic
execution with a framework that enables the optimal design of such protections [106].
All these works share with us the intuition that dynamic analysis suffers from insufficient
path exploration and they prove this intuition with extensive experimentation. Our work aims
at enabling the formal study of these approaches.
Formal Systems. Dynamic taint analysis has been formalized by making the taint information
in the program semantics explicit [124].
Their work focuses on writing correct algorithms and shows some possible pitfalls of
the various approaches. Ochoa et al. [103] use game theory to quantify and compare the
effectiveness of different probabilistic countermeasures with respect to remote attacks that
exploit memory-safety vulnerabilities.
In our work we model MATE attacks. Shu et al. introduce a framework that formalizes the
detection capability in existing anomaly detection methods [130]. Their approach equates the
detection capability to the expressiveness of the language used to characterize normal program
traces.
4.7 Conclusions
This work represents the first step towards a formal investigation of the precision of dynamic
analysis in relation to dynamic code attack and defenses. The results that we have obtained so
far confirm the initial intuition: diversification of the execution traces is the key for harming
dynamic analysis. Since dynamic analysis generalises what it learns from a partial observation
of program behaviour, diversification makes this generalisation less precise (dynamic analysis
cannot consider what it has not observed). We think that this work would be the basis
for further interesting investigations. Indeed, there are many aspects that still need to be
understood for the development of a complete framework for the formal specification of the
precision of dynamic analysis (no false negatives), and for the systematic development of
program transformations that induce imprecision.





equivalence relations. It would be interesting to generalise the proposed framework wrt to
any semantic property that can be formalised as a closure operator on trace semantics. The
properties that we have considered so far correspond to the set of atomistic closures where the
abstract domain is additive. We would like to generalise our framework to properties modelled
as abstract domains and where the precision of dynamic analysis is probably characterised in
terms of the join-irreducible elements of such domains. A further investigation would probably
lead to a classification of the properties usually considered by dynamic analysis: properties
of traces, properties of sets of traces, relational properties, hyper-properties, together with a
specific characterisation of the precision of the analysis and of the program transformations
that can reduce it. This unifying framework would provide a common ground where to
interpret and compare the potency of different software protection techniques in harming
dynamic analysis.
Another aspect worth studying is to view dynamic analysis as a learner that observes
properties of some execution traces (training set) and then generalises what it has observed,
where the generalisation process is the identity function. We wonder what would happen if
we consider more sophisticated generalisation processes such as the ones used by machine
learning. Would it be possible to define what is learnable? Would it be possible to formally
define robustness in the adversarial setting? We think that this is an intriguing research
direction worth pursuing.
Since the framework cannot prove the efficacy of poisons and antidotes, we believe that it
can be extended to work with probabilistic code transformations. With this, the first thing to
change would be the transformation potency, as it cannot be calculating exactly how many
execution traces are needed to uncover the semantic property under analysis. This exact
quantity can be substituted with the likelihood of the analysis discovering the property or
with the expected value of the number of traces needed to discover the property.
Overall, the framework presented in this work, along with the challenges uncovered for
the formal study of dynamic analysis, is nothing but a first stepping stone towards a very
ambitious goal. The next works in this direction will hopefully shed some more light onto the





This chapter serves as a central gathering point for all the contributions in the thesis. We
start by giving a brief summary of each chapter, focusing on the methodologies and positive
results. Afterwards, we postulate the possible future works and the limitations. The last section
contains a brief distillation of the conclusions that we believe can be made as a result of the
works presented in this thesis.
5.1 Summaries
Each one of the previous chapters is summarized in this section.
5.1.1 The Problem
In chapter 1 we introduced the problem of malware classification and why it is represents a
worthwhile endeavor. The unprecedented diffusion of malware in the last few years can be
connected to the wider distribution of devices that can be attacked, mainly due to the ubiquity
of mobile devices and their increasing complexity.
One of themost important tasks in the fight against malware is collecting them into “families”,
which are groups of malware samples that exhibit the same malicious behaviours. This allows
for quicker responses to attacks, as many defenses are designed to work against all members
of the same malware family.
In order to achieve this goal we need to be able to group programs according to their
behaviour. More technically, we need to group them according to their semantics, which rep-
resents what the programs actually do, and not how they are written. This is an uncomputable
problem, which means that a generic algorithm for semantic equivalence of programs does
not exist.
Since the problem is uncomputable, the only way to achieve the goal is to allow some impre-
cision by considering an approximation of the program semantics (also called “abstraction”),
rather than the whole program itself. In order to group the malware samples according to
their semantic similarity, we can then extract the semantic abstractions (a representation of





This type of approach is always possible if there is enough domain expertise on the pro-
gramming language at hand and if the malware samples can be reverted to their source code
or at least to a disassembled version. This is well represented in scenario 1, where the code is
readily available to the analyzers and their domain expertise can be used to the fullest extent.
Scenario 1 represents an ideal situation that is not always common in malware analysis. For
this reason we introduce scenario 2, where the malware samples have to be analyzed from
their compiled binaries since the source code is not available and, we assume, the disassembly
process is at least partially impeded. Finding a suitable program representation and a similarity
measure then becomes a harder problem due to the lack of domain expertise.
Both scenarios so far allow the use of static analysis to achieve the goal of familial malware
classification. Static analysis usually overapproximates the semantics of programs, thus
allowing imprecision.
A third scenario is then introduced where the analyzers do not have access even to the
malware binaries. This can be reflected in a realistic scenario where an antivirus can only
execute a malware sample in a sandbox and then send the execution traces to the analyzer.
This scenario presents different challenges from the previous two, mostly because the domain
expertise lacks the powerful theoretical tools of static analysis.
In the following we explore the three scenarios in more detail and describe the insights
gained during our studies.
5.1.2 Malware Analysis on Android
Chapter 2 is firmly situated in scenario 1, where the source code of the malware samples is
readily available (or, at least, a decompiled version of the programs is obtainable). Android is
the perfect environment for such a scenario, since the applications can be easily decompiled
through the use of an intermediate language called “smali”. Malware on Android is also very
interesting because of its pervasiveness and its potential to affect many more people than
standard viruses.
R.E.H.A.
In order to classify malware on Android according to their behaviour we designed a system
that extracts the smali representation of the malware samples and focuses on each method in
the code. A simple first observation is made by noticing that, thanks to the security design
of Android, apps can only perform malicious actions when they call a specific set of system





methods that never interact with such APIs (“risky” APIs) and only focus on the methods that
are potentially harmful to the user.
After this initial filtering we extract the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of each method and use
it as a basic feature (a program representation) for the program similarity. Building a similarity
measure between CFGs extracted frommethods would likely incur in a computational overhead
and a loss of precision with the presence of program obfuscations that aim to disrupt the normal
control flow of the programs. In order to combat this we adopt an approximate representation
of the CFGs called 3D-CFG, which is a projection of the CFG into a 3D space and results in the
methods being represented by a single vector called “centroid”. The centroid is very similar
to a center of mass for the 3D-CFG and can be computed at basically no cost during the CFG
construction. The similarity function between 3D-CFGs is also very light computationally
since it consists of three simple vectorial operations.
This approach is implemented in a tool called R.E.H.A. (Reverse Engineering Helper for
Android), for which we also design a search space reduction algorithm that further decreases
the computational complexity. The tool is then tested against a very popular, albeit dated,
dataset of Android malware called GENOME, achieving around 88% accuracy in a classification
task. A second round of tests has been conducted on new datasets collected at the time of
the first study (2017), containing both general malware and ransomware samples. This new
dataset has been first labeled through AVClass, a tool that takes the labels assigned to the
malware samples by majority voting of most common antivirus software.
These tests revealed that R.E.H.A. can group together members of the same class that have
been misclassified by many antivirus software into different families. At the same time, it
can differentiate between malware samples that have the same label according to AVClass by
assigning them to separate families when they do not share enough malicious behaviours.
StranDroid
R.E.H.A.’s methodology, of course, is not perfect and allows for many false positives. In order to
quell some of this imprecision we introduce a different program representation called “strand”
and a new similarity function between them. Strands are easily described as backward slices
confined in a basic block. Every method is then represented as a set of strands, each collected
from every basic block in the method. Methods that do not call risky APIs are still filtered out,
but now, strands that do not flow into an API call are also removed. We then design a similarity
function between strands that makes use of the Jaccard Index by treating them effectively as
sets.
Strands are a more fine-grained program representation than 3D-CFG centroids and do not





similarity of different methods. We test this with the same ransomware and general malware
datasets collected for REHA and notice a significant improvement in the precision of the
similarity analysis. At the same time, the feature extraction algorithms and their similarity
function lead to a significant increase in computational complexity when compared to our
previous effort. This a common tradeoff in static analysis: in order to have precision we need
to sacrifice computational resources.
5.1.3 Learning on Malware Binaries
Scenario 2 requires us to find a way to group malware into their true family without their
source code or any disassembly attempt. Using solely the compiled binary to classify malware
is a task that is well suited to many machine learning techniques, as we can treat the binary as
raw data and let the algorithms extract a proper program representation and the similarity
function. To this end, we encode each binary as an image by extracting their hexadecimal
representation and assigning a pixel intensity to each hex value. Each image is then resized
through bicubic interpolation. At this point, we can treat the problem as an image classification
task and we can employ common deep learning algorithms such as Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) to classify the malware samples.
Naturally, the learning approach is not free from downsides. For example, instead of relying
on domain expertise for the design of the program representations and their similarity function,
the learning algorithms need to rely on a ground truth given by the labels of the malware
dataset. This poses some problems because it requires considerable human effort to correctly
classify these samples into the right family and sometimes this results in datasets that are
either undersized or unbalanced.
When a dataset is undersized, it is harder to use it to train deep learning algorithms,
as the huge volume of free variables (weights) in a deep network require a proportionally
larger amount of data point to classify, lest we incur in the all-too-common problem of
overfitting. The unbalanced nature of certain datasets is also a detriment to the proper training
of deep networks, since the dataset is biased towards a few bigger classes and the resulting
classification algorithms will also tend to favor these classes. Both of these problems make for
bad generalization of the classifications.
In image classification, it is usually easy to deal with both these problems by using data
augmentation techniques. These are simple image transformations, such as rotations, flips,
zooms etc. that result in new data points that still represent the same original object as the
initial image but are different enough to generate models that generalize better.
The same exact techniques cannot be used for our problem setting, as we are classifying





points that do not represent the same original object (they probably would not represent a
program anymore). For this reason we developed a novel technique for data augmentation
that works specifically for program classification.
To this end, we employ a set of obfuscations in order to generate new programs from the
original ones before transforming them into images. We develop a proof of concept dataset
from 47 sample programs in C taken from programming tutorials and from the solutions to
the Google [...]. After the programs have been iteratively obfuscated, we obtain a dataset of
18800 programs divided into 47 semantic equivalence classes.
We then design two deep learning models, a convolutional neural network (CNN) and
a long-short term memory (LSTM) to classify the aforementioned dataset. The results are
promising, as the accuracies range from 92% for the CNN to 94% for the LSTM.
Since the goal of our work is still malware classification, we train our two models on the
MalImg and the Microsoft Malware datasets. The LSTM (our best performing model) achieves
98.6% and 92% accuracy respectively.
Another technique that can be used to combat the lack of properly sized datasets is transfer
learning, which consists of learning on a large dataset and then “freezing” the weights of the
feature-extraction part of deep learners. The head (the dense layer) of the network can be then
swapped with a new one in order to classify a previously unseen (and possibly undersized)
dataset. This is a very valuable technique as it can also be used to remedy the lack of proper
computational resources. After all, many of these deep networks often require significant
monetary investments for the proper hardware.
In order to apply transfer learning in this domain, we leverage the fact that we can generate
an arbitrarily-large dataset thanks to our data augmentation technique. We then test transfer
learning techniques with both models and both malware datasets, finding that it performs
much better on the CNN and the MalImg dataset. We also verify that it is indeed possible to
perform transfer learning between the two malware datasets themselves.
5.1.4 A Formal Framework for Dynamic Analysis
After exploring two scenarios with static analysis, we hypothesize a new scenario where we
do not possess the source code nor the binary. In scenario 3, we are interested in dynamic
analysis alone.
Some of the domain expertise used in previous scenarios can be backed by the wide selection
of theoretical results in the static analysis field. These results allow us to know for sure, and
prove formally, which obfuscations work against which types of analysis. Generally, they






Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, cannot draw from the same deep pool of knowledge.
Formal frameworks for dynamic analysis are few and they generally do not aim to explain
the effect of obfuscations on dynamic analysis. This is an obstacle that we did not face in the
scientific efforts previously described when working with static analysis techniques. For this
reason, in chapter 4 we build the foundation of a new formal framework which aims to address
the problem of describing the efficacy of obfuscating transformations against specific dynamic
analysis techniques.
In order to build such framework, we take inspiration from abstract interpretation, a well
known mathematical framework for static analysis. From this we define the topological nature
of dynamic analysis as partitions of the set of execution traces. Intuitively, we equate the
power of dynamic analysis with the concept of code coverage, which is indeed often used to
evaluate the effectiveness of dynamic analysis.
Similarly, the power of obfuscations is shown as their ability to add new partitions to the
set of execution traces in order to make the code coverage harder. We then describe some
obfuscations designed to work against dynamic analysis and show how they can be formalized
using our framework to prove that they actually do harm the process of dynamic analysis.
5.2 Limitations and Future Work
Each of the three last chapters so far summarized lends itself to many possible future works.
5.2.1 Malware on Android
The 3D-CFG centroid is an approximation of the CFG extracted from each method in the
malware samples. This approximation works very well against program transformations
that slightly alter the control flow structure of the method, but it does not bode well against
pervasive control modifications. The main problem is that the centroid is very sensitive
to changes in the number of statements of the method (which increase the “weight” of the
centroid). Due to this, it is relatively easy to add spurious statements to certain basic blocks in
order to shift the centroid and render the 3D-CFG effectively unusable for program similarity.
Another problem is that the CFG itself might not be a good choice for the task at hand.
With Android especially, it is very common to have methods that have the same exact control
structure, often comprising a single basic block with no control statements at all. This leads to
many false positives that are only slightly mitigated by the API vectors that we introduced in
chapter 2.
The approach that resulted in the StranDroid tool is also not perfect. It suffers from false
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positives as well, just in lower numbers, and it requires much more time for each analysis
on the same dataset compared to R.E.H.A.. One thing that could help in this respect is the
development of a new search space algorithm focused on strands.
5.2.2 Learning on Binaries
One of the advantages of the previous scenario is the ability to directly apply domain expertise
and know exactly the expressive power of the program representations. This allows us to
properly deal with obfuscations, since it is clear how they impact the analysis.
This is an advantage that we miss in the deep learning context encountered in scenario
2. Letting the algorithms build their own program representation and similarity measure
lessens the impact of not being able to directly apply domain expertise to the problem. At
the same time, it takes control away from the analyzer and makes it harder to understand the
vulnerabilities of the approach.
It is not known to us whether there are some obfuscations that would generate new samples
that would bemisclassified by ourmodels. On the other hand, this could be seen as an advantage
since the attackers also would struggle in order to find such obfuscations. We postulate that
adversarial learning would be much harder in this setting. With normal image classification
problems, it is relatively trivial to modify an image slightly to maintain its meaning while
forcing the models into a misclassification. To apply adversarial learning on this problem, it
would not be enough to slightly modify the images in the dataset. The code of the malware
samples itself would need to be modified with two requirements: 1) maintain the semantics of
the program and 2) generate a binary whose image will force a misclassification. This problem
is certainly non-trivial to solve and we would like to investigate it thoroughly.
In general, one of the biggest limitations of our approach mirrors the problems of many
deep neural network solutions: the system is not easily interpretable. This is mainly due to the
fact that the input to the models is the raw binary and the models have to generate the features
on their own. While there are many techniques that can reveal what features are observed by
the networks, they tend to be features of the images that hardly can be linked back to semantic
features in the original code. This avenue has been explored in the past using networks that
employ attention mechanisms but we would like to delve deeper into this problem, as the
interpretability of the results is one of the best features of the approach in scenario 1.
In addition, we believe that exploring different types of resizing algorithms could be inter-







The framework built in chapter 4 has been designed with a mathematical foundation that
should be easily connected to abstract interpretation. One of the main reasons for this design
decision was to find a way to connect the two frameworks and, hopefully, enable talking about
dynamic analysis and static analysis with the same mathematical language. This would make
it easier to reason about many types of hybrid analyses which use both static and dynamic
analysis in order to achieve their goal.
More realistically, we would like to translate some of the concepts common to abstract
interpretation directly into our dynamic analysis framework. For example, the approach to
completeness defined in abstract interpretation would be very interesting when mirrored in
dynamic analysis.
Another direction for future improvements would be to enhance the framework to deal with
randomized obfuscations such as poisons and antidotes.
5.3 Conclusions
The three scenarios presented in this thesis, and the wildly different constraints they add to the
problems, make it clear that there cannot be one unified approach to solve program similarity
in the context of malware analysis.
The open system scenario is ideal to apply domain knowledge in order to customize the
program representations and the similarity analysis between them. This comes with many ad-
vantages, among which is the ability to accurately predict when an obfuscation will negatively
impact the analysis at hand. In order to make good use of these inherent advantages, we built
a program similarity tool for Android malware called R.E.H.A. that is able to group malware
according to how many malicious behaviours they share. This led us to discover that malware
samples, especially recent ones, are often mislabeled by commercial antivirus software that
rely mostly on simple syntactic signatures.
Due to the lack of precision of our system, we investigated a more fine-grained code feature
for malware similarity by extracting strands, or backward traces in the scope of basic blocks.
After building a second tool for malware similarity called StranDroid, we verified that indeed
the more precise nature of the feature led to better results in the classification of Android
malware. The new system is not without its faults as static analysis in general is prone to
precision loss due to the nature of the approximations used.
Due to the difficulty often encountered in disassembly binaries, we hypothesized a second





in mind. The natural solution to this problem is to resort to deep learning solutions. We
explored the most common problems in this context and isolated two very common ones:
undersized datasets and unbalanced datasets. For both of these problems, we designed a new
technique for data augmentation specific to program classification problems. We then designed
two deep learning models, a convolutional neural network and a long short-term memory in
order to train them on a custom dataset generated using the aforementioned technique. After
verifying that resulting networks were able to successfully classify the dataset, we used them
to classify two common datasets composed of Windows malware samples.
The positive results of the classification of the malware datasets led us to investigate a
second possible way to improve deep learning problems in this context: transfer learning.
With this in mind, we experimented with learning the features from our custom built dataset
and then used the network with a new head to successfully classify the malware samples.
The third scenario has been investigated in order to introduce dynamic analysis into the
context of program similarity for malware classification. The lack of a proper formal foundation
led us to establish a mathematical framework based on topological abstractions of the program
semantics. Thanks to this framework, we showed how it is possible to express a dynamic
analysis and, at the same time, show how an obfuscation could work against it. There is great
potential in this approach which has only been touched upon.
We believe that all three scenarios investigated present some unique research challenges
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